China Academic Library

Guangdan Pan

Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism

外语教学与研究出版社
FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEACHING AND RESEARCH PRESS

China Academic Library

Academic Advisory Board:

Researcher Geng, Yunzhi, *Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China*
Professor Han, Zhen, *Beijing Foreign Studies University, China*
Researcher Hao, Shiyuan, *Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China*
Professor Li, Xueqin, *Department of History, Tsinghua University, China*
Professor Li, Yining, *Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, China*
Researcher Lu, Xueyi, *Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China*
Professor Tang, Yijie, *Department of Philosophy, Peking University, China*
Professor Wong, Young-tsu, *Department of History, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA*
Professor Yu, Keping, *Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, China*
Professor Yue, Daiyun, *Department of Chinese Language and Literature, Peking University, China*
Zhu, Yinghuang, *China Daily Press, China*

Series Coordinators:

Zitong Wu, *Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, China*
Yan Li, *Springer*

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11562

Guangdan Pan

Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism

外语教学与研究出版社
FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEACHING AND RESEARCH PRESS

Springer

Guangdan Pan (1899–1967)
Minzu University of China
Beijing, China

Sponsored by Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences (本书获中华社会科学基金资助)

ISSN 2195-1853 ISSN 2195-1861 (electronic)
ISBN 978-3-662-44574-7 ISBN 978-3-662-44575-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4
Springer Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014952290

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publishers, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publishers' locations, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publishers can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publishers make no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Preface

The May Fourth New Culture Movement in 1919 marked a new chapter of China's modern ideology and culture. Around this great event, with the gradual construction and improvement of China's modern university system, the modern academic system started to establish and flourish under the efforts of returned overseas Chinese scholars. Some disciplines made relatively high achievements in the 1930s and 1940s. Pan Guangdan, among those scholars who made contribution, was a very active and distinguished one in fields such as eugenics, sociology and sexual psychology. *A Study on Feng Xiaoqing*, written in the summer of 1922, was the first relatively important work throughout his academic life. Towards the breakout of the "Cultural Revolution" in 1965, his translation of *The Descent of Man* by Charles Darwin marked the end of Pan's academic career. Over four decades, Pan with his wisdom and diligence strived to seek a path to improving the quality of the Chinese nation, leaving behind him a great number of works that are still widely read and highly regarded today. It is fortunate that most of his works have been painstakingly collected and compiled into the 14-volume *A Collection of Pan Guangdan's Works* with a total of 6.4 million words, which provides a reliable source for later studies and researches.

Due to various reasons, however, the 14-volume *A Collection of Pan Guangdan's Works* does not include Pan's sizable and well-written English works. In spite of titles and sources of these English articles listed as a catalogue in a detailed manner at the end of the 11th volume, it is still a painstaking job to search for these articles from different publications home and abroad ages ago. It was especially difficult before the publication of the English edition *The China Critic* in 2011. A good proof is that these English articles are rarely valued and used more than a decade since the Collection's publication. Today, Springer Publishing and Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press are to jointly publish *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*—a collection of Pan Guangdan's English academic works—and at the same time add it to the China Academic Library co-created by the two publishers. By doing so, Pan's English works are available to more readers, to digest, appreciate

and study his academic achievements and spiritual world. The benefits for later generations are beyond measure.

As to Pan's English writing, there is no unanimous opinion among scholars. Liu Yingshi of the same generation once referred to him in his article written during the War of Resistance Against Japan as "Mr. Pan can write English in an elegant style".[1] Fei Xiaotong, the famous sociologist, once said, "I heard his English is so fluent, pronunciation so accurate that you wouldn't be able to tell he's a Chinese if you just hear him speaking next door. After coming back to China, he used to teach in Shanghai and also undertook the position of the editor for *The China Critic*, a renowned English magazine. The editorials composed by him were well received at that time. Being elegant in both manner and words, well versed in both Chinese and Western culture are no overstatement on him at all."[2] In the 1930s,Wang Mian (pseudonym: Kun Xi), a student of the sociology department of Tsinghua University, once recalled that, "Mr. Pan was of great attainments in English. Back in Shanghai, along with Lin Yutang, Quan Zenggu and Wu Ching-hsiung, Pan was the special contributor for *The China Critic*. There is one thing known by few people: among all the English translations of the will of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, first president and founding father of the Republic of China, the best version came from Mr. Pan. Especially the first sentence of the will was translated in refined and graceful words, which was quite impressive."[3] This time I take preface writing as an opportunity to read most of his works included in this Collection and thus had a better understanding of his English writings. What strikes me most is his rich vocabulary and refined wording. As Mr. Wang Mian said, the translation of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen' will is indeed impressive and unforgettable. Actually, Pan was such a talent because he was only 26 years old when he first translated it in 1925. Two years later, he revised his own work.

Over the decades, the compilers of *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism* have tried every means to collect Pan's English academic works as much as possible. With their efforts, only a few are left out. To my knowledge, some of the articles were obtained through all kinds of difficulties, such as the one published on *Eugenical News* when he was in his senior year, and the one where he explained Chinese people's religious beliefs to American people during the War of Resistance Against Japan on a such lesser-known magazine that it was hard to trace in major libraries in China. Fortunately, both the above-mentioned are included in this Collection. The compiler also spent quite some time identifying Pan's works from those published on *The China Critic* in his pseudonyms. No one could possibly understand what the compiler had gone through unless he had done it himself once. Here I would like to go into details concerning the aforementioned articles that have been left out. For example, in 1947,

[1] Liu Yingshi: "The Issue on Students Joining the Party", *Central Weekly*, issue 13, vol.3, 7 October, 1940.

[2] Fei Xiaotong: "'The Descent of Man' Postscript Translated by Pan & Hu, Moderation and Adaptation: In Memory of Pan Guangdan's 100th Anniversary", compiled by Pan Naimu, China Renmin University Press, 1999, pp. 258–259.

[3] Kun Xi: "My Teacher Pan Guangdan, Moderation and Adaptation: In Memory of Pan Guangdan's 100th Anniversary", compiled by Pan Naimu, p. 130.

Pan Guangdan and Fei Xiaotong were commissioned by the Institute of the Pacific Relations to conduct a research on the "The Chinese Gentry", some papers of which were completed[4] but could not be recovered.

His English works enable us to have a more accurate and clearer understanding of the development of Pan Guangdan's academic ideas. When Pan was still a senior student in the Dartmouth College, USA, in 1923, he published a long article titled *Eugenics and China: A Preliminary Survey of the Background* on the American academic journal *Eugenical News*, in which he did a preliminary survey on the relations between eugenics and the China's racial traits and certain far-reaching social systems. Later, part of its contents was adapted to the Chinese article *The Westernization and Eugenical Issues in China* and published on *The Eastern Miscellany*, which received the criticism from the biologist Zhou Jianren. But what needs to be clarified here is that the Chinese article is not a direct translation from the English one, given the different readership. They differ in the perspectives of arguments and some references. It was only 15 months after Pan studied in the States when he published this article in November, 1923. What he achieved within such a short period not only suggested that he had a good knowledge of English and Western culture, capability of absorbing the classroom knowledge quickly and conducting researches with the help of scientific literature, but also indicated that he had probably already had certain knowledge and thoughts about eugenics back in Tsinghua University prior to his studies in the States. Otherwise, completing such a well-put article within only one year's accumulation of knowledge would have been unimaginable. In 1952, Pan Guangdan said in a self-criticism article that his American teacher always appreciated his work and English writings, "whenever the teacher read out to the whole class short pieces of excellent works by students, mine always went first; the teacher would also recommend my longer pieces to journals for publication."[5] This article published on the *Eugenical News* in November, 1923, might be one of the "longer pieces" that Pan did not specify here. For another example, the essence of Pan's academic thought is generally considered as humanity, which could be completely reflected in his early article *Backbone of Chinese Humanistic Thought* and *The Superstitious Are Not Lost*, a short review, both published in 1934. In 1932, his *Eulogy to Mr. Jin Jingyang* touched upon Confucian humanism from the perspective of his close friend Jin. Today, through his English literature, we have access to more details about how he shaped and developed humanistic thought. In 1933, he made comments on a sociological book *The Mind of China* centering on Chinese people's religious beliefs by Edwin D. Harvey, a professor from his Alma Mater Dartmouth College, claiming that the author put too much emphasis on religious practices such as the worship of supernatural powers, while underestimated the role of Confucian humanism that it deserves. In his opinion, "the Confucianist is not anti-religious, but his religion is frankly founded

[4] Refer to the diaries of Pan Guangdan on 10 August, 1947, *A Collection of Pan Guangdan's Works*, vol. 11, compiled by Pan Naimu, Peking University Press, 2000, p. 280.

[5] Pan Guangdan: Why I'm Incapable of Hating America—A Self-examination, *A Collection of Pan Guangdan's Works*, vol. 10, compiled by Pan Naimu, Peking University Press, 2000, p. 496.

upon man, and is anthropomorphic and anthropocentric in the best sense of the words"; "Gods are made by man, and being man-made, they are capable of ever being refashioned to suit man's purpose." He also resorted to the spirit of "worshipping the gods as if they were present" to further elaborate on Chinese's respect for the gods. However, this humanism always stays at a respectful distance from the gods, avoiding being their slaves. But when the gods fail to answer the prayers, they might be even at the risk of being damaged by the indignant people. In a word, this means the destiny of gods is under control of those who show respect and pray to the gods. Here, Pan's criticisms on the American scholars' views of Chinese religion and elaboration on Confucianism have already reflected the essence of his two later articles which were written in 1934 and specialized in the humanistic thought of Confucianism. Using "anthropomorphic" and "anthropocentric" to characterize the thoughts, the articles are concise, powerful and impressive.

Hu Shih published an English article *Conflict of Cultures* on the *China Christian Yearbook* in 1929. When talking about embracing the Western culture, he used two words "whole-heartedly" and "wholesale" for the same meaning despite their obviously semantic difference. This misuse was spotted by Pan Guangdan, who was of great English attainments and had a nose for this. In a book review written in February, 1930, not only did he make a distinction between the two words, but also put forward alternative attitudes for the Western culture "be half-hearted in acceptance of the whole of Western civilization", "be whole-hearted in accepting portions of Western civilization" or "whole-hearted selective adoption". Pan Guangdan appreciated the last one most. In June, 1936, Hu Shih acknowledged that Pan Guangdan had a point in the *Wholehearted Cosmopolitanization and Wholesale Westernization* and then replaced "wholesale Westernization" with "whole-hearted cosmopolitanization". The story was rarely known by people, given that the English *China Critic*'s readership was mainly for Westerners home and abroad, and the minority of Chinese intellectuals well versed in English. As a loyal *China Critic* reader, however, Hu Shih noticed and was impressed by the point of view raised by Pan who only devoted part of his book review to discuss.[6] Pan's criticisms and discussions got spread due to being mentioned in *Whole-hearted Cosmopolitanization and Wholesale Westernization.* That two intellectual elites wrote in English about the attitudes Chinese people should adopt towards the Western culture became a deed praised far and wide.

The China Critic, born in May, 1928, was the major journal where Pan Guangdan published his English articles. As a weekly journal sponsored by Chinese people with great overseas influences, its major editors who were returned overseas students previously graduated from Tsinghua University, adopted a dual standards towards culture by judging China with a Western standard and judging the Western culture with a Chinese standard. Some scholars pointed out that, "What they have in common with the Westernizers is that, they agree the traditional Chinese culture is

[6] To learn more about the relationship between Hu Shih and *The China Critic*, refer to Zhao Libin, "Criticism and Defense: A Conflict between Hu Shih and The China Critic", Academic Research, issue 10, 2013.

not suitable for the modern society and some cores of the Chinese culture need to be supplemented and improved by the Western culture. But they object to the direct transfer of cultures. They underline that culture is not imitation but creation and adjustment. What they have in common with the Orientalism is that, they put emphasis on the digestion and absorption in cultural exchanges and attach great importance to the building-up of subject consciousness while assimilating foreign cultures. Nevertheless, unlike the Orientalism who fantasizes about saving and exceeding Western culture with Chinese culture, they are fully aware of the fact that Chinese culture categorized as cultural chaos and cultural imbalance is at a disadvantage within this multi-culture world."[7] This feature is also reflected in Pan Guangdan's works, in which he both absorbed and criticized the views of the Western scholars with the purpose to rebuild the Chinese culture while maintaining subjective consciousness. Pan Guangdan and his peer scholars, all well versed in both Chinese and Western cultures, served as a bridge for Chinese and Western cultural exchanges in a sense. On the one hand, they endeavored to introduce the advanced Western culture to China. On the other hand, they took a new perspective to interpret the essence of Chinese culture which promoted its own rebirth and then presented it to the West in English.

When doubling as the editor of *The China Critic*, Pan Guangdan made great achievements in various academic fields. It was also the same time when he worked and cooperated closely with the liberal intellectuals. They had a great influence on the formation and development of Pan's liberal political view as well as his participation in the democratic movements during the War of Resistance Against Japan. However, throughout the end of the 1920s to the beginning of the 1930s, all of Pan's published works, in English or Chinese, barely touched upon politics and occasionally talked insignificant topics concerning politics at most. He devoted more to the issues such as culture, society and eugenics, with strong patriotic feelings between the lines.

In a nutshell, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism* is of great value for us to have an overall and in-depth understanding of the development of Pan's academic thought, and to explore the spiritual world of the scholars related to *The China Critic* who were dedicated to rebuilding of the Chinese culture and bridging the Western and Chinese cultures. On top of that, although the English expressions more than eight decades ago might not be familiar to today's readers, we can still travel through history to appreciate the richness, elegance and refinement of the predecessors' English and get delight from its beauty.

Institute of Modern History Wenhao Lv
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

[7] Deng Lilan: "A Brief Discussion on Cultural Value Orientation of The China Critic: Centered on the Debate on Chinese and Western Culture Initiated by Hu Shih, Pearl Buck and Lin Yutang", *Fujian Forum* (Humanistic and Social Science Edition), issue 1, 2005.

Contents

1 Eugenics in China: A Preliminary Survey of the Background 1
1.1 The Chinese as a Race 2
1.2 The Chinese and Biology 4
1.3 Some of the Social Institutions Analyzed 6

2 Evaluation of Chinese Student Fraternities in America 11

3 Sociobiological Implications of Confucianism 25
3.1 What Confucius Did Not Teach 25
3.2 What Confucius Did Teach 32

4 An Anthropological View on China's Troubles 41

5 Why Christianity Fails in China 49

6 China and Birth Control 55

7 The Problem of the Cultural Hybrid 63

8 Browbeating Prostitution? 71

9 Familism and the Optimum Family 77

10 The Meaning of a National Examination System 83

11 Glimpses into the Universities 89

12 Notes on Modern Marriage 95

13 Chinese Colonization in Manchuria 101
13.1 A Word of Introduction 101
13.2 Colonization Movement During the Ming Dynasty 102
13.3 "The Manchu-Manchuria Policy" 105
13.4 A Period of Steady Growth 1858–1928 109
13.5 Japanese and Korean Immigration into Manchuria 115

13.6 Manchuria and China's Population Problem (The Quantitative Aspect) 117
13.7 Manchuria and China's Population Problem (The Qualitative Aspect) 119
13.8 Concluding Remarks 121
Further Reading 122

14 The Third Session of the Institute of Pacific Relations 123

15 Selection and Athletic Prowess 129

16 Bon Voyage to Chekiang Refugees 131

17 Patrilineage and the Surname in the New Civil Code 133

18 Consanguineous Marriage and the Law 137

19 Genealogy in China: A Neglected Phase of Historical Study 145

20 The Late Mr. Yuan Hsi-tao 153

21 Whither China's Womanhood? 159

22 Japan's Rape on Civilization 163
22.1 Introduction 163
22.2 The Facts 165
22.3 An Interpretation 174

23 Since Darwin's Death 177

24 Japan's Southward Policy 181

25 Bankruptcy of Higher Education 183

26 From Lausanne To Lousan 185

27 Some Vital Statistics from Kuala Lumpur 189

28 Manchuria as China's "Life Line" 193

29 Havelock Ellis as a Humanist 199

30 Construction for Rehabilitation 205

31 Ma Chun-wu (马君武) 211

32 Educational Facilities at Home 215

33 Birth Control and Oversea Chinese 217

34 Eugenics and Birth Regulation 219

35 The Chinese as Believers 223

Chapter 1
Eugenics in China: A Preliminary Survey of the Background

In the eyes of the evolutionist China is a land where natural selection is still working more or less unhampered. Population has seldom been a problem in China. The enormous birth rate has always been, at normal times, balanced by an equally high death rate. The following remarks from a foreign resident in China are worth noting:

> The loss of life from abnormal causes in China in each decade must be far greater than in any other portion of the world, with the possible exception of India in former times. Apart from the congestion of population in the great centers, where, with the characteristic indifference to sanitation and hygiene, a favorable field is offered to and taken advantage of by numerous epidemics . . . China is particularly susceptible to recurring visitations of floods and famine. Chinese chronicles are filled with the recital of national or local disasters. . . . (*China Year Book*, 1922).

The mortality due to various zymotic diseases is very high; 700,000 persons were said to have died of tuberculosis alone in a single year.

There are no vital statistics available to show the relative number of births and deaths per annum. But that the death rate as above indicated is on the whole highly selective is obvious.

Racial decadence, in a state of nature, is said to be impossible. It is only when the forces of nature are retarded by those of culture, to use the word in its broadest sense, that eugenics, first as an empirical and crude practice, and later as a science and an art, finds its origin and development. It is then that the "selective birth rate" has to replace at least partly the "selective death rate."

Since the middle of last century, with the influx of Western culture, this comparatively selective death rate in China has been perhaps steadily decreasing. The new industrial and economic development, the rush to the city, the charitable establishments,

---

(Originally published in *Eugenical News*, Vol. VIII, No. 11, November, 1923, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_1

and many other attempts at merely euthenic improvement have likely conspired, or will have conspired in the next 10 or 20 years at least, to upset the old equilibrium, which is not to be regained until a new set of compatible conditions will have been first introduced—and these conditions must be so consciously directed as to be eugenical.

So the population problem in China, when thus reviewed, is essentially the problem of the whole civilized world. It is not that too few are now dying, which one cannot help, nor is it that too many are being born—in short, it is not a problem of overpopulation, as so many students of sociology, both native and foreign, are lamenting. The real problem is whether the enormous numbers that are being brought to the world are of the best stock of the race. The problem in China is as yet not so serious when compared with that of some of the countries in the West, since all stocks have until only very recently procreated alike, but it is becoming increasingly so. An intelligent eugenical program, based upon the sound tradition of the race and aiming more at prevention rather than at correction, is highly desired.

The following discussion promises to review roughly the ground upon which such a program will someday have to be launched. The soil must be examined before the seed is sown.

1.1 The Chinese as a Race

Anthropologically, the race exhibits many differences from the races of the West. These differences are, however, not yet adequately and extensively measured to permit of generalizations. Broca's early attempts and those of others following him include only very small groups and therefore cannot be taken as very significant. A general description is perhaps the best one can do. The typical Chinese has a pale yellow skin; his hair is straight, stiff, long, and black and has a rather round cross-section. His superciliary arches are not prominent, but his cheekbones are; the interval between the orbits is considerable: these three features together make the face appear flat. The flattened and wide interval between the orbits has a bony setting which is said to be unique of the Chinese skull and so can serve as a mark for recognition. Another outstanding feature is the roundness of the orbits themselves: the orbital index for 27 persons measured by Broca about half a century ago averaged 93.8, being the highest in the list.

The trunk is relatively longer and the limbs shorter than those of the Caucasians. On the whole the Chinese, when unmixed with the blood from the north, has a smaller stature and a lighter body weight. Both the body and the limbs are less hairy.

Early death among adults and infant mortality resulting from a general indifference to sanitation have been the two important factors in reducing the average longevity of the Chinese to an insignificant minimum. Dr. Laufer, of the Field Museum at Chicago, has been working on this subject, though I have not yet been able to see his results. A case of extreme longevity lately appeared in a leading Chinese paper: A Shantungese is said to have lived 163 years and is still healthy; the news may be

taken as authentic, as both the picture and a rather detailed life-sketch of the man were given. This is an extreme case, to be sure, but it suggests that there are promising possibilities when the general racial health is properly attended to.

Recent investigations in physiology seem to indicate that there is something which is peculiar to the race. Dr. Liang, of Tung Chi Medical College at Shanghai, is just now studying into the blood of the race, and is said to have found some unique characteristics; the same investigator is now in Manila, studying the blood of the Chinese emigrants there, perhaps to see if these characteristics are entirely due to environment. At the same time, investigations on the part of the American physicians in China also revealed something about the blood. The following appeared in a recent number of the *Journal of the American Medical Association*:

> Cadbury has more recently compiled the facts for Cantonese and other Chinese young men from the south of China. Their systolic blood-pressure averages from 20 to 30 mm. of mercury less than the normal for people in Europe and North America. The diastolic pressure of the Chinese is also lower than the generally accepted normal, but by only 10 to 20 mm. . . The average pulse pressure shows little variation from the generally accepted normal, that is, therefore, relatively high.

The paper goes to say that hypertension as a pathologic condition in the Chinese is very unusual, and that to detect the fundamental factor responsible for this vascular condition in the Chinese might mean the discovery of the best way to avert hypertension among the Americans. So far they have not yet been able to find this fundamental factor.

We know still less about the mentality of the average Chinese than about his physical features. Measurements on Chinese children have been taken in California, in the Hawaiian Islands, and by missionaries in China, with a view to ascertaining how far the Chinese children differed mentally from those of the white race. But as groups of children like these are usually small and possess local characteristics, the results of these measurements are far from being representative, though they in general reflect favorably on the race. Mental tests of various kinds are now being devised and enthusiastically experimented on; more accurate returns are expected in the near future.

Such is a very incomplete review of the Chinese race as to its more or less typical mental and physical conditions. But before I quit this first section I would like to point out, in my opinion, one very significant fact about the race, that is, a distinct tendency to breed out.

As a race, the Chinese is far from being homogeneous, as is commonly supposed. Recent studies in history have shown that in spite of the fact that the Chinese race had for centuries held in disdain all its surrounding neighbors, a great deal of intermingling and assimilation have taken place at all times. When the “barbarians” become overbearingly troublesome on the borders, a wedlock between the barbarian ruler and a Chinese princess was often proposed—by the Chinese. There were periods in which such neighboring races overran China and later settled in different parts of the country, and it was during such periods that miscegenation was most active. Not only certain old families received into them new blood, but also new families with new surnames arose as a result. For example, families such as Sah and

Hah were originally Siberic in blood, not Sinitic; whereas the Chao family is said to have received at one time a rich supply of the blood of the Huns, whose exodus from northwestern China finally threatened the Roman Empire.

In our own times, the same tendency is still working, perhaps even more conspicuously. The Chinese mestizos in the Philippine Islands constitute almost a third and perhaps the most influential part of the insular population. In Mexico, it is reported, the number of children resulting from mixed marriages has been so steadily increasing that about a year ago the Chinese Young Men's Christian Association there found it necessary to establish a special school to accommodate them. Still another instance is afforded by the melting-pot on the Hawaiian Islands. Mr. MacCaughey, in an article on the extent of race mixture on the islands, said in conclusion, "The Japanese and Koreans contrast strongly with the Chinese in race mixtures, the former groups evincing strong clannishness in marital selections, the latter groups freely breeding 'out.'"

The last few instances are more significant, in two ways: they show, first, that the tendency to breed out among the Chinese is present not only when the members of the race are masters at home, but also when they are residents in foreign countries; and second, that the same tendency manifests itself even in the presence of another race which is ethnologically very dissimilar.

Whether this racial heterogeneity as above indicated is eugenically significant in a positive way, we do not quite know. Students are only beginning to tackle the problem of miscegenation. But it has always been a source of pride for many Chinese that the race is able to assimilate so much without losing its identity. Personally I rather incline to doubt whether the word identity has much ethnological significance, though it may have a cultural one.

1.2 The Chinese and Biology

The study of biological principles, especially those governing heredity, must precede a true and effective eugenical program. What has the Chinese done, in the many centuries past, along this line? Strictly scientifically speaking, the race has done very little, but empirically it has accomplished a great deal. Dr. King, in his *Farmers of Forty Centuries*, has had much to say about the whole subject of Chinese agriculture.

That the Chinese farmer is a past master, in a most empirical way, of horticulture, of the arts of budding, cutting, and grafting is admitted by even casual observers. The fruits of such artificial cultivation are now being introduced into this country. A member of the Department of Agriculture at Washington speaks of the Chinese jujube as "one of the best flavored grafted sorts that have so far fruited in this country." "There are giant persimmons," says Mr. Higgins, an American biologist at Peking, "to four inches in diameter, and better to eat than Americans can imagine." About the Chinese cabbage or *pe-tsai*, Mr. Fairchild, of the American Genetic Association, has the following to say: "In brilliancy and crispness and in keeping qualities the

pe-tsai is undoubtedly superior to the lettuce and it rivals lettuce in palatability. Furthermore, a seed crop (lettuce) requires several months to mature in, whereas a leafy vegetable can produce a crop of leaves in a few weeks of early spring and in the cool days of late fall. This economy is understood by the Chinese." The culture of chrysanthemum is said to have dated from 1688 in Europe, when there were already at least more than 100 varieties in cultivation in China and Japan.

The conception of "pure line" in plant and animal breeding dates back very early. The first instance that I have been able to find in history came about in the Chow Dynasty, about eight or nine centuries B.C. The breeding of horses was at that time, according to the record, taken up by the government, which carefully saw to it that the distinction among six varieties of the equine species, with their respective merit and demerit, should be kept clear. A more recent case of pure line in plant breeding was found recorded in the memoirs of the Manchu emperor Kang Hsi. The breeding was done with apparently a new mutation of rice. It is now considered, at its face value, one of the earliest examples of successful breeding of a pure line. A translation of that part of the memoirs is found in the writings of Huc, a noted traveler in the East, and has been quoted by Dr. Walter in his *Genetics*.

Coming down to the breeding of man, one finds, however, more superstition, misconceptions, and wrong social usages than empirical biology.

Maternal impression or prenatal culture has been and still is the principal eugenic teaching in China. It dates back about 3,000 years, when the mother of the founder of the Chow Dynasty practiced it, as far as recorded history goes, for the first time. It was said of her that during her whole pregnant period she managed to avoid all "unwholesome spectacles" and "vulgar music and utterances" for fear of contaminating the child, who was destined to be a great ruler. It is interesting to note, in spite of the erroneousness of the conception, that this royal line was directly descended from the Chinese demigod of agriculture, and hence that the earlier generations of this family were often taken to represent racial or, more correctly, tribal abundance as well as purity. In the *Book of Odes*, one can find numerous poems and songs eulogizing the descendants of the Family Chow, both as to their quantity and quality.

This royal mother serves as a good example of expectant motherhood even to this day. Pregnant women of the upper classes make close copies of her, whereas those of the lower classes, not having so much moral sense, are led to fear such a gentle domestic animal as the rabbit, for they are quite convinced that it is the cause of so many harelips among babies.

Then, it is believed that the natural and meteorological forces exercise a great deal of influence upon conception. There are numerous days, including those set apart for religious purposes, on which conception must not occur. Such wild beliefs certainly have no effect upon heredity. But they are now losing ground, even without a specific education.

The sperm and the ovum, as the true gametic contributions of the parents, are now being popularized, unfortunately, largely through quacks and publishers of cheap books. The popular conjecture on this point had hithertofore been very indefinite. It is perhaps still generally conceived that the father contributes the germ, or rather, the seed, whereas the mother offers the soil in which the seed is to grow—a

conception found in most of the primitive races, from which adjectives such as "barren" and "sterile" as applied to unproductive females first arose. In other places, still more childish ideas flourish, such as that the father contributes the bony skeleton, and the mother flesh and blood.

As to the mental and temperamental endowment of a child, beliefs are also many, each supported by important scholars. Some maintain that all men are born good, but some become tainted by unwholesome environment. Others advocate the opposite that all men are originally bad, but can be made good through education. A much later school, however, with some real insight into human nature, rather than merely bringing about a happy compromise, believes that some men are born good and others are born bad; the formulator of this new belief even cited concrete historical examples for support. He showed that some were incorrigibly worthless, whereas others remained good despite adverse circumstances.

The belief in the inheritance of acquired characters, needless to say, is as common as elsewhere.

The ideas about the determination and control of sex in the offspring are too many and fanciful; they hardly deserve our attention here.

1.3 Some of the Social Institutions Analyzed

After a consideration of the biological background, it is but natural to review briefly some of the social institutions as to their eugenic or dysgenic bearings.

The history of every civilized people has something to relate concerning periodic attempts at racial purification or racial multiplication. Aside from political reasons, the institution of ostracism of the early Greeks had its eugenical significance. Deportation of criminals to remote lands in later times was a direct outgrowth of ostracism. Ostracism and deportation were practiced throughout the length of Chinese history, beginning, as far as we know, as early as in the twenty-third century B.C., when four whole criminal families were put to exile, "to the four corners of the earth to be eaten up by monsters."

The same principle seems to have been incorporated into the educational system a few centuries later. In the *Book of Rites*, one finds the following interesting account. The state proper was divided into two parts, perhaps chiefly for educational purposes; any person who failed to receive an education in one part of the state, in spite of due efforts on the part of the public, was transported to the other part of the country to have a second trial. If this failed again, the person was sent out to the nearest region bordering the state proper for a third trial. In case of further failure, a fourth and last trial was granted in the outermost region of the country. If this last trial should fail to do any good, the person was then considered hopeless and was driven out of the country altogether, not allowed to associate with his fellow countrymen throughout his life. The account ends here. The principle embodied in such a system is very significant; for while, perhaps, recognizing the important factor of heredity, it by no means discredits the validity of environment. It may appear to

be a mere waste of time and energy, yet it was perhaps the only way, when there was but a very scanty knowledge of biology and psychology, to do reasonable justice to those who were mentally defective. I do not know how far the system was actually put into practice. But if it had been put into effect for a considerable period of time, we would have the right to expect that the proportion of the feebleminded among the population would be comparatively small. That would be very encouraging indeed, were it but true.

In discussing Chinese civilization, no one can fail to mention the importance of the family system. The sanctity of the family, which includes filial piety and due veneration for the past in general, requires an individual to have good children and to have as many as he can afford to. "The gravest of all unfilial sins," says Mencius, "is to leave no posterity behind"; for in that case, the ancestors would be left unremembered. This utterance, proceeding from the mouth of a sage and the chief exponent of Confucianism, has had almost the force of a Mosaic commandment for more than 20 centuries. A teaching of this kind, when it tends to emphasize quantity more than quality, cannot fail to produce harmful results; yet, it is plain that it is this same teaching that has partly made possible the maintenance, rather than suspension, of the natural selective process discussed in the beginning of this chapter. A high and reckless birth rate, when not coexistent with indulgent euthenic measures, is not in itself harmful.

But thus speaking, we are not blind to other social forces that make for qualitative improvement. A definite form of exogamy, that individuals of the same surname are not allowed to enter into marriage, has not only been a racial tradition, but also has been sanctioned by law ever since the tenth century B.C. This tradition, together with the racial tendency to breed out with other races, has contributed greatly to the heterogeneity of the germinal make-up of the race, already referred to in a previous portion of the discussion.

In earlier times, again, a form of Valentine's day was said to have been observed in the middle of every spring when all the marriageable young men and young women of the country, under the supervision of the state, turned out for perhaps untrammeled sexual selection. Such an observance, untoward as it was when looked at from our modern sophisticated view point, must have had a highly eugenical significance; and, I remember, one of our pioneer writers on the subject has once expressed the wish that some such observance may be reinstituted in the future. Besides, be it remembered that this old observance existed side by side with a very elaborate marriage system and so was not a mere relic of a general primitive sexual practice. Slightly different from the said observance was the encouragement by the state for more marriages, especially after the country had suffered from famine or pestilence, when ordinary marriage laws and customs concerning matrimony were suspended to facilitate the situation. Indeed, even in peaceful times, it was the tradition of the poets to write satires, hinting that the state was not taking good care of and making proper provisions for those who, though marriageable, were yet without mates. The main principle underlying all these practices is moral as well as biological; and they served two purposes: to prevent sexual irregularities, and, through the preventive measures, to keep the country always replenished. And I may add that

since the fourteenth century a premium has been granted to parents of twins and triplets—a measure evidently following the same principle.

China, it has sometimes been maintained, is a land without classes. This may be true in so far as there have been no clear-cut lines between the various social strata and no member of any so-called lower stratum has been impeded in any external way from rising to the top of the scale. Nevertheless, a marriage contracted between an official or scholarly family and that of any of the lower professional classes was considered unwise; and taking to wife a prostitute, an actress, or the relative of a criminal by an official or scholar was explicitly against the law. Such restrictions, though more punitive than eugenical in nature, had helped to maintain the assortativeness of matings and had protected the valuable strains of the race from deterioration. Thus, one does not need to look long before one comes across families with statements in their family records such as, in equivalent English, "Our immovable property consists only in F.R.S.'s, Litt. D.'s, LL.D.'s, etc." A statement of this kind can be easily verified from the pedigree of the family. I recently came across a family which produced, in less than a century, at least 15 poets and 2 poetesses.

In the *Book of Rites*, again, it was stated that the man should marry about his 30th year, and the woman her 20th. How far this injunction was adhered to is evidently questionable, but there is little doubt that the Chinese does neither marry very early, nor very late, as a rule. There are extreme cases of early marriage in the interior and mountainous parts of the country, but even such cases cannot compare with those taking place in India decades ago, and do not call for alarm. Late marriage, such as found among the intellectual classes notably in this country and in England, is definitely dysgenic; while, on the other hand, very early marriage, as advocated by some, is biologically disputable, if not economically unworkable. So it remains that the ages set by the early Chinese, for practical purposes, are still perhaps the best.

A few words must be said about the divorce system. The family in China is not a mere social institution, but, like the church here, a religious sanctity. It is hard to enter, and equally hard to quit. So it is not at all strange when we hear that, only until recently, divorce was almost unknown, not that there were no divorce cases or cases of pure desertion, but that there were very few and even these had to be done clandestinely for fear of public censure. There have always been a few legal enactments regulating divorce, and indeed the prosecution thereof had only to proceed from the husband, but they were very strict and hence seldom used. Eugenically again, this usage, needless to say, is highly beneficial; it has made for social stability and continuity by affording the young an abode which could not be easily shaken. It has taxed not infrequently the personal freedom and individual right of the parties concerned, to be sure; but one can hardly see how the study of eugenics can ever be of practical benefit to mankind when the ontogenetic interest of the species tends always to overshadow the phylogenetic.

Such is the ground upon which future attempts at racial conservation and betterment must be made. The general eugenical program that has been suggested here and elsewhere is not wholly adequate for China; the various factors peculiar to the race and its cultural background must be taken into consideration. My present knowledge of the subject does not allow me to speak intelligently about such a

program, but the following preliminary considerations at once suggest themselves when we have finished reviewing the background.

1. *A general eugenic education for all*. Such an education necessarily aims at doing away with all the misconceptions about being well born, and at supplying and popularizing new and correct ideas. The Eugenics Record Office in this country and the Eugenics Education Society at London have already done much along this line and their valuable efforts can, after some modification, be transplanted.
2. *A revaluation of all the social institutions and proper emphasis upon those that are conducive to racial health*. The family, for instance, must be remodeled, reinstituted, and receive new emphasis; again like the church in the West in the last century or two, it is just now receiving heavy blows on all sides.
3. *Statistical studies and researches in the problem of population, in genealogy, and in anthropology*. Extensive as well as intensive exploration can be made in all these fields, especially genealogy, as all respectable families have kept pedigrees. A department of vital statistics is urgently needed. The society of anatomy and anthropology started in Peking about 2 years ago has already initiated the work in anthropology.
4. *New method and point of emphasis in animal and plant breeding*. Sericulture, for instance, is carried on in extensive scale in a large portion of the country; it can be made, as it has already been done in Japan, to offer a very fruitful field for the study of genetics. Indeed, much of the empirical knowledge of the Chinese farmer can be utilized to advantage.
5. *The conservation of the rural population*. I want to stress this point in particular. Modern urbanization has had so many dysgenic effects upon the race that, unless it is modified in some fundamental way, it should not be encouraged any more. No back-to-the-country movement in China is as yet needed, for only about 14 % of her population lives in the city. I firmly believe, especially in the case of China, that it is essentially in the tillers of the soil, who constitute perhaps Nature's real elite, that the future strength of the race lies.

Chapter 2
Evaluation of Chinese Student Fraternities in America

One of the most remarkable phenomena of Chinese student life in America in recent years is the rapid growth of fraternities, secret or semisecret. It will be out of question for an outsider to give any cross-sectional view of the whole phenomenon. But upon one who is deeply interested in things social and psychological, and who in one way or another has friendly relations with many members of the fraternities, the phenomenon cannot fail to make a very strong impression. Many other outsiders, who have either thought that the grapes are sour or have never thought about the subject at all out of sheer aloofness, have indeed been indifferent and silent. This, of course, is not a reason why the problem, as such, should not be seriously studied and appraised; for to a student, and such we all are or should be, nothing, if it could be helped, should escape his attention. Study and appraisal of any social problem, let it be further stated, does not, when properly orientated, come into collision with the generally accepted liberal principle of noninterference.

It is interesting enough to look into the problem purely as an intellectual one. But the problem means more. We deem it not only pertinent, but imperative that it now be entitled to the public's attention. It affects deeply, for good or for bad, the Chinese student life in this country at this hour; and it threatens, for good or for bad, to affect the social life of Chinese communities in the near future, because, for real or ostensible reasons, the individuals now connected with the phenomenon, will be the guiding forces of these communities, especially as the phenomenon itself is very likely to be carried back on such individual's return trip.

There have been many guesses made to explain the genesis and development of secret or semisecret fraternal orders among Chinese students here. The institution is peculiarly non-Chinese. It is certainly true that secret fraternities for political reasons have existed in China; the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen was once a leading figure of

(Originally published in *The Chinese Students' Monthly*, Vol. 20, No. 8, June, 1925, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_2

some such organization. Secret fraternities for antisocial pursuits of many "colors," it is also true, have come into notice and are still to be found. But it will be next to imbecility to identify the present secret fraternities among us with either kind, justifiable or even honorable as it sometimes was. Fraternities of quite another type known collectively as the "Orders of Gold and Orchid" have found a place in our cultural history, but these were usually composed of not more than half a dozen individuals and were not secret or even semisecret; they were simply friendships sanctified, not through humiliating initiations before ordinary mortals, but in the awe-inspiring presence of the spirits of ancestors and of Nature.

The secret and semisecret fraternal orders among us are *adaptations*. They are Western, and particularly American, as we shall soon see. We shall also notice that these adaptations did not come about as a result of conscious deliberation, but are rather unconscious makeshifts to "meet" the exigencies of American life. Some of these fraternities are Greek lettered, although it must be owned that many of their members will be at a loss to name the entire Greek alphabet in its original symbols; their knowledge of the Greek letters would be indeed no more than their ignorance of the etymological significance of a few simple characters of their native tongue. Other fraternities suggest, at least one would gather from their titles, possible affiliations with "The Royal Riders of the Red Robe," "The Knights of the Flaming Sword," "The Loyal Order of the Moose," etc., so peculiarly American. In short, most of the titles embody symbols of a religious, militant, biological, and etymological significance of which our forefathers never dreamt.

The secret and semisecret fraternal orders among us thus appear, grossly, to be unconscious and unthoughtful adaptations of some of us to American life. Such an inference on the part of the public is at least justifiable in view of the fact that it has been denied, by the very nature of the case, a thorough understanding of the internal operations of these organizations; and be it further noted, no public should be insensitive enough as to be fully unaware of the existence of something which, for good or for bad, will soon affect its own welfare, and to neglect to pass judgments thereupon.

But the verdict "unthoughtful adaptation" does not by any means exhaust the question. There must be deeper causes leading to such an adaptation.

It is said that in this matter of fraternities, as he is in many other matters, the Chinese student simply obeys the very primary psychological dictum—imitation. It goes without saying that the factor of imitation, so fundamental in human behavior, plays its part; and there are doubtless some among us who put so high a price upon American culture as to insist on learning everything it has to offer. In college, they rub elbows with members of many Greek-lettered fraternities; as workers getting practical experience, they come into knowledge of fraternal organizations of a business and recreational nature; and they take to it.

An explanation based upon the law of imitation alone, however, is far from sufficient; and, besides, it is derogatory and unjust to the individuals concerned to be labeled mere mimics.

Studying in a foreign country is a mighty precarious and discomforting business. It is often embarrassing. In fact, the mere thought of being away from home for so long a distance both in time and space, and of having to endure the bustling and jostling of much city life, in extreme contrast with the tranquility and self-sufficiency which many of us enjoyed as country lads, shakes our nerves and makes us reach for some prop, lest we fall. From without, there is the inexorcisable phantom of race prejudice, haunting one wherever one goes. In many cases, such a phantom is literally a phantom; it is a product of our own mind; nevertheless, it is effective as a factor in inducing changes in our behavior. Such feelings, it is true, are mitigated to a large extent by the efforts of foreign friends who show a great deal of ethical and religious interest in us. But, then, we feel we are patronized; these friends, we think, do not really understand and have high regard for us, they are kind to us for professional and obligatory reasons. Thus, between the state of stranger and protégé, the average Chinese student is left to oscillate, and many there are who do not know where to hold themselves and be at peace.

Now we are nearer the explanation. But we need another factor to make it at least plausible. In the absence of a large number of compatriots, a Chinese student thus situated has certainly a hard time in adjusting himself. But when there is a sufficiently large number of his countrymen present, such as in some of the big cities, the problem resolves itself into a much simpler one. Individuals similarly situated would soon band together to form a *compact* unit, and by their mass alone, they gradually refuse to further oscillate and soon attain a state of relative equilibrium in which they can rest. In other words and to dispense with the figure, such Chinese students, by gathering themselves into *close* units, succeed in warding off the unfavorable influences, real or imaginary, attendant upon the mere state of being outlandish, from around them. As separate individuals they are more self-conscious than self-confident in the presence of a strange, if not hostile, environment; but by so grouping together, their overdeveloped self-consciousness, which is often painful, is dulled and their self-confidence strengthened, thus making life more bearable.

But were I to stop here, I would miss the whole point of making the study at all; and although I myself hold the above explanation fundamental, very few others would be convinced of its correctness. Collateral and more special reasons must be given.

In a preceding paragraph, the words “compact” and “close” were italicized, for here lies a very significant point. It deserves some scrutiny. It seems that mere banding together is not enough to help the individuals feel less acutely the storm and stress of life in a foreign community. They must be more adherently welded together. “Societies” or even “clubs” are too commonplace, they must have “fraternities”; “membership” or even “friendship” is too prosaic, and they must have “brotherhood”; the expression of willingness to abide by the rules of the fold must be “sanctified,” and initiation, with its tasteful salts and acids, slips into the shoe of a simple ceremony. The individuals as individuals shall be so humiliated at the outset that his wishes and activities in the future shall not run counter to those of the group which means so much for all. The public shall not be permitted to poke into the affairs of the group, nay,

it shall remain ignorant even of its existence. In a word, it must have exclusiveness, for exclusiveness alone insures security. And what we have is secrecy and semisecrecy, which characterize most, if not all, of the fraternities.

But wherefore must this extreme longing for security, one would ask. Here, we tread upon the ground of a small but real bit of American philistinism. There are, it is reported, more than 600 fraternal orders, in one form or another, in existence today in the United States, and over 7 % of the population belongs to them. It is further remarked that these fraternal orders usually have their nuclei in the small towns, and that they supply, with their secrecy and other paraphernalia, a real psychological need called forth by the deadly monotony of democratic conventionalism. Again, it was pointed out, whereas there is a sense of self-insufficiency and inferiority in all of us at one time or another, it is especially potent in some individuals, so much so that they must try hard, unconsciously, to cover it up by collecting themselves into groups, oath-bound and protected with an inveterate veil of secrecy. "It is particularly strong," says Professor Mecklin, in the case of the Ku Klux Klan, "in the man of narrow outlook who chafes under a sense of his own insignificance and grasps eagerly at the mask and robe as a means of gratifying wounded pride or cowardly spite."

Now, how much of this is true with the secret and semisecret fraternal orders among the Chinese students? It would seem that if the phenomena are more or less of the same nature and have their roots in a more or less similar soil, the same explanation would more or less apply. Our explanation would be different from theirs in degree, but not in kind.

In the first place, it will be argued that the fraternal orders among us do not constitute a small town movement. On the contrary, it is in the metropolitan cities that we find them most active. Quite so. But let us examine more closely. When we say that the deadly monotony of small town life is a cause in producing the fraternal orders of the American citizens, our emphasis is not on "small town life," but on its "deadly monotony." And here we have our explanation. A great number of Chinese students, it is true, are living an extremely urban life, where attractions and distractions abound. But what of it? In a foreign community, with but restricted financial resources to take advantage of the cultural facilities, with no families to share his emotions, with a heavy schedule of class or laboratory exercise if he is a regular student, or a drab routine of office or factory work if he is getting practical experience, it would be nothing short of an act of Providence if the average Chinese student does not turn, in the course of a few years, into a veritable Babbat so skillfully presented by Mr. Sinclair Lewis. Metropolis or small town, it makes little difference to an average Chinese student; to him drabness and dreariness, circumstances have so conspired to ordain, is the lot, and therefrom he must find an escape.

But we are not through. We often hear it said that in America, and as a part and parcel of philistinism, respectability has taken the place of morality, at least in practice. Unfortunately, there seem to be not a few among us who have acquired quite a smack of this American idea, motivated, of course, by slightly different causes. From the very beginning, we were made to feel that we are unofficial representatives of China, and our resolution was: wherever we go, we will be good bills and posters for our motherland. Such a resolution is admirable, provided the individual

so resolving has enough stuff in him to appear in some way a finish product of an Oriental culture and has enough nerve to be frank and true to facts where the motherland fails to live up to her best. Such "unofficial representatives" of course cannot be too many; and with their absence, the resolution degenerates; it does not break down, but it comes to center around rather insignificant matters; and lo, we have among us respectability.

Now respectability in small town life is a direct causal factor in producing drabness, and an indirect one in the formation of the fraternal orders, in the case of American citizens. With us, the daily scrupulous attentions bestowed upon ourselves, upon other people, and sundry other affairs, all for "social" reasons and for fear of being in the least offensive to others, put a heavy premium upon the nerves. With the free atmosphere, we enjoyed in our boyhood and early youth, such exacting conventionalities are indeed great contrasts. "When you enter a foreign country, learn first its rules of conduct" is indeed a bit of commonsense international ethics understood and practiced by our forefathers; but such a traditional saying, when carried to its extreme, and for weaker souls, is very pernicious; it smothers the spirit to differ and enhances the desire to conform, to follow the line of least resistance, and it is upon conformity and complacency that respectability and moral stagnation rest. We are here to show our differences as Chinese, and we need no apology for doing so. We miss the entire idea of truly representing China, which, as a national and cultural unit, is so very unlike America or any other country. As at present, many of us are no longer *foreign* students, but, upon our own initiative, we are going through a process of rapid assimilation, which the American government has never intended for foreign individuals of our status.

The above appears digressive. But it is not to be denied that all these facts tend to increase the tedium and monotony of our sojourn here. The very fact that some of us are being rapidly Americanized explains partially their status as members of fraternal orders, a characteristic American institution. Furthermore, it must be noted, the rapid assimilation going on is after all exotic to our racial psychology and early upbringing, and, as a result, consciously or otherwise, some mental conflict is bound to arise, which makes the yearning for escape all the more acute.

Then there is another factor, and a very important one. To many foreigners, it would seem that most Chinese students, during their stay here, enjoy absolutely no sexual life, and have little emotional outlet. While this of course is not exactly the case, nobody among ourselves will be so blind as not to admit that there is a great deal of self-restraint or repression going on. Some are already married, but have wives at home and these are often unsatisfactory; others, in great majority, are yet unsettled. There is a great disparity between the number of girl students and that of boy students; and even for pure and simple "social" purposes, it is extremely hard to find an equitable distribution. The company of American girls, though not unwelcome, is after all not so very desirable, as may entail racial and biological consequences. Dancing halls are indeed inviting, but these, again, heavily tax the purse, and as students, few can afford to frequent them.

The fraternity, as we have already intimated, serves a functional purpose. It is able, at least to some extent, and after a fashion, to solve some of the problems just

enumerated. In the absence of a normal amount of association with the opposite sex, some psychological inversion is bound to take place, and this the fraternity life proposes to harbor and satisfy. Further such an assortative grouping among the boy students simplifies the question of sex distribution. Henceforth, it appears, a good number of boy students will act as a unit in keeping company with the girls, whose status is now slightly comparable to that of the sponsors among the cadets of some of the Midwestern universities. Such girls are called, somewhat endearingly, "adopted sisses."

An individual in situations such as described above soon finds his way into a fraternity, or, if he does not, he has not yet the chance. Or, if he is of a rather individualistic type and has enough leadership and personality at the same time, he will organize one himself.

There of course cannot be too many leaders. While the Chinese students as a whole are often taken to be quite a selected group by foreigners, it will be flattering ourselves to say that all of us are potential leaders. As a matter of fact omitting the sore spots at one end and a few really brilliant ones at the other, we form a pretty mediocre lot. Under an apparent eagerness to learn, an evident brain capaciousness to store information—the retentive power of the Chinese students, as compared with students of other countries, is said to be proverbial—and a sincere desire to adapt, even only to relatively insignificant matters, most of us have passed for superior students and made a very favorable impression. But, I am afraid, such is not the real case. Better and truer judgment will come when we are no longer students as such. At least one American student of psychology has intimated that the adaptability of Chinese students to modern cultural situations is only apparent, is short-lived, and perhaps soon stops after the end of college life—an alleged fact which explains the backwardness of the country despite repeated attempts at reconstruction.

This appears again to be running off the tangent. But the central point is that there are among us many who do not think clearly, who find it hard to make independent judgments, and who lack sufficient self-reliance and must find their self-expression (here somewhat paradoxical), not as individuals, but in groups, in which the individual as such is submerged. An individual of this description forms a good recruit for fraternities once already organized.

Here in a group of like-minded compatriots, he is finally at home. Here, a kind of psychological affinity between the members obtains. He addresses other brothers and is so addressed in return, and there is congeniality. He shall go through a sort of ordeal called initiation resembling the third degree—the one difference being that the one presses something out of, the other presses something into, the person. He shall not know the details of the process until he cannot help knowing them, else, we may be sure, he might have to reconsider his decision. But he is more than compensated for that; he is now within the fold and feels warmly its impact around him and for him. He soon comes to think that the ordeal is after all a mere form, like the baptism of the Christians (whom, by the way, he has often affected to despise). Finally, he comes to regard the ordeal a necessity. It *is* a necessity, of course, for the preservation of the group. He will before long have the pleasure of seeing some others going through the same process. No matter what religious affiliations he has,

it is here, in this matter of fraternity initiation I take it, that he experiences an enforced but real bit of mysticism—a sense of absolute surrender.

But with reference to friends and acquaintances of the outside world at large, the member of a fraternity is still an absolute individual. But he is now different. He has acquired a new status and belongs no longer to the common lot. He has a whole cohort of "brothers" behind him. He is to be envied. Under the cover of secrecy or semisecrecy, he is now also something of a mystery, to be so recognized, but not to be unveiled. Theoretically and from the above analysis, we would expect that his secrecy cannot be too absolute; he must at least make known the simple fact that he is now a member of a certain fraternal order. Absolute secrecy would defeat the purpose for which it is used. And this appears to be the reason why while the public is practically wholly ignorant of the *modus operandi* of the fraternal organizations, it is usually informed, through some channel or other, as to who are the *fratres* and who are not, and is able, further, to tell their particular affiliations with unwonted precision.

The reader may object to the above on the ground, first, that there are many strong men in the fraternities who are also recognized leaders by the student public at large; and second, that most, if not all, of the fraternities have as their immediate purpose the cultivation of friendship through mutual assistance, and as their more remote purpose the redemption of China through their cooperated service.

It would be far from me to have neglected these phases of fraternity activities. Personally I have a good number of friends and acquaintances in the fraternities whom I myself have long acknowledged to be leaders of no mean caliber. I have also been led to notice that considerable progress has been made along the lines indicated in the latter part of the objection. Individuals who until their admission into a fraternity were of an unduly reserved and self-sufficient type, have since their admission become sociable and fully convinced of the value of the principle of mutual aid. At least one of the more serious-minded fraternities has launched a program for the reconstruction of China to be carried out later on, and it is already in the process of preparing a sinking fund.

To all these high-minded endeavors, I pay my due respect. There are indeed many who sincerely believe that organizations in the form of fraternities can do a good deal more for their members and for China than mere professional societies or patriotic groups, in which close cooperation and sympathy are not guaranteed. While I do not myself subscribe to such a belief, I fully sympathize with those who cherish it, for reasons to be shown in a latter part of our discussion. But it must be said that the manifest phases of fraternity life enumerated above do not really come into conflict with my contention in a psychological analysis of the problem. They do not constitute valid grounds for an objection. Nay, they even throw sidelights on the truthfulness of the psychological background of fraternity life. A more detailed examination of the validity of the objection raised will now follow.

No matter what group activities one joins and no matter how heartily and honestly one joins them, there is always a personal equation—a borrowed term to denote the sum total of the wishes and desires, conscious or otherwise, of the individual—which

lies behind and demands, through the group, expression. This personal equation has long been termed with much opprobrium selfishness. It *is* selfishness; but none needs necessarily to be ashamed of it. It is in everyone of us; and so long as it results in good to the individual without encroaching upon other individuals, it is not readily to be condemned; and if it results in good to others at the same time, as it often does, so much the better. Indeed it will not be far from truth to say that all social endeavors are based upon mutual selfishness, a basis which does not in the least detract the worth of such endeavors. It may also be said that altruism is a roundabout expression of egoism, and an extremely valuable expression at that.

It appears, therefore, that no social group exists purely for disinterested and idealistic purposes. The fraternal order is no exception. At best, such ideals as embodied in a constitution represent some common practical beliefs of the members as a whole, apart from the selfish (in its nonmoral sense) ends that each in his own way pushes to attain. At worst, these ideals are mere platitudes, moral abstractions, and stereotypes, which have been instilled into the minds of the individuals from childhood, and what is more unfortunate, they are often taken advantage of by unscrupulous leaders to perpetrate truly antisocial deeds.

The fraternities among us, it must be credited, do embody ideals at their best. Cooperation and patriotism, let us further remember, are two practical ideals in which the Chinese as a race have hitherto proved to be rather deficient.

But the existence and practice of ideals do not by any means invalidate my proposition that the fraternity is an adapted institution on the part of some of us to *American* life, with all the psychological and sociological implications outlined in this discussion. The ideals of the group and the wishes and desires of the individual are coexistent. We tend to take cognizance only of the former, because they are manifest, whereas the latter are masqueraded, often behind the very ideals.

We must now come to meet the objections based on the point of leadership. We have already seen how fraternity members play the relative role of followers and how they find satisfaction out of so playing. Now, the role played by the leaders is no less a psychological necessity, though of a somewhat different nature. No healthy individual will absolutely spurn a bit of "agreeable inflation of the ego," when he is offered one; and the so-called leaders are just those who by their own resourcefulness and personality are able themselves to regulate the valve, so to speak, so that the amount of inflation is kept constant or increasing without stretching themselves to the breaking point. This much is at least true of all leadership, that of the fraternal commonwealth not excepted.

To be more concrete, I will cite two reported instances. One student among us was approached to be a member of a certain fraternity. He courteously declined. The reason was, as he later told others, that he was *unwilling* to be "one of their standard-bearers and to march in their train." Now to be a "standard-bearer" as understood by the Chinese is in no sense complimentary, and no individual, this gentleman thinks, with sufficient personality and independence of judgment would fain be one. The second instance is more significant. During the early history of the

fraternity movement, a student, a man of great business ability, was denied admission by a fraternity; thereupon he organized one himself. The two rival fraternities are still living and prosperous. These two instances well testify to the fact that to be a leader does not have a peculiar kind of psychological satisfaction—an agreeable inflation of the ego; and that in playing the part as one the individual is not, and cannot, be motivated by ideals alone. This is pointed out without any defamatory implication, for, as we have already hinted, the will to dominate in the leader and the willingness to be dominated in the follower, when they are properly meted out and do not lead on the one hand to tyranny and to docility on the other, constitute no social menace; in fact, they are essential for social progress.

In this connection, we must recall a very important question which for years past has confronted the Chinese student as a body and our younger generation in general. It has been noticed for some time that *esprit de corps* is woefully deficient among us. We do not cooperate. Maybe we lack true leaders who can make us work together willingly and harmoniously. But the more important reason is, I think, that altogether too many want to play the first fiddle; and of course no orchestra can be formed. During a recent rather elaborate social entertainment given by the Chinese students in an eastern city, three different individuals ridiculously contested for the chairmanship that the affair was almost dropped and that, unable to reach a decision, the office was finally given to a girl student, with whom, as a matter of course, none is manly enough to compete! There is at bottom a wrong philosophy. If Western education has unwittingly done any harm to us at all, it is this: it has awakened the petty ego in us without showing us, as a better system of education should and will do in the future, how petty it is! In following the will-o'-the-wisp of an eighteenth century Western view of society, we have left behind us and forgotten the torchlight in the injunction which Mencius quoted, "Not to be able to command others, and at the same time to refuse to receive their commands is to cut one's self from all intercourse with others." "If I cannot issue orders, I can at least refuse to accept any" is the "social sense" of not a few of us.

To remedy this unfortunate situation, the fraternity has again stepped in; for group life must go on. In ordinary times, big organizations are not feasible among us. Smaller organizations of a professional nature are workable, but not very successfully. But the fraternity, the secret fraternity fares well! Why? The constituents are the same; the fundamental social outlook is the same; but the psychology has changed. As we have all along noted, the components of a fraternity are not mere members, discrete and unrelated, but brothers, organic and indivisible; and being brothers, why should they not work together? *Con*-sanguinity suggests *sym*-pathy. We all know the difference between a social affair and a family affair, into the execution of the latter few need to be coaxed. The difference between the members has now resolved itself into one of mere age, and not of ability or talent; for in a fraternal order one leads as a big brother and another follows as a younger one. The rugged stones have become pebbles, and there is little friction; and all this is due to a twist of psychology. This is no new discovery on the part of the fraternity organizers; it is age-old; it forms an essential part of the Christian religion,

which, with its "fatherhood" and "brotherhood" (and "motherhood" and "sisterhood" in addition in the case of Catholicism) has long been a "family" affair; else, we may be sure, it could not have been invincible.

We are now in a position to appraise the problem.

We have seen that the fraternity forms a part of the adjustment that some of us made to an American environment; that it supplies a psychological need in a great variety of ways—in a word, it is a means to social control among us. Inasmuch as it is helping some of us, as a more or less exclusive group, to make life more worth living, due credit should be accorded to the institution.

But the Chinese students taken together form a much bigger social group than the members of all the fraternities combined. Real social control and welfare, therefore, must have reference to the Chinese students as a whole, not to the same in separate and discrete units. From such a standpoint and one we should take, the fraternity as an institution, while very "social" in the vulgarly accepted sense of the term, seems almost unsocial, or even antisocial. This indictment is by no means hastily made; it has its basis on the practice of secrecy or semisecrecy, which characterizes most, if not all, of the fraternities. To the social value of this important phase of fraternity life we shall now turn.

In 1897, during a period in which secret societies greatly flourished in America, a book of essays entitled *Secrecy and Citizenship* was published by some Congregationalist ministers. The opposition as herein expressed were based on political, moral, and religious grounds. We will neglect the religious issue, but examine the other two which bear upon our problem.

Secret societies, it is argued, are unpolitical and unsocial. They are incompatible with free democratic institutions, "citizenship in a free state seeks the equal welfare of all the members of the same. . . . But an oath-bound, exclusive, secret society—whether a monastery, a convent, a lodge of Jesuits, or of Free Masons, the Mafia, or the Clan-na-Gael, or whatsoever else refusing to permit the state, that is the whole people to know its purposes and methods, closed in by hostile and repelling barriers, shutting out the state and its representatives as such—not only has no place as a friendly and essential body within the state, but is contrary to the purpose and character of all those other groups, which make up the essential parts of the state" (*Secrecy and Citizenship*, quoted by J. M. Mecklin in *Ku Klux Klan*).

While the Chinese students in this country do not form a state, they nevertheless constitute a social and in a sense political group, and as such the above characterization and disapprobation of secret societies will apply. Viewed from within, the fraternity may be a centre of friendly intercourse, but from without, the student world at large, it has not unfrequently proved a source of disturbances. In general, it is felt as a spot with referred pains refusing to be definitely located and traced. In student activities, it becomes the hotbed of "politics" to which the public can point but vaguely. For individuals of a same interested group and with real ability to monopolize, a number of offices are in itself not to be condemned, indeed sometimes to be welcomed, provided the fight is open. In the absence of openness, which alone guarantees the public from being abused, it is no wonder that suspicions

of all sorts have made a series of targets out of the fraternities. The more secret the order, the stronger and more numerous the suspicions.

In activities of a "social" nature, the same is true; and here the fair sex is again involved. Evidences there are that certain fraternities have practically, though perhaps unwittingly, put a patent on some of the girls; and consequently not a little jealousy and ill-feeling have come to pass between different orders, especially on important "social" occasions.

Why must the fraternities keep secret or semisecret? Apart from the psychological explanation I have attempted to give on a preceding page, there have been conjectures from without and justifications from within. Some of the conjectures, if proved, would tend to discredit the organizations altogether; they paint all fraternities embryo political cliques soon to replace those now in power; they indeed maintain that not a few "politicians" so gestated are already in field. While I am no idealist and have not too much faith in the goodness of human nature, I cannot restrain from suspecting that strictures so wild cannot have come but from those who not uncommonly proclaim the grapes sour on not being able to reach them. For there is the other side to the shield. Secrecy or semisecrecy is often justified by the members on the grounds of expediency. One fraternity has explained to the effect that unless they keep silent for the present, their plans for serving China in the future may be disrupted or frustrated, and they are not particularly in the mood to count the eggs without having them first hatched; again, that unless publicity is withheld, too many may want to come in and thus destroy the homogeneity which belongs to a smaller group and is necessary for close cooperation, and they do not feel disposed to incur the displeasures of others in denying them admittance. Secrecy, they further explicate, will be dispensed with as soon as the organization is full fledged and ready for public service.

Now who is to judge? As long as the curtain is down, fraternity life will remain a topic of curiosity and adverse criticism to officious individual outsiders and a cause of anxiety to the general public, no matter how much one chooses to explain. It is decidedly a bad policy. Besides, it has always appeared to me that in insisting on the point of secrecy, aside from the psychological significance which their members would gladly disown, the fraternities have betrayed considerable weakness in spite of the compactness of their union. In their fear for jeopardizing their constructive schemes, they show a lack of sufficient self-assurance and of unity of purpose. Undue caution, which is often indistinguishable from want of courage, is divulged in their unwillingness to offend others to whom admittance is denied. A policy of expediency is in itself a precarious one, for its helpfulness is not insured; and it looks particularly unattractive in view of the pressure which the outside world is bound to bear upon it and the anxiety such pressure may call forth from inside the group. It is not to be surprised if the policy has up to the present done more harm than good to those who practice it.

The public should be tolerant to those fraternities which are secret mainly to expedite matters which are worthy and honorable (that they are such will first have to be assured); but from those who think that, in shutting themselves up in close compartments, they derive pleasure from defying and nonplussing the bigger

community outside, such tolerance must be withheld, not to say those which have come to harbor and foster petty politics, tending to make student life abroad all the more disreputable. A fraternity so veiled and fortified will soon cease to be a mystery and stronghold; it is then a social nuisance and as such deserves to be socially persecuted. It may not be out of place for me here to quote a piece of news from a recent issue of the *New York Times*; it will show how the Americans themselves have become tired of secret societies, while we only begin to have them! It reads:

> High school students who are members of school fraternities may lose their diplomas if new regulations proposed before the Board of Education banning secret societies are acted on favorably by the Board's Committee on Law, to which they were referred yesterday.
>
> The by-law provides that "a member of a secret society, secret club or secret organization shall be declared ineligible to membership in honor society or organization in the schools, to receive any scholastic honor, to hold any school or class office or to participate in any school or class election or in any public school exercises or athletic or any contest as a representative of the school."
>
> It is further provided that a student participating in any of the above activities shall sign a declaration that he is not a member of a secret society. If the pledge is later proved to be untrue the student will be debarred from receiving the diploma.

Just imagine if the Chinese Student's Alliance and the various educational missions were to pass such a law!

There is current among fraternity members another ground on which they justify the practice of secrecy. It is held that secrecy keeping is a part of an individual's inalienable right, and no one should be so impudent as to question it. What fallacious logic! As separate individuals, they and all of us have a certain amount of privacy with which the public is not supposed to meddle. But individual privacy is not the same as group secrecy. As components of a group which belongs to a bigger one, the individuals become social units, and being such they owe to the community as much fairness and squareness as necessary for common welfare. From justifications like this, it is indeed to be lamented that we, at least some of us, who assume the responsibility of introducing Western culture to China should be so parrot-like in our pursuit and yet making blunders even in the simple capacity as transcribers.

The second objection raised in *Secrecy and Citizenship* is based on moral reasons. Secret fraternities are immoral, because no man can bind himself by oath or pledge to keep secret what he does not yet know without thereby bartering away his moral freedom. This is the fundamental error in all the secret orders which vitiates everything in connection with them. . . . What the individual has thus pledged himself to keep secret may prove, when he comes to it, to be a legitimate object of secrecy, but he did not know this when he made his oath. If, on the contrary, the things which he learns, as he goes forward, prove to be iniquitous or for other reasons deserving publicity he finds himself bound, in the most emphatic way, by his own promise, not to divulge them. He must, therefore, either violate the plainest demands of his conscience and abide by his oath of secrecy or obey the present behests of duty, make known the things which he has learned, and thereby confess the sin committed

in the beginning. . . . [This situation] inevitably induces a degree of moral blindness and indifference to duty, [and it] creates among the members of the order a habit of concealment, an indirectness of speech amounting often to actual falsehood; the result is permanent impairment of the sense of truth and of truthful expression (*Secrecy and Citizenship*, quoted by J. M. Mecklin in *Ku Klux Klan*, pp. 211–212).

Now, anyone who has the slightest acquaintance or connection with the fraternities among us will find the above quotation extremely relevant even in view of the fact that some of them are only partially secret. In one fraternity at least, the exact nature and details of the initiation process are withheld from the candidate until it is too late. In this respect, it is a veritable trap from which retreat is impossible. I do not propose to enter into the moral argument at any length. It suffices to say that both as a disinterested on-looker and a friend and well-wisher of many fraternity members, I have come to see that the fraternities, if they persist in the present state of affairs, are undoubtedly tending in the direction with all its deviated paths pointed out in the above quotation. "A habit of concealment and an indirectness of speech" are often noticed when the slightest allusion is made to the question of fraternity.

Besides secrecy or semisecrecy, there are other phases of fraternity life which are of social significance. I shall desist from going into them, except perhaps the economic phase of which a word may be said. Some of the fraternity members, especially of one fraternity, who assume a sort of aristocratic genteelness with all its flourishes known as etiquette and social graces, will prove someday quite a burden for the old horse—the practical, prosaic, and poverty-stricken China—to pull. But we hope she will be more than compensated by the cooperative service of their fellow members who are less prodigal and more provident.

No matter whether the problem is viewed socially, individually, or psychologically, its keynote can be found, I think, in the single word, *estrangement*. As social groups the fraternities have estranged the whole Chinese student public. Strong indications are not wanting that there is a good deal of interfraternity estrangement due to "political," "social," and other reasons. As social individuals, the fraternity members have estranged their former friends and associates. The reader, if he is a nonfraternity man, will undoubtedly recall the disconcertment he felt when he discovered that a close friend of his had been initiated into a fraternity without in the least so informing him. In the case of associates for professional reasons, it is not infrequently found that interests are now divided; that the fraternity men have preferred cooperation based on secret or semisecret brotherhood, to that going abreast with open and fair competition, and have come to abandon their former affiliations, altogether or at least in spirit. There has been a decided lowering of interest in professional organizations since the spread of fraternities.

But above and worst of all is the estrangement that an average fraternity member creates in himself. This is psychological. In acting on the belief that secret fraternity life will insure cooperation and success, he barters away, as already said, his sense of independent judgment and moral freedom. In going through the process of initiation, he loses a part of his initiative. He may be weak as a personality, but in joining a fraternity, he virtually admits himself to be irremediable by his own efforts.

What wonder if it is often speculated that a mediocre individual, who would inevitably lose in the open struggle for existence and power, finds an easy refuge in secret fraternal organizations, where, by playing the role of a "younger brother," he will in the course of time be smuggled to victory; and this often at the expense of really able and independent spirits who do not care to march under fraternity banners!

An average fraternity member simply does not understand what cooperation means, and the share that he as an individual is supposed to partake. Openness, fair competition, the realization of one's own and others' abilities and weaknesses, and the willingness to properly acknowledge them and thus determining the relative role of leaders and followers are factors at the root of true cooperation. As able-bodied and intelligent social individuals, not as autistic and make-believe "brothers" must we work together. For real service and lasting success, there is no psychological shortcut. This is no moralizing to one who perceives how easily we slip into the slough-pond of make-believe and mystification and thus fail to see facts squarely in the face. He who is willing to be so beguiled by his own psychology will soon find a stranger in himself.

Chapter 3
Sociobiological Implications of Confucianism

3.1 What Confucius Did Not Teach

A word of explanation of the subject is perhaps necessary. By sociobiology is here meant the study which has gradually been taking shape since the development of evolutionary biology and its growing application to men as a social animal. It deals in the main with the selection values of various social and cultural agencies, in short, the problem of social selection. It will be out of place here to give even a brief account of the history and the present status of this study in the West. Suffice it to say that the fundamental principles involved have much in common with those found in the study of theoretical eugenics, first named by Francis Galton in 1883.

It would be far from the writer or indeed anybody, to read into the teachings of Confucius and his school any plain and direct injunctions bearing on the problem of racial welfare. But as it is true with many ancient schools of thought, Confucianism, especially in its early stages, must be accredited with a good deal of sociobiological common sense. This is not to be wondered at, the moment we recognize, as not a few of us now actually and generally do, that primitive peoples take considerably more care of their racial health than those farther advanced in civilization. Such sociobiological implications as we find here represent perhaps some remnants of an old practice and are preserved because of their efficacy which the race, in the course of its history, could not fail, even though in an unexplained way, to feel.

The following discussion will be divided into two parts, dealing respectively with the negative and the positive aspects of the problem. In the present chapter, the writer will endeavor to show what, contrary to popular belief, Confucius did not teach. It stands to reason, even in the absence of verifying facts, that much has been

---

(Originally published in *Chinese Students' Monthly*, Vol. 21, No. 1, November, 1925; a revised version was published in *The China Critic*, Vol. VI, Nos. 14/15, April 6/13, 1933, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_3

unwittingly but wrongly ascribed to Confucius since the introduction of Western culture into China, especially in the fields of religious and political philosophy. In another chapter, which will appear in these columns very soon, he will take up what Confucius did teach. In the course of the discussion, digressions will have to see how far Confucius has been misrepresented by some of his more enthusiastic exponents.

In the West, the disturbance in the fields of political and social philosophy during the last 20 or 30 years attendant upon the recognition of some of the principles of evolutionary biology has been manifold. But in the main the controversies may be said to involve three fundamental questions, to wit, the goodness or badness of human nature, equality among men, and the efficacious role of environment in progress. Needless to say, no matter how much these questions have been hashed and rehashed as bits of political and religious metaphysics, they are essentially biological; and as they necessarily underlie and lead to the formulation of practical social policies, they become at once sociobiological.

* * *

It will not be far from truth, then, to examine Confucius' teachings with respect to these three questions, in order to determine in a fair measure how Confucianism in its more undiluted form stands sociobiologically. For such an examination, we must turn to the Confucian *Analects* as the most reliable source.

There are two important references as to the nature of human endowment as follows[1]:

Tse-kung said: The Master's personal displays of his principles and ordinary descriptions of them may be heard. His discourses about man's nature and the way of Heaven cannot be heard.

The Master said: By nature, men are nearly alike, they got to be wide apart.

There is little that is ambiguous about these two quotations. "Cannot be heard" in the first quotation cannot very well be interpreted to mean "very profound and therefore beyond the power of comprehension of the disciples," especially as we are well aware that Confucius once in a most straightforward way refused to discuss the problems of death and of service to spirits, by saying that such questions were not in order when men did not yet understand life and the problem of serving their fellow men. Confucius as a scholar was indeed as agnostic to the problem of human nature as he was to Nature itself. In the absence of tangible experience, he simply disinclined to speculate, especially in the presence of his disciples.

The second quotation is just a statement of a common fact—a fact, shall we say, of developmental biology based on common sense. While it is open to various interpretations, it in and by itself certainly does not imply any moral judgment as to goodness or badness of human nature.

The optimistic doctrine that human nature was essentially good took its origin from Mencius who received instructions from a pupil of a grandson of Confucius.

[1] These translations and others that follow are taken from the popular edition of the *Four Books in English*, with slight modifications.

By way of mere analogy, he was the St. Paul of Confucianism, and like St. Paul, he was a powerful introducer of many novel ideas into a young but fairly well-established system of philosophy—a capacity which in the popular mind does no violence to their position in the direct line of apostolic succession.

Perhaps it will be illuminating to quote rather fully what Mencius had to say as to the essential goodness of man:

The disciple Kung-to said: The philosopher Kao says "Man's nature is neither good nor bad." Some say, "Man's nature may be made to practice good, and it may be made to practice evil. . . ." Others say, "The nature of some is good, and the nature of others is bad. . . ." And now you say, "The nature is good." Then are all those wrong?

Mencius answered: From the feelings proper to it, it is constituted for the practice of what is good. This is what I mean in saying that the nature is good. If men do what is not good, the blame cannot be imputed to their natural powers. The feeling of commiseration belongs to all men; so does that of shame and dislike; and that of reverence and respect; and that of approving and disapproving. The feeling of commiseration implies the principle of benevolence; that of shame and dislike, righteousness; that of reverence and respect, propriety; and that of approving and disapproving, knowledge. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and knowledge are not infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with them. And a different view is simply from want of reflection. Hence it is said, "Seek and you will find them, neglect and you will lose them. . . ."

It is evident from the preceding quotation that until Mencius none of the many theories about human nature asserted that it was universally good. The reason of this will be discussed later on. With the growth and acceptance of such a view of man's moral nature, there soon came a corresponding growth in our emphasis upon the importance of the human will; for nature being infallible, it was the will of the individual that must be held responsible for all moral consequences. "Seek and you will find them; neglect and you will lose them." The belief, or make belief, that will power conquers everything is as indispensable a corollary to the doctrine of natural goodness of Mencius as that of absolute surrender to the doctrine of natural depravity, to this day preached by many Christians. The question of the will, need we say, is another of such questions that will have to be explained, if at all, on biological and physiological grounds.

* * *

The next controversial question is equality among men. No matter how unfounded on facts the concept equality is, it has received many qualifications since the development of evolutionary biology such as equality before the law, equality of opportunity,

equality of personality, etc. Before these days, however, such qualifications hardly existed and the concept was often taken at its full face value; and even to this day, it constitutes, with other concepts equally abstract, the basis of some of our political structures.

Confucius was no such idealist. The assertion in the *Analects* which comes closest to the modern and popular conception is this:

> There are only the wise of the highest class and the stupid of the lowest class, who cannot be changed.

From the rest of his sayings, however, one easily concludes that he was an aristocrat by conviction. Some of these sayings follow:

> To those whose talents are above mediocrity, the highest subjects may be pronounced. To those who are below mediocrity, the highest subjects may not be pronounced.

> The people may be made to follow a path of action, but they may not be made to understand it.

Compare these two statements with one made recently by an American biologist on the limitation of education in a democracy, to the effect that most people can be taught *how* to read, but not *what* to read.

Confucius was in the habit of comparing and contrasting the "superior man" with the "inferior man." There are in the *Analects* at least 18 such antithetical assertions aside from numerous instances where "superior man" alone or "inferior man" alone is mentioned. His exponents, especially some of the more modern ones, have tried to show that the distinction Confucius had in mind was entirely one of education and culture and was not inherent. It is thus maintained that everyone is potentially a "superior man" in the Confucian sense, and the status can be actualized through self-culture. Such an interpretation aimed at making a democrat out of Confucius is not warranted, however, when we come to read the following two remarks, especially the latter one:

Tse-lu said:	Does the superior man esteem valor?
The Master answered:	The superior man holds righteousness to be of highest importance. A superior man having valor without righteousness will be guilty of insubordination; an inferior man having valor without righteousness will commit robbery.The Master having come to Wu-cheng, heard there the sound of stringed instruments and singing. Well pleased and smiling, he said: Why use an ox-knife to kill a fowl?
Tse-yiu[2] replied:	Formerly, Master, I heard you say, "When a superior man is well educated, he loves men; when an inferior man is well educated, he is easily ruled."
The Master said:	Tse-yiu's words are right. What I said was only in sport.

[2] A disciple of Confucius well known for his literary attainments. He was then the chief administrator of the city of Wu-cheng.

It would thus seem that the difference between a superior man and an inferior man in the Confucian jargon is something more than the want or possession of a moral and intellectual culture. Education at its best is not only to produce leaders, who will be mindful of the welfare of those under them, but to produce good followers, who will realize their own inferiority in intellect and ability and will be contented with their corresponding positions in the social scale. Some such interpretation is certainly consonant with another statement quoted above that the mass or people can be made to follow a certain line of action, but not to understand it.

But Confucius' idea of inequality of things, including men, went further, so much so that an over-enthusiastic Darwinian may well say that he almost suggested natural selection. The following remark is found ascribed to Confucius in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, written by Confucius' grandson:

> Thus, it is that Heaven, in the production of things, is surely acting according to their natural qualities. Hence, that which is cultivable, it cultivates; while that which is ready to fall, it overthrows.

The notion of natural equality, which was soon raised to the dignity of a social principle, was inaugurated, again, by Mencius. The term equality is of course modern and not to be found in his works, at best he would say:

> Thus all things which are the same in kind are like to one another. Why should we doubt in regard to man, as if he were a solitary exception to this? The sage and we are the same in kind.

But the conclusion that the principle of equality was not only hinted at, but didactically maintained and evangelistically disseminated is inescapable, even after only a casual perusal of his works. We have already seen how he gave rise to the doctrine of natural goodness of man. From a priori grounds alone, it would thus appear that this additional principle of natural equality was nothing short of a logical necessity. Natural goodness implies natural equality: a state of affairs in which one man is by nature 50 % good, another 70 %, and still another a 100 %, would be beyond conceivability.

To make the principle of more effect, Mencius constantly harkened back to history. He picked out famous servants and kings—some of whom have since his time been proved to be partly legendary—as specimens of perfection, who should and could easily be reduplicated if his contemporaries only knew how. Of Yao and Shun, two ancient kings, he made a veritable fountainhead of inspiration, not only for himself and his disciples, but for dukes and kings whom he was for many a year in the habit of interviewing in his enthusiasm to help set up a united empire and a new social order.

* * *

The twin principles of natural goodness and natural equality finally necessitate another logical step—the efficacious role of environment. In the social order as it is or as it ever has been, equality and goodness seldom, if at all, obtain; and this unfortunate state of affairs must be accounted for on some other ground than our moral nature; and environment including education and training steps in as *the* important factor of social well-being and progress, and is easily represented as powerfully

effective in assisting or obstructing our good moral endowment, and thus producing inequalities and social ills.

Confucius was no such believer. A great educator such as he was, he entertained no illusions as to the molding power of education. His dealings with his own disciples bear ample testimony to this fact. Education, necessary and helpful as it is, will not wipe out the distinctions that nature has made, as can be seen from the following passage in the *Analects*:

> Those who are born with the possession of knowledge are the highest class of men. Those who learn and so readily get possession of knowledge are the next. Those who are dull and stupid, and yet try to learn, are another class next to these. As to those who are dull and stupid and yet do not learn, they are the lowest of the people.

When we come down to Mencius, we find, however, a very different situation. We expected it from logic. His position was already clear when we quoted in a preceding section, "If men do what is not good, the blame cannot be imputed to their natural powers." But here are a few more of his many such remarks:

> In good years the children of the people are most of them good, while in bad years, the most of them abandon themselves to evil. It is not owing to their natural powers conferred by Heaven that they are thus different. The abandonment is owing to the circumstances under which they allow their minds to be ensnared and drowned in evil.

> There now is barley. . . . Although there may be inequalities of produce, that is owing to the difference of the soil, as rich or poor; to the unequal nourishment afforded by the rains and dews; and to the different ways in which man has performed his business in reference to it.

Mencius finally arrived at a general conclusion:

> Therefore, if it receives its proper nurture, there is nothing which will not grow. If it loses its proper nurture, there is nothing which will not decay away.

* * *

Confucius' position with reference to the three sociobiological questions of the moral nature of man, natural equality among men, and the molding power of environment, will be clear from the discussion outlined above. It is very interesting, besides, to note the change, almost a reversal, of position with reference to the same questions in the case of Mencius. Were it not for the fear of digressing too much, the writer would like to venture a rather detailed explanation of the change which took place between two leading figures of to all appearances a common school of thought within the short span of three or four generations. But it is hoped that the following may suffice.

The causes of the change in this case, as in any other historical matter, must be sought in the social backgrounds in which Confucius and Mencius had their being. Confucius' was a time when the feudal system was still operative, and the social classes under the system had not changed to such an extent as to confuse greatly the biological gradations obtaining in relatively primitive communities. In other words, it was a time, when aristocrats and common people were such owing not so much to shifts of social and economic circumstances as to qualities based on natural endowment. The epithets "superior" and "inferior," so distasteful to many modern savants, might have indicated biological distinctions as well as the degree of cultural attainment.

Tracing down to the time of Mencius, we find that the old feudal system was on the verge of collapse, and the class distinctions, which had never been hard and fast, became much more blurred. Thus, Mencius, in one of his more pessimistic moments, wrote:

> There is a nobility of Heaven, and there is a nobility of man. Benevolence, righteousness, self-consecration, and fidelity, and the unwearied joy in these virtues: these constitute the nobility of Heaven. To be a kung, a ching, or a tah-fu: this constitutes the nobility of man.
>
> The men of antiquity cultivated their nobility of Heaven, and the nobility of man came to them in its train.
>
> The men of the present day cultivate their nobility of Heaven in order to seek for the nobility of man; and when they have obtained that, they throw away the other: their delusion is extreme. The issue is that they must lose that, the nobility of man as well.

Mencius of course did not advance any explanation of such a change aside from the psychological one of unwillingness on the part of his contemporaries to be like the ancients. But we now know better perhaps. Political and economic vicissitudes had resulted in the downward diffusion of much of the blood of the higher classes, and the diffusion of that of the lower classes in the opposite direction. Much social unrest and chaos set in. The "theory of the aristocratic class" became at first an object of envy, then a source of complaint, to those whose forbears, unknown to them, had been in that class. And as these waxed strong in number, they began to throw gauntlet at the class above them but not necessarily superior to them. The complaint and challenge were destined still later to crystallize into a theory of natural goodness and equality of all men, in the hands of a philosopher who had the combined caliber of an optimist, a social reformer, and an evangelist, and who in this case was Mencius.

The causes of the upward and downward diffusion of blood were many and have been discussed rather fully by Mr. Liang Chi-chiao, without, however, grasping their full significance, in his *History of Political Thought before Ching Dynasty*.[3]

Among these causes it may be mentioned, as the most significant, the protracted operation of the law of primogeniture, which reduced all lines of descent but the oldest of an aristocratic family to the social level of the common people after only five generations. But as they were not appreciably reduced biologically, they soon became the discontented and insurgent elements in the community.

But no matter what these causes were, and how differently we may choose to interpret them, the end result was there. We witness a change in the qualitative distribution of the population, aside from quantitative changes which time alone was enough to bring about, especially in a milieu where parenthood has always been a matter of commendation. And to these sociobiological changes, the writer deems it, was due to difference between Confucius and Mencius as far as their social outlook is concerned. A secondary reason, it may be added, was that Mencius was comparatively more of a social reformer than a scholar, and that in his glowing enthusiasm for bettering the situation, he was led to formulate the most sweeping generalizations.

These changes in population during the so-called periods of Autumn and Spring and of Warring States and their far-reaching effects on later history are still to be

[3] In Chinese. The Commercial Press, 1923.

worked out in detail. But from the brief attention we have given to them, we are perhaps not far from truth to suggest that democratization as an unconscious racial movement and perhaps a cultural stage occurred by far much earlier in Chinese history than in the West. In the latter, England, where the principle of primogeniture had worked most regularly, was the leader; but her influence did not reach far until the movement received a fresh spur from the political metaphysicians of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—metaphysicians not uncomparable with Mencius in their views. Beyond this suggestion, however, we shall be going too far.

* * *

One has perhaps often wondered in the naivety of a student of nature whether democracy, no matter in how many ways we may frame it on paper, has ever existed, or ever will exist. It is conceivable that in the primeval past the austerity of natural selection might have kept all people strong, healthy, and intelligent in a more or less equal degree; and that these, having agreed to live together, might have framed some form of political organization which was truly democratic. It is equally conceivable that in the remote future, after a long process of rigid artificial selection, some such condition may supervene. But short of this "Utopia" ahead of us and that "Golden Age" behind us, one sees little possibility of a government in which everyone will have a share. By representative government is often made to mean, in these days, the government by the best, that is, those on the right extreme of the distribution curve, and with the consent of those occupying the rest of the curve. But oftener it actually means the government of the typical, that is, those occupying the middle portion of the curve, to the embarrassment of the rest who are either extremely able and intelligent or dull and docile, but who equally suffer by being outnumbered.

Democracy idealized, that is, representative government by the best, is in end result the same as aristocracy; the one point of departure being the one without the consent of the governed and the other with. But what does this element of consent, even when properly made, amount to at the present time when anybody's consent is as good as anybody else's, particularly in a community in which the gradations in intelligence of the people are many and varied? One does not fully appreciate that remark of Confucius that the people may be made to follow a path of action but not to understand it, until one comes to a country where a system obtains, in which such docile following is precluded and the understanding is assumed.

This is of course no treatise on the merits and demerits of democracy. The above observations are only offered to link together the negative aspect, already presented, and the positive aspect, to follow in another paper, of the sociobiological implications in the teachings of Confucius and his school.

3.2 What Confucius Did Teach

There is an underlying principle in the social and political philosophy of Confucius; and this may be best translated as the principle of differentiationism. Society as an independent entity was hardly conceived at that time; and so it was with the

family and the state that the great bulk of Confucius' social philosophy deals. With reference to the state, this principle of social differentiationism is most evident, and from it later developed the system of gradation and selection of able and intelligent men by the government—a system which had always proved a source of national strength. With reference to the family, the same is true, although it is perhaps less obvious. But it is mainly in this principle, the writer believes that an explanation is found, directly, for the great permanence of Chinese family life, and indirectly, for the social stability and order in the relative absence of legal and religious restrictions.

In *The Doctrine of the Mean*, we find ascribed to Confucius the following interesting observation:

> Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity, and the greatest exercise of it is in *loving one's relatives*. Righteousness is the accordance of actions with what is fitting and proper, and the greatest exercise of it is in *honoring the worthy*. The *decreasing measures of love* due to relatives, and the *gradations in honor* due to the worthy, are produced by the principle of propriety (italics the writer's).

In the same book, appears another passage ascribed to Confucius:

> By means of the ceremonies in the ancestral temple, the people distinguished their kindred according to their order of *descent*. By ordering the parties present according to their *rank*, they distinguished the more noble and the less. By the arrangement of the services, they made a distinction of talents and *worth*. In the ceremony of the general pledging, the inferiors presented the cup to their superiors, and thus something was given to the lowest to do. At the concluding feast, places were given according to the hair, and thus was made the distinction in *age* (italics the writer's).

These two passages may be taken to represent what the writer has ventured to call the principle of social differentiationism in Confucianism. Social differentiation based on blood relation; differentiation based on age or seniority; differentiation based on official position; and differentiation based on personal character and ability are urged by all Confucian exponents including Mencius; and their constant counsel to that effect cannot fail to impress any reader as very striking. A more detailed discussion of this principle will now follow.

Just to facilitate discussion, the following scheme is offered:


principle of social differentiationism
based on talents and worth (primary)
based on official position (secondary)
Application to the state
based on blood relation (primary)
based on ageor seniority(secondary)
Application to the family

There are at least six references in the *Analects* as to the necessity for the welfare of the state of singling out and installing men of real talents and worth. In *The Doctrine of the Mean* ascribed to Confucius' grandson, and *The Great Learning* ascribed to one of his immediate disciples, there are at least eight references to the

same effect besides what has already been quoted in the preceding paragraphs. In the works of Mencius, over a score places are found where this principle of, let us call it, civil selection, was stated. Let it be noticed that Mencius was here truly orthodox.

All these references point to one all-important injunction, that it is the primary duty of the state, then represented by the ruler and the chief minister, to pick out and properly place in office individuals of great ability and virtue, or to pay honor and respect to them without burdening them with any official duty. Thus it was said:

> To see men of worth and not be able to raise them to office; or to raise them to office, but not to do so quickly; this is disrespectful. . . . (*The Great Learning*).

And a famous minister of the time was actually condemned by Confucius for being so disrespectful:

> Was not Tsang Wen like one who had stolen his position? He knew the virtue and the talents of Hwui of Liu-hsia, and yet did not procure that he should stand with him in court (*The Analects*).

The whole philosophy behind this principle of civil selection is very easy to understand. It is no more than the commonsense belief that in any human endeavor, it is the man factor that finally counts. Thus we read in *The Doctrine of the Mean* again:

> The government of Wen and Wu is displayed in the records—the tablets of wood and bamboo. Let there be the men and the government will flourish; but without the men, the government decays and ceases.
>
> With the right men the growth of government is rapid, just as vegetation is rapid in the earth; and moreover their government might be called an easily-growing rush.

And in *Mencius*:

> If a prince hates disgrace, the best course for him to pursue is to esteem the virtuous and to honor the scholarly, giving the worthiest among them places of dignity, and the able offices of trust. . . .

Then there is in addition the commonsense belief in the educational and exemplary value of worthy men; even their mere presence is significant—a light on the stand and not under the bushel. Thus, we read in *Mencius*, perhaps again betraying his zeal as a reformer:

> The administration of the government is not difficult; it lies in not offending the great families. He whom the great families affect, will be affected by the whole state; and he whom any one state affects, will be affected by the whole empire. When this is the case, such as one's virtue and teachings will spread over all within the four seas like the rush of water.

Again:

> Wherever the superior man passes through, transformation follows; wherever he abides, his influence is as if by way of magic.

These beliefs are easily crystallized into one central principle—the principle that the virtuous and talented are truly supreme, before whom even imperial dignity must bow. The following appear in *Mencius* in three different connections:

> Therefore a prince who is to accomplish great deeds will certainly have ministers whom he may not summon. When he wishes to consult with them, he goes to them. . . .
>
> When a prince wishes to see a man of talents and virtue, and does not take the proper course in doing so, it is as if he wished him to enter and yet shut the door against him.
>
> An old saying has it: "A scholar of complete virtue may not be employed as a minister by his sovereign, nor treated as a son by his father."

* * *

It will be interesting now to see how these principles have been borne out by subsequent Chinese history. We shall not be able to go beyond a bare outline of the age-long system of what we have called civil selection. Confucius and his school, needless to say, did not originate the principles that were behind the system, but they were the first to state them with unerring emphasis. Centuries before Confucius, rulers, then hardly more than tribal, were already in the habit of "employing men of talents and virtue without regard to where they came from." Thus, Mencius enumerated the humble origins of some of the great ministers before his time.

Shun rose from among the channeled fields; Fu Yu was called to office from the midst of his building frames; Chiao Ke from his fish and salt; Kwan Chung from the hands of his gaoler; Sunshu Ngao from his hiding by the sea-shore; and Pei-li Yi from the market place.

It was then hardly a system. This rather personal form of selection persisted until fairly recent times. But with the development of a graded national educational system in Hsia and subsequent dynasties, a supplementary source became established from which leadership along many lines were drawn.

In the Han Dynasty, when Confucianism was raised to a highly orthodox position, the system of civil selection was greatly elaborated, including methods of examination of aspirants. Special appellations of honor, properly graded, were also introduced, designating the successful candidate to be "filial and contemptuous of worldly wealth" or "conversant with the classics," etc. The system in its essence persisted until the last days of the Manchu Dynasty, within the memory and even experience of many of us. Though it received many modifications at different times, especially since the Ming Dynasty—modifications often formalistic and of very dubious significance, the underlying principle was never lost sight of. Francis Galton, in his *Hereditary Genius* and, much later, in *Essays in Eugenics*, cast some very happy reflections upon the system. The system is indeed now gone; but it is interesting to note how the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen suggested the necessity of adding two more powers to the current tripartite form of government, which he named "the selectional" and "the prosecutory," the former perhaps an amplification and modification of the historical system and the latter suggesting the *droit administratif* of the French, but both having to do with insuring leadership and expert service within and without the government.

The writer has throughout insisted that many teachings of Confucius such as underlying the system of civil selection are sociobiological. That they are so perhaps calls for some further explanations. The very first effect of a nation-wide system of selection based, as it was, on scholastic attainment (not on expert training as in the case of civil service examinations) was to set aside the more intelligent portion of the population from the less intelligent; and as the selection was graded, subdivisions were made among the more intelligent into many smaller groups. Thus a sort of class system based largely on talent and ability was finally established without, however, any clear-cut and hard-set boundary lines common to class systems having different bases, so much so that the term class or any equivalent of it was seldom used.

But the distinctions as a result of the selective process were nevertheless there and could not fail to produce far-reaching social consequences, especially as they related to the matter of marriage. Marriages tended to be contracted within the same class or between classes closely associated. Though the matter has yet to be worked out in detail, there is little doubt about the fact that the innumerable great families responsible for the making of Chinese history have been preserved mainly through the operation of the principle of assortative mating which the system of civil selection enormously encouraged—a happy result which the philosophers primarily responsible for the system, then in the absence of sociobiological knowledge, never counted upon.

* * *

We come now to the application of the principle of social differentiationism to the family as the social unit in a state.

The necessity of differentiating one's affections toward persons and things of the outside world forms one of the cardinal parts of Confucianism. Numerous references are found in the writings of the school, but the following one from Mencius is perhaps the most representative:

> In regard to inferior creatures, the superior man is kind to them, but not benevolent. In regard to people generally, he is benevolent to them, but not loving or affectionate. He is loving or affectionate to his parents, and benevolently disposed to people generally, and kind to creatures.

Mencius' criticism of and antagonism to the teachings of Mo-ti, an older contemporary of his, was entirely aroused by his doctrine of universal love, which tended inevitably to wipe out the distinctions which nature had ordained, thus resulting in social disorder and degeneration.

We have seen in our discussion of the negative aspect of the sociobiological implications in Confucianism, how Mencius, in his capacity as a reformer, had formulated theories quite inconsistent with his inherited position as a Confucian scholar. But here we find him in perfect accord with what Confucius taught, and even more emphatically. In his more scholarly moments, he was indeed very much opposed to any social forces which tend to mow down the natural distinctions normally obtaining in human relationships. In refuting some of the egalitarian ideas of his time, he made the following remarks which, the writer thinks, represent a point

of view which is essentially modern and is at the basis of the principle of social differentiationism we have been discussing:

> It is the nature of things to be of unequal quality. Some are twice, some five times, some ten times, some a hundred times, some a thousand times, some ten thousand times, as valuable as others. If you reduce them all to the same standard, that must throw the empire in confusion.

It is from this healthy point of view that he opposed himself most vigilantly to the schools of Mo-ti and Yang-chu at a time when Confucianism was barely on its feet.

> Yang's principle is "each one for himself," which does not acknowledge the claims of the sovereign (representing the state). Mo's principle is "to love all equally," which does not acknowledge the claims of the father (representing the family). But to acknowledge neither king nor father is to reduce oneself to the state of a beast. . . .

To the effects of such teachings, Chinese history throughout its length bears ample testimony. To the Chinese, family integrity is the very basis of social and national solidarity. Educational influences embodying as they do the religious veneration of deceased forebears, filial piety to the living, the premium put upon age and experience, the ideals of marriage perfectly unintelligible to an average Westerner, the almost duty-bound bearing and rearing of the young within the ancestral hearth, are all directed toward insuring the permanence and prosperity of one institution—the family. To him also, the sense of family identity, well commented upon in Popenos and Johnsons Applied Eugenics, and with it a proper amount of family pride, comes as a matter of course.

The effects produced are to all appearance only educational and social and political, for to a Confucian, the fundamental principles behind the operation of the family and the state are the same. But they are farther reaching. The racial significance of the family system is yet to be fully grasped by many enthusiastic aspirants to individualism and freedom among our younger generation.

The writer has discussed elsewhere[4] in some detail the racial significance of the Chinese family system based on principles first emphatically laid down by Confucius and his early exponents.

In thus speaking about the family system among the Chinese, the writer does not mean to imply that the system is perfect or even that it needs little modification. Far from it. But the principles upon which the system is founded, he does believe, are just those which modern society is wanting. One does not fully realize this until one comes into contact with life in the West, where the family has practically ceased to be of much social, educational, and in not a few cases, even biological significance.

Perhaps very few of us realize, and fewer will admit, that sentimentalism, a peculiarly Western social method of dealing with things and one leading nowhere, is a result, almost a logical outcome, of the disruption of the family. Personal sentiment, which formerly and naturally had as its central point of attachment the hearth,

[4] "Eugenics and China", *Eugenical News*, November, 1923.

becomes now, as it were, dislodged, scattered about, and finally comes to invade all other provinces of life, wherein it ill fits. The whole situation, in its extreme, is perhaps well epitomized by the following in a comic paper:

"I had to discharge my nurse for the most horrible cruelty."

"What did she do?"

"She kicked my poor darling Fido for biting the baby."

It is only upon such a view that one can reconcile such social phenomena as the birth control movement and the society for the prevention of cruelty to animals.

Sentimentalism is nothing but a form of diffused and undifferential affection which Confucius and his school took special pains to point out as a subtle and yet powerful cause of social disintegration.

* * *

This much for the application of the principle of social differentiationism to the family and the state. The writer did not stop to discuss that part of the application of the principle as based on official position or rank and on age or seniority, for the simple reason that these bases were secondary and derivative, and that the significance of the distinctions so produced was largely social and not racial.

The Chinese as a race, not only as a culture, has certainly much to thank for the teachings of Confucius and his school. Both on the positive and negative aspects, their sociobiological implications have resulted in social ideals and institutions which have done by far more good than harm from our standpoint. They have curbed individual freedom and initiative perhaps to an extent deleterious to purely social and cultural advancement. But intelligent people begin to see that were they induced to discard the Chinese system as dominated by Confucianism, and to accept its equivalent in the West, or indeed anywhere else, as the only alternative, they would more than hesitate.

We touched upon democracy in a preceding page. The Chinese has often been called one of the most democratic peoples. Under whatever circumstances this pronouncement was made, there is certainly more than a modicum of truth in it. We have stated that the democratization of the Chinese definitely took place as early as from the sixth to fourth centuries B.C. But it stopped shortly afterwards, and perhaps fortunately so. The optimistic theories of Mencius, almost equivalent to what Rousseau and his school formulated, never bore much fruit. That they did not was perhaps due to the fact that democratization had already gone far enough as not to need further psychological spurs as in the case of the Pre-Revolutionary period in France. Confucius and Mencius themselves belonged to the common people but were originally of aristocratic stocks.

Another reason as to why the theories of Mencius did not take much effect was that early Confucianism had in itself elements sufficiently potent to serve as an antidote—a fact which, Mencius, in his enthusiasm, happily did not himself recognize. I refer again to the principle of social differentiationism, which can hardly be reconciled with the theory of natural equality and its logical conclusions.

Democratization among the early Chinese did not develop into representative government as it did in the West. It took quite a different course. Feudalism did disappear, but the form of government remained essentially what it was before—it was monarchical. But in spirit, we must now concede, it was really aristodemocratic. Not everybody had a share in the government, it is true, but men of character and of more than average talent were sure, speaking generally, to push themselves to the front and make themselves heard. There was no known obstructive mechanism, such as class distinction,[5] religious partisanship, racial prejudice, etc., to prevent them from so doing. Even in the last days of the national examination system, a great many successful candidates were of very humble parentage.

The negative aspect of the sociobiological implications in Confucianism has been treated elsewhere in Chinese in much greater detail by the present writer. A thorough study of the positive aspect, however, will involve a detailed examination into the system of civil selection and the family system in their historical entirety, and their effects as have found expression in biographies and genealogies, which cannot be done in a magazine article.

[5] The traditional distinction between scholars, farmers, artisans, and merchants, and someone adds, soldiers, is mainly professional and although the social value of each is different, there is absolutely no external mechanism which prevents an individual from changing his status.

Chapter 4
An Anthropological View on China's Troubles

Every thoughtful Chinese has time and again asked himself: What is after all at the root of China's national troubles? How are we to account in the simplest terms for the chronic state of affairs including famine, war, pestilence, ignorance, and almost every other thing that characterizes a disorganized country? Granting that there are many factors responsible for the state of affairs that we have been witnessing for the last few decades, we would still like to know if there is any single factor to which we can point as the most vital of all. To this there have been of course many answers or attempts at answering. If we have enough time and, what is more important, enough patience to make an inductive study of these answers, so amply furnished by modern facilities for free discussion and publicity, we shall surely land upon three or four issues of great moment. They are:

1. The lack of a unified central government.
2. Poverty and extremely low standard of living among the masses.
3. Ignorance of the masses due to illiteracy and a general deficiency in educational facilities.
4. The interrupting and disrupting influences of foreign imperialism.

In short, the factors responsible for China's stagnation and disorder are economic, political, and educational. This is indeed so obvious as to be platitudinous. But when we go further to inquire which one of these three or four factors is the most fundamental, we are at once confronted with great difficulty. We shall be forced in the end to abide by the inconclusive answer that either none of these is fundamental or all of them are.

But for those of us who do not have a general grasp of the situation and who are perhaps biased by profession and training, the choice as to this most underlying factor is easily made. In a round table of professional men, which is a common thing

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. I, No. 3, June 14, 1928, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_4

today, the discussion, true to the style of the gathering, may be overheard something like this, with Mr. A evidently leading:

A: Why is China such an invalid for years?
B: The cause is to be found in the absence of a stable government.
A: But how is it that such a government is not yet formed, we started on the task some two decades ago?
C: I believe it is only because the people are not prepared for it. We need to educate the people first. A democracy without education is one built on sands.
A: But we have certainly modernized our education, in method as well as in spirit; it seems strange that we have as yet done little towards raising the level of intelligence of the masses.
D: You gentlemen forget something more important. Think of the poverty, nay, the utter destitution of the masses. We in the professions do not seem to realize that the majority of our people are living below what the economist would call subsistence level; in plainer language, they are starving. You cannot expect to make citizens out of empty stomachs, much less would you ask them to come in for culture, for ideals of constructive statesmanship! It is impossible.
A: This is all very well. But for decades we have been eagerly industrializing our country, and besides, there are other reconstructive measures for alleviating the economic status of the people. Yet we must admit that the situation is no better. I am afraid there must be other factors that condition in a very unfavorable way our economic development . . .
E: May I interrupt you? I just want to point out the factors that are limiting our economic development. I refer to the imperialistic policies on the part of other countries. Consider their grip upon our tariff system, not to speak of other evils fostered by unequal treaties, nor indeed the secret roles some of them play in trying to keep up indefinitely our civil wars, for unification would mean the end to their exploitations.
A: I am not quite sure whether the factors I referred to a moment ago correspond exactly with yours. Even granting your point of view, I doubt if we are on enough solid ground for some real constructive work.
B: As most of the gentlemen have spoken, may I come back at this point? Mr. E has not only thrown all the faults on others, true to the spirit of our people! But has also mistaken cause for effect and effect for cause. The absence of a stable government, I insist, is at the root of all evils including foreign aggrandizement, nay, it invites it. The presence of it will easily cast off all yokes imposed upon us from without. We should profit by the experience of Japan.

So the discussion comes back to the point where it started. A vicious circle! Many a round-table discussion today is precisely so circumscribed in its outlook that no conclusion can ever be reached.

But any one of us who is so unfortunate as to find himself in a vicious circle will soon begin to suspect the adequacy of the arguments which make up the circle. Arguments that are sound form a series which may be visualized as a ladder, where one step leads to another in logical sequence, and not as a circle where any step may

be recurring. So viewed, the factors alleged to be responsible for China's difficulties may not be real factors at all, but effects of some common factor or factors which are yet to be found. The state of affairs may now be visualized, to use another geometric figure, as a cone, of which the gentlemen of the round table saw only the circumference of the base, but not the vertex.

Now what is this vertex or vertices? To those among us who have watched the development of the doctrine of evolution, especially that phase of it which deals with man and his culture, the answer readily suggests itself. Without going so far as to remind ourselves of the hierarchy of sciences formulated by the French philosopher and sociologist Comte, or indeed, for that matter, the now well-established truism that social and cultural evolution must be preceded by and based upon organic and geographical evolution, we see that even common sense does not permit us to think that social and cultural life stands or falls entirely by its own merit. Quite on the contrary, culture, in all its phases has doubtless a physical basis. In the first place, it is necessarily conditioned by the geographical environment to which a people adapts itself, and in the second, by the hereditary qualities with which they are by nature endowed.

This is essentially the anthropological viewpoint. From such a viewpoint, the whole problem is seen in a very different light and setting. Has our physical environment deteriorated during the historical period? Has there been any appreciable impoverishment of our hereditary constitution as a result of adverse natural and social selection? Or, while our hereditary qualities have remained constant, may it not be possible that the process of modernization has been so sudden and in so large a scale that we find ourselves for the time being unequal to the task? We are admittedly in a state of mal-adjustment, but how much of it is directly traceable to environmental and biological shortcomings? These are the questions now in order.

We may begin answering by a short survey of China's present day population, both in its quantitative and qualitative aspects. We have as yet practically no vital statistics, but it is generally believed by competent judges that our population has not been increasing for the last 100 years or so, if it has not actually decreased. Professor East, in his *Mankind at the Crossroads*, estimated that our annual natural increase cannot exceed 3 per 1,000, and more probably less than 3, maybe from 1.5 to 0. This is a very poor showing, poorer than all European and American countries, not even excluding France which is also characterized by an extremely low natural increase.

Now increase or decrease in numbers is immaterial, were it not for the fact that it helps to indicate the general vitality of a people. Upon this is based the so-called Vital Index of Professor Raymond Pearl of Johns Hopkins University, which is simply the ratio of the birth rate to the death rate multiplied by 100. Thus, an index of 100 means merely sustaining vitality, one exceeding 100 indicates increased vitality and brighter prospect for survival, whereas one less than 100 spells degeneracy and forebodes slow but sure extinction, if the index keeps on growing smaller. Now what is the vital index for China? We do not know; we have no natality and mortality statistics to calculate from. Professor East's estimate of 3 per 1,000 would suggest an index of 100–100.3. But according to Sweeney, another student of population

from Johns Hopkins, calculated indices from Hong Kong, Penang, the Strait Settlements, and other regions in and around Malaysia where Chinese immigrants constitute the bulk of the population are much below 50; and Hong Kong holds the world's record in having an index as low as 10. Such low indices cannot of course be taken at their face values, as the Chinese population in these outlying regions is characterized by considerable mobility and perhaps a good many confinements are made to take place in China in cases where there are still old homesteads. But we cannot help suspecting that there has been a decided downward trend in the general vitality of at least one section of our population, which, be it remembered, is from the economic point of view one of the best sections that we possess.

This leads us to a more specific consideration of the qualitative side of the Chinese people. On the purely physical aspect, the Chinese is well known for his general stamina, which includes such traits as the adaptability to almost all climatic conditions, the ability to stand hardships and long hours of labor, and the resistance to some of the diseases to which members of other races may easily succumb. But observations of this kind are largely based upon Chinese emigrants who constitute a rather selected lot and may not be representative of the whole racial group. Medical and physiological researches in recent years seem to show that the Chinese is characterized by a lower metabolic rate and lower blood tensions than the European or American due to quantitative differences in internal glandular secretions. The significance of these is not yet quite known. Low blood pressure, according to Alfred Friedlander, is a symptom of an abnormal bodily state, rather than a disease itself; although it seems to be clearly established that in many persons it may be compatible with perfect health.

On the mental side the evidence is equally inconclusive, although there are statements from authorities which call for anxiety. Let us take the matter of intelligence, which is now generally believed to be inherent and hence heritable. Both general intelligence and the specific types of intelligence, or special talents or aptitudes, are of course at the root of the efflorescence known as progressive culture, and their presence in abundance forms the greatest asset that a people may covet. It is often asserted, though with little inductive evidence, that the apparent inability of the Chinese to adapt himself to modern cultural conditions may prove to be inherent, that is, due to a rather low level of general intelligence. His failure to make, or sluggishness, as compared with Japan, in making any important contributions to modern scientific progress perhaps points to the same thing. It has also been suggested that the Chinese as a race is less variable than the European, or less polymorphic, as the late Professor Bateson of Cambridge would call it. He is perhaps deficient in mathematics. "Mathematics has not been the strong point of the Chinese," says Professor East, commenting upon our defective population figures. All these, as I said, are no more than casual observations to which we cannot attach very much importance.

Better scientific conclusions come from the results of mental tests. Those based upon the Binet–Simon type of tests seem to show that the Chinese is at least as competent as members from any other racial group. But at least one piece of research, based upon what is known as the Maze Test by Professor S.D. Porteus,

formerly of the University of Hawaii, concludes quite differently. This test proposes to measure "progressive adaptability," that is, intelligence largely in its constructive and creative aspects and not merely learning capacity; and if true, would prove more useful to our present discussion, which professes to be a study of the mal-adaptation of the Chinese due to inherent reasons. Permit me to quote a few lines from Professor Porteus ("Temperament and Mentality in Maturity, Sex and Race," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1924):

> Despite the fact that the Japanese boys were below the Chinese in Stanford–Binet level, in the maze they were markedly superior to the Chinese at every age from ten years onwards. . . . The Japanese girls . . . were ahead of the Chinese girls. Hence we can state that as regards tests of development involving the capacities of persistent effort, resistance to suggestibility, mental alertness and power to inhibit nervousness and emotion, the Japanese are considerably superior to the Chinese. . . . The superiority of the Japanese over the Chinese is all the more marked because of their inferior standing in the tests of learning capacity (pp. 70–72).
>
> It is difficult to believe that the differences in progress made during the last fifty years by the Japanese and Chinese are not due to actual differences in the racial intelligence of the two peoples (p. 59).

All these conclusions, favorable or unfavorable, were based upon tests taken among isolated groups of Oriental children in Hawaii and along the Pacific coast of America, and we may be justified in doubting their general applicability to the Chinese or Japanese people as a whole. Yet, it must be admitted that evidences of this kind, incomplete though they may be, cannot but call for our most thoughtful concern.

There remains the temperamental aspect of our constitution. This will inevitably be the weakest part of our discussion, as scientific generalizations relative to this aspect are almost wholly wanting. But there are a few traits which are of such common occurrence that they may be considered quite typical. The Chinese, true to his phlegmatic make-up, is often reserved, introspective, and when issues come along, he is very ready to compromise—a trait which the Anglo-Saxon can understand only with difficulty, notwithstanding Mr. Morley's book to the contrary. The Chinese of earlier generations were often credited with magnanimity and tolerance, but these seem to be passing and in their place are now found selfishness and inability to see other men's points of view. These are especially reflected in our economic life. Professor Huntington says of us in *The Character of Races*:

> Economy and thrift are virtues, but they easily pass into parsimony and selfishness. Now selfishness and self-centeredness, which perhaps are the same, are among the most prominent and most regrettable qualities of the Chinese. And they too, like a strong physique and the spirit of rigid economy, seem to have become inherent in the race, ingrained equalities innate in the germ plasm.

Now some of the traits touched upon are generally taken as virtues. But when the same are accentuated unduly, they soon assume the character of vices. Thus, thrift easily passes into miserliness, and tolerance may end in indifference to weal or woe, in the deadening of the sense of values, which accounts for easy compromise, and in the extreme, it ends in apathy, which is actually what we find among many Chinese today, irrespective of degrees of educational attainment.

Assuming the general truthfulness of our very brief survey of both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of China's population, we have for certain greater cause for concern than for contentment. We are evidently on the debit side of the account. We are now being weighed in the scale of intensive national and cultural struggles and are found wanting. The late Dr. Yen Fu, the translator of Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*, recognized years ago the plight we are in and will be remembered as being the first to sound a bugle of alarm to arouse us from a state of apathy and muddle headedness. I beg to translate a short passage from a letter to his friend:

> Nobody in these days is actually free from the woes that you referred to in your last letter. Extreme egalitarianism and unbridled liberty bordering upon license may be likened to cyclones on the sea. They of course cannot last long, but meanwhile incalculable damages have already been wrought. These are cataclysmic days; a bad heredity from within and rapid social and cultural changes from without have so conspired to produce the state of affairs that I wonder if it might have been at all preventable. Had it been so, we would have fain spared ourselves much of our effort in expostulation.
>
> Yet it must be noted that it is here where we witness the principle of natural selection at work. When expurgation has played its role, we may again hope to rise on our feet. Westerners have often intimated that the Chinese race will ultimately rehabilitate itself, but before rehabilitation is possible, they say, it must purge itself of all its hereditary wretchedness and evil practices which are but expressions of a partially wretched heredity.

Much of what Dr. Yen said is of course not quite up to date. Now, we know we are not entirely at the mercy of natural selection, and we know further that natural selection may not always do good, and as a point of fact, it has effected more harm than good in the development of the Chinese people during the historical period.

This naturally leads us to look for the forces, natural as well as cultural, that have brought the Chinese people to the present impasse.

The Chinese must have been a very sturdy and able race to begin with, as students of race evolution, including Dixon, Taylor, and Huntington, have amply testified. "We hate to admit," says Professor Huntington, "that potentially they [the Chinese and others] may be the better people, but both Taylor and Dixon agree that our present seeming racial superiority is only an accident." As the present superiority of the white people, especially the Nordics, is largely due to favorable geographical environment, according to Taylor, and to happy racial mixture, according to Dixon, and to chastising but loving natural selection, according to Huntington, it would seem logical for us to infer that the reverse of these factors, or any one or two of them, is responsible for the present lagging behind of the Chinese race.

In the first place, it is to be observed that north China is characterized by an increasingly dry climate due to the southerly shift of the desert. Now, a dry climate usually means alternate periods of droughts and famines, for there will be torrential rains when the protracted state of desiccation finally breaks. It is here where we must seek the very root of China's sorrows, including the proverbial one of the Yellow River, for such climatic conditions can only result in periodical famines due either to too much rain or too little.

In the wake of famines come severer struggle for existence and more rigorous natural elimination and selection. As far as physical stamina is concerned, every famine perhaps leaves the population afflicted sturdier and healthier. But when

mental resourcefulness is taken into account, we are not so sure whether selection has done its job with our human sense of values in view. The villagers in regions in the north chronically affected by famines seem to exhibit a sluggishness of perception nowhere found in the south. "An investigation during a recent famine," relates Professor Huntington, to whom we must be very much indebted for a thorough discussion of this topic, "made it seem probable that the people of these villages are as a whole subnormal mentally. They are little more than morons, apparently." Judging from my own observation, I do not think this statement is at all overdrawn; underfeeding and malnutrition have certainly done their share, but they cannot explain all.

Along with changes in physical and mental character, there comes a shifting of emphasis upon qualities which we call moral. Overpopulation in fat years, scarcity for lean years, and straight famines have necessitated a policy of constantly providing for the rainy day, which typifies all households in regions so afflicted. Here, adverse selection is again active, for it is obvious that the family which consistently denies itself in order to lay aside a surplus and another which consistently extract a percentage from everything that passes through their hands, regardless of ownership or value, is far more likely to survive than those who spend freely or show the spirit of altruism and sacrifice. Selection under such circumstances puts a heavy burden upon public-spiritedness, just as it does, mentally, upon sensibility and alertness.

But the loss to the north amounts to much more when we take into account the repeated migrations to the south of individuals who are more farsighted and who are too sensitive to remain and lead a wretched life under famished conditions, and also the selling of more intelligent and good-looking girls to the cities. All these sap the vitality of the rural districts in the north, and consequently that of the urban centers as well.

But depletion in the north through selective migration has perhaps enriched the south. It certainly has. But let it be noted that such migrations have not confined themselves entirely to Chinese territory, the most adventurous families have kept on streaming southward to Malaysia and Polynesia, where, in spite of their economic successes, they do not seem to maintain themselves biologically, as their vital indices strongly suggest. And that means they are being lost to the race forever.

When we come to the social and cultural forces that have shaped us, we are perhaps upon happier grounds. The Chinese people, until very recently, were characterized by two institutions of far-reaching social and, less obviously, racial importance. The first was the system of national examinations selecting and grading presumably all the able and intelligent individuals of the country. It was a system that not only provided for political and cultural leadership, which is manifest, but also insured the survival and advancement of the best blood lines in the country, which was a greater contribution than merely furnishing leaders, which any system of civil service may do and is doing. The other was the family system. The great permanence of Chinese family life was not only responsible for the stability and order in our social life in the relative absence of legal and religious restrictions but also for the conservation and development of many great families, which represent some of the most valuable strains of the race.

I believe that until very recent years it was these cultural forces that offset to a certain extent the ill effects of an adverse natural selection. But since our coming into contact with the West and as a result of our changing cultural ideals, not only have these social forces as institutions lost their hold upon us but also the sound principles they represent and the spirit they embody are being rapidly relegated to oblivion.

Thus, we may be convinced that our racial prospect is not particularly bright. Adverse natural selection is of course going to remain, but the social and cultural agencies that have helped us to ward off its sinister influences are going. They leave us divested of all protection. What are we to do? The preceding paragraphs aim only to show, in a very sketchy way, the present biological or anthropological status of our people and the forces that have brought it to pass. To change the status, to better it, and to restore the pristine qualities that had been ours before adverse selection did its ravages is the problem that is facing us today. A problem of this magnitude defies any simple solution, and I do not propose to offer one for the present occasion.

Chapter 5
Why Christianity Fails in China

Of recent years there has been much anti-Christian propaganda in China. The propagandists may be divided into two major groups. The first takes a political and economic standpoint, and views Christian evangelization as a subtle, disguised, but powerful measure of Western imperialism. Of this it must be said, however, that there is not much evidence. Imperialism may have occasionally made use of Christianity to further its cause, but to say that the missionaries as a group have deliberately joined hands with their home governments in exploiting China is manifestly a false accusation. The second group is composed of educators and college students, who maintain with justice that a people has the right to educate its own members and that outside intervention, no matter how helpful, is undesirable. But if the view of the first group is unjust, that of the second is unnecessary. When hundreds of students are being sent out every year to Christian countries to be educated, it would seem that a hard and fast line between the right to educate ourselves and the right to be educated cannot be drawn. Besides, it must not be forgotten that Christian schools established within Chinese boundaries are after all amenable to social and governmental control, whereas Chinese students abroad are left free to assimilate anything from foreign cultural systems that they think they want.

Yet, even in the absence of such propaganda based upon prejudice and ill-feeling, we have a problem before us—a problem that confronts not only the Chinese who are non-Christian, but also those who are Christian. It is a problem of cultural mixture, of the adjustment of radically different social and ethical ideals.

The intermingling of cultures has been a common historical fact, and is in itself a maker of history. But when two cultures that have developed quite apart are brought together, the desirability of their indiscriminate compounding may be questioned. It tends to upset the social equilibrium that originally obtained in a

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. I, No. 6, July 5, 1928, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_5

community and brings serious disorders in its trail. Now, this is precisely what the whole process of Christianization in the West for the last 2,000 years has meant. It would be profitable for us to review briefly how this has been so, before we turn to China.

Christianity in Europe has gone through three important phases: the theological, the ecclesiastical, and the sectarian. Christian theology is obviously a compound of the Christian conception of the supernatural with Greek intellectualism, be it of the Pauline or Aristotelian form. In the second phase, the elaborate and highly efficient organization known as the Church with its legal code known as the Canon Law represented the product of a new cultural alliance, and this time the new party was the legal and political genius of the Romans, sometimes conveniently expressed as Roman legalism. The third phase was initiated into history by the Reformation. It has been and still is characterized by a strong tendency to split into sects or denominations—a tendency which forces us to infer that in the place of Greek intellectualism and Latin legalism, Teutonic individualism is now in order and is at work.

Now, it must be admitted that all these cultural concoctions with their entailed consequences have not been as happy as we wished them. The hair-splitting disputes of the early theologians, the absolutism of the medieval church, asceticism culminating in wholesale celibacy of the clergy, the Crusades, the Inquisitions, the restraints put upon artistic and scientific expressions, the conflicts between the state and the church, between Catholicism and Protestantism, and between the denominations since the days of Luther, well represented by the Fundamentalist issue in America, are important expressions to the effect that the process of concocting during any one phase was in no sense complete, and the shifting from one phase to another necessarily entailed increased maladjustment and disorder. Matthew Arnold is the only writer in the West who has been willing to admit that the Christian religion and ethics has never worked into the European people completely and who in one of his essays maintains that Western history represents the alternate ascendency and descendancy of Hellenism versus Hebrewism.

Now, will similar social and cultural disturbances appear in China, when the Christian ethico-religious ideals are given full sway? To answer this, it will be pertinent for us first to refer to the past career that Christianity has already had in China, and, second, to see if the Christian ideas and ideals are in general accord with those originally prevailing among the Chinese people.

The Christian career has undoubtedly been an intermittent one. The Nestorians came to China during the early years of the Tang Dynasty when a very liberal emperor was in power. For a few decades, the Nestorian faith received considerable official endorsement and flourished side by side with Buddhism. But during the reign of Wu Tsung, the government found it advisable to close up all religious establishments, Christian and Buddhist alike. And since that date, practically nothing was known about the Nestorian believers, although we find allusions to their last remnants in Marco Polo's *Travels*. The Franciscans appeared on the scene not long after the last Nestorians had made their exit, but they failed even more signally to make much impression. Catholicism was reintroduced into China through the hands

of the Jesuits in the later years of the Ming Dynasty. The latter succeeded in winning the favor of the litterati largely through their intellectual pursuits. By the middle part of the Manchu Dynasty, the Protestant form of Christianity began to come in. And both Catholicism and Protestantism have remained active ever since. The Christian religion as a whole appears quite determined this time to stay, although it must be pointed out that for the last 300 years Catholicism has only been able to convert about two million souls and Protestantism, with shorter history but more indirect methods and less stringent requirements, only about 600,000 souls.

The brief historical survey seems to suggest that the affinity between Chinese culture and Christianity has not been particularly close. Comparative study of the cultural role of Buddhism in China would more clearly bear this out. Such comparative studies will prove highly interesting, but we cannot go further here beyond a bare statement.

That the affinity between Christianity and Chinese culture cannot be very close is better brought out by checking up some of their life ideals or views. Of these we propose to pick out two: the conceptions of God and of human relationships.

We have no desire to go into any technicalities with as regards the nature of God, and it is quite unnecessary. We simply want to point out the difference of opinion, if any, in which God is generally held by the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christian Chinese on the other. It will be remembered that the God of the ancient Hebrews was one that, if not Godly enough, was thoroughly human; he loved as well as hated, his loving kindness might turn into anger and the people had been not infrequently "smitten" for infidelity and iniquities. "Whomsoever God loveth he also chastiseth" is the simplest characterization we can give the Old Testament. Now, the idea of God among the ancient Chinese was quite similar to this. Those who have read the Book of Odes will remember how people were often "smitten" by Shang-ti with the iron rod of famine for their moral degeneration. Such a view of God is prevalent even today among peasants who in fat years are sure to give thanks to Tien, disclaiming any merit on their own part, and willing to acknowledge that they are "relying on Tien for their sustenance", but when lean years come along, the very same peasants will be found heaping curses on Tien. Among them also, when a good man dies untimely, his neighbors and acquaintances will surely not hesitate to foreswear that the old Tien is blind.

The Christian view of God is said to have improved upon the Judaistic. It represents God as only capable of love and indeed "God is love." To the unsophisticated Chinese, the new view of God is perfectly unintelligible; it is incompatible with his common sense and his personal experience, for only last year his fields were devastated by flood and some of his family members were lost, while apparently he had done nothing that could be displeasing to the deity. To be fair, we cannot but sympathize with this man. If anthropomorphism were indeed an ineradicable trait of man's belief in God, then let us all pray that it be not too incongruent with our common sense. Common sense says that if a being knows how to love, it must also know how to hate; even Christ has his moments of "righteous indignation."

But to the unsophisticated, the most unintelligible thing is yet to come, and that is the atrocious murder of Jesus by the Jews. How could a really just and loving God

have let such a thing happen? The very "sacrament or seal" of God's love in the eyes of Christians thus becomes its very disproof in those of the unsophisticated pagan Chinese. To those who understand enough human psychology, this whole legend built around the death of Jesus by murder is but a beautiful bit of rationalization to "confirm" that "God is love."

From the sentimental view of God, or, what amounts to the same thing, the view of a sentimental God, is derived the corollary belief that no sins are not forgivable. This is of course again diametrically opposed to what the Chinese are used to believe. In the Confucian *Analects*, we read "If you sinned against Heaven, nowhere may you pray for forgiveness."

Except in the case of a very religious people, the idea of God is, however, one that does not call for daily and constant concern. A dispute as to his exact [existence is] rarely found. But any irreconcilable difference in nature can only arise among metaphysicians whose views with regard to human relations, particularly the relationship between parent and son, in this connection is sure to arouse bitter mental conflict in any person who has a father and a mother. The relationship between parent and son, needless to say, has always had a great social and ethical significance for the Chinese. The filial and parental bond is the starting point of the family organization, which is in turn the starting point of social life itself. Thus, the thesis maintained by Confucius and his followers that a sane and healthy social life must be built upon the assured foundation of the parento-filial relationship is even to-day sound sociology and will surely meet with the hearty approval of those sociologists led by Professor Cooley, who have fully realized the social perils consequent upon modern family disorganization. Now, it is at this very foundation of social life that the ethical ideals of Christianity have united their lances.

One of these ideals is the so-called fatherhood of God. This is something worse than anthropomorphism; it projects into God not only human qualities, but also social qualities as well! Undoubtedly, this is again quite foreign to the unsophisticated Chinese; no matter how much faith he may have in God, as a personal deity, the Chinese believer has never proposed to allow him to usurp the place of the father who gave birth to him. The realms of faith and fact shall in no way be confounded!

The ideal of the fatherhood of God was calculated to bring in what is known as the Kingdom of God. While it may have been somewhat slow in bringing about the new social order, it has eminently succeeded in undermining the old one by destroying its center of gravity, the family. In the light of this ideal, the real father in the household would appear exceedingly diminutive and insignificant. So become the siblings by virtue of a kindred ideal, the brotherhood of all men. In fact, the medieval church, while eager to destroy the family in order to hasten the coming of millennium, did not loathe to take over the whole stock of relationship that can only properly pertain to this old biological and social institution. Thus, in addition to the primary heavenly father and the holy mother, the Medieval Christians, as still with the Catholics, were ennobled with a whole train of secondary fathers and mothers in the person of the pope, minor priests, priestesses, abbots, and abbesses, and fellow monks were invariably brothers and nuns sisters. But the aping of family relationships by the church did not stop here. Have we not been told that Jesus was the

groom and the church his bride? Have we not also read that medieval women who joined the church upon an oath of virginity often beguiled themselves into believing they were actually married to Jesus Christ? The God's family is now complete; in addition to parenthood, we have also marriage.

The Americans are wont to ask "What's in a name?" But the churchman thought differently. For the solidarity of the church and the perpetuation of the faith, he must look for representations or symbols to which peoples' sentiments might always be attached with a constantly high degree of firmness, and certainly no representations serve the purpose better than those based upon family relationships. Jesus himself was the first to have developed this form of safeguard for the new faith, when he assumed the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of men. This is no doubt interesting psychology, but it is very bad sociology, since it has led as we said inevitably to the dissolution of the family system. "Names and titles must not be lent," we read in the *Analects*. The Chinese mentality is equally aware of the psychological significance of names, but it has more practical sense and does not make any illegitimate use of it.

The deep attachment of the Chinese for his family is too well known to need iteration. His attachment is perhaps overdone, hypertrophied, and for that reason, undesirable. But in any case, such deep attachment must have proved a stubborn impediment to the spread of Christianity which offers to install a fictitious father in the place of the real one, and brothers with common ideals in the place of brothers with common blood. When it is remembered that such attachment is characteristic of the great majority of the Chinese people, the difficulty of the Christian workers would indeed seem insurmountable, not to speak of those who have enough rational education to see the social significance of the family and resent any outside force that tends to undermine its solidarity.

In line with the brotherhood ideal, we have the Christian doctrine of universal love of which "Love thy neighbor as thyself" is the simplest statement to be found in the Bible. Like the doctrine that "God is love," this is of course not possible, and any attempt at practicing it will surely make one a sentimentalist, if the attempt is sincere, and a hypocrite, if insincere.

Although "the quality of mercy is not strained," nature easily is. The reason is simple. Human nature is such that we tend to have more affectionate regard for those who are nearer to us; not necessarily by blood, but knowledge of our blood relationship with any man will very naturally deepen our attachment to him. Now, while such common sense based upon daily experience is entirely ignored by the Christian doctrine of brotherly love, it is fully recognized by the Chinese and explicitly stated in the ethical teachings of Confucius and his followers. They maintain that while kind regards for others is generally desirable, it must not be in the same intensity, but selective and differential. Thus, the fellow members of one's family, particularly the father and mother, are entitled to our kindest regards, whereas our neighbors, acquaintances, and fellow men are entitled to less, and other living beings of the animal world still less.

It is easily seen that such a view of emotional attachment among men has also worked for social order and integration. Our emotional life when so regulated

is given, so to speak, a center of gravity, and the orientation and gravitation of our emotional life is of course at the basis of social harmony and well-being. The writer has elsewhere tried to show that the extreme restlessness of social life in the West, especially in the urban centers, can be best explained by the insufficiency or absence of such gravitation due on the one hand to the disintegrated state of the family, and on the other, to the lack of a differential principle regulating men's emotional attachments, such a lack being traceable to no other cultural force than the indiscriminate Christian ideal of brotherly love. Admitting this, we shall see that the problem of sentimentalism and the problem of divided loyalties in Western social life are two expressions of a single problem; they represent that people's emotional attachments are either easily made or unmade, fleeting and insecure, or scattered and presenting no unified aspect.

Now, unless we are willing to make our social life an exact replica of that of the West, we as Christians and non-Christians might well take thought as to the advisability of imbuing ourselves unreservedly with this ideal of universal love. From the above discussion it would seem that even were it possible, it is not desirable.

The failure of Christianity in China, therefore, is nothing to be wondered at.

Chapter 6
China and Birth Control

In Dr. Kan Lee's "Over-population and Its Remedies," which appeared in the last number of the *China Critic*, we read:

> With their antiquated methods of production and their low degree of productivity, the nation has been sinking deeper and deeper into the mire of over-population, with all its accompanying evils. The **apparent** remedy is voluntary reduction of number. . . . In order to attain this end, birth control and late marriages are pointed out as the roads towards salvation. Not to say that these propositions are attended with many necessary evils, suffice it now to state that the result is uncertain, and cannot be immediate. . . . (**Blackfaces mine**).
>
> The impracticability of the scheme for the reduction of number impels to the consideration of some other remedies.

Birth control, as it is at present advocated, is certainly a very doubtful remedy of overpopulation, but I think Dr. Lee disposed of it a little bit too lightly. Remedy or no remedy, the knowledge of it has been widely and recklessly diffused and taken advantage of ever since the landing of Mrs. Sanger some 6 or 7 years ago. While we may legitimately depreciate its value as a palliative of overpopulation, we must not overlook, nor minimize, its importance as a social and biological factor in the molding of a new national life.

To supplement Dr. Lee's discussion then, the following paragraphs are offered. Some Western writer—I think it was Mr. A. E. Wiggam, the author of *The New Decalogue of Science*, once likened birth control to a two-edged sword, which cuts both ways. "What Bernard Shaw regards as the greatest discovery of the nineteenth century, viz., the means of artificially limiting the size of families, may prove," thinks Professor Conklin, one of the leading American biologists, "to be the greatest menace to the human race." Let us have a look at both sides of the shield.

Birth control has long been known to the Chinese both in principle and in method. But in principle it had scarcely received any rationalization and popularization,

---

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. I, No. 9, July 26, 1928, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_6

nor had it in method reached the present degree of refinement, until we began to assimilate the "fruits of philosophy" of the West, or perhaps more specifically, until our intelligentsia who were bent on reform heard Mrs. Sanger. Thus, it is plain that for a study of its merits and demerits, we must need to turn our head once more toward the West, where it has had an established existence for at least half a century.

At the outset it must be observed that birth control or rather the movement in its behalf, though pertaining to the venerated "fruits of philosophy," was not started deliberately and with a reasoned knowledge of its possible consequences. During the Sixth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference held in New York in March, 1925, I was surprised to hear rather strong remarks to this effect from more than one speaker, among whom was Dr. Louis I. Dublin, a very well-known vital statistician. That the movement for birth control has had a highly sentimental background is now generally admitted, even by some of the Neo-Malthusians themselves. Mrs. Sanger, who presided at the meeting wherein Dr. Dublin spoke, for instance, made a reply which sounds almost like pleading guilty:

> When we started our movement, truth to say, we were largely moved by strong sentiments. People academically disposed had indeed asked us to wait until the matter was theoretically more fully worked out. But how could we afford to after seeing with our very eyes again and again the anguish of forced and exhausting maternity.

In pointing out the preponderance of the emotional element in the history of the birth control movement, we do not mean to blame unduly those who have been responsible for it. An element of feeling is necessary to all social endeavors, and birth control is no exception. But we do mean to emphasize the fact that no solution can be arrived at for any social question when those working at it are overwrought with sentimentalism, for reasons which are obvious to anyone who has been trained to value facts and to reason correctly.

But even today the overweight of the feeling element in the birth control movement is still a fact. That there are by far more women than men in the movement partly accounts for this, as women are known to possess greater affectability. Under ordinary circumstances this is not to be wondered at. But long before the movement became full fledged, it easily played itself into the hands of the militant feminists, who saw in it a weapon which would vindicate more effectively than anything else the claim that "women must have control of their own bodies." Thus, in the name of their "right to voluntary maternity," many women have deliberately evaded marriage and parenthood, and more have been induced to join the ranks, until, as one exponent (Stella Browne of England) expresses it, "birth strike" becomes "practical politics." This is all very well for the feminist cause, but practical politics is oftentimes bad sociology and, what is worse, bad national and racial economy.

Overmuch sentimentality also accounts for the wild claims of the ardent birth controlists. No enlightened people will this day deny the presence of overpopulation with its accompanying evils. But there can be no single panacea for it. Only the shallowest of optimists will uphold the belief that Neo-Malthusianism alone is sufficient to remove all evils born of a superabundant population. Yet, some birth

controlists have not hesitated to do so. Their ardor has blinded them to the simple fact that there are at least two aspects to the population problem—the quantitative as well as the qualitative. Evidently their efforts for the last 40 or 50 years have largely proceeded from the conviction that the elimination of surplus numbers is all that is necessary, irrespective of the nature or worth of the human life thus eliminated. Instead of inconveniencing the reader with any statistical material to show that such has been the case, I beg to quote from a few Western writers who have watched the movement with a more discerning eye. Says Professor Conklin:

> We need not "fewer and better children," but more children of the better sort and fewer of the worse variety. There is great enthusiasm today on the part of many childless reformers for negative eugenic measures. . . . But unfortunately this reform begins at home among those who because of good hereditary traits should not be infertile. . . . If it (birth control) were applied to those who should not have children or to those who should for various reasons have only a few children it would be a blessing to mankind. But applied to those who could and should have many children it is no gift of the gods (*Heredity and Environment*, Revised Fourth Edition, pp. 315–316).

From Mr. S.H. Halford of England:

> Birth control implies forethought; this indicates superior brains; and therefore we get the races with superior mentalities rapidly lowering their rate of reproduction, and, within these races, the most intellectual classes doing this at much greater speed than the rest. Thus we see a vicious and essentially dysgenist process at work. **The higher races are using the resources of scientific knowledge to reduce the death-rate of the inferior peoples and the birth rate of the superior**.
>
> In any case there seems no other prospect, if the full feminist ideal be realized, than the extinction of British or American intelligence within the next two or three generations ("Dysgenic Tendencies of Birth-control and of the Feminist Movement," in *Population and Birth-control*, edited by E. and C. Paul, pp. 229 and 232).

We also read from Professor S.J. Holmes of the University of California:

> It is among the well-to-do who are best able to support and educate their children that the gospel of birth control has secured its largest following. Many comfort themselves with reflections about "fewer and better children," and that "Quality is better than quantity," without considering that without a certain minimum number of children there would soon be neither quantity nor quality. . . . Limiting the family is a perfectly justifiable procedure for a large part of humanity, but it is unfortunate that it is practiced most among those whose excuse for so doing is least (*The Trend of the Race*, p. 174).

Then we have Mr. Wiggam, who writes with his characteristic vivacity:

> The one central question is, **who is going to have the children**—the wise, provident and strong, or the weak, thoughtless and stupid? There is no such thing as race-suicide. It is always class-suicide. And it is always the wrong class. There is immense danger that our birth controllers will influence limitation of families in the one class that ought not to limit its birth-rate to any very great extent. Because the ones who will listen to them are the more intelligent. And when the more intelligent disappear, as they are disappearing in America, civilization disappears with them (*The Fruit of the Family Tree*, p. 323).

Passages of this nature can be easily multiplied, but these will suffice to show that through ignoring the qualitative side of the problem, the birth control movement has already done much havoc, from which Western civilization is going

to suffer a few generations; hence, when the lack of leadership will be more acutely felt in more lines than the political and industrial.

But the muddle headedness of most birth controlists does not end here. Even with regard to the quantitative aspect of the problem, they are not as circumspect as we are led to think. They fail to see, as Dr. Dublin pointed out during the Sixth International Conference referred to above, that whereas a superabundant population is certainly undesirable, sufficient numbers must be maintained in any country at any economic stage so that tolerably equable distribution of wealth and a fair amount of stimulating competition may keep the people from being spoiled by too high a standard of living, by luxury, indolence, and dissipation, ending inevitably in social and racial decay. Although depopulation did not contribute in any large measure to the decline and fall of ancient Rome, it did help to bring about a state of prodigality and licentiousness, which characterized the social life of the waning Empire. The population of America today, thinks Dr. Dublin, has not yet overshot the optimum point to warrant any overzealous propagation of Neo-Malthusian principles.

Let us now turn to more local situations.

China's overpopulation is a historical and proverbial fact. It was discussed in some detail by Malthus himself. At present, our teeming denizens may add up to 500,000,000, as some Chinese authorities believe, or barely 300,000,000 according to estimates by foreign authorities. But it does not matter; there is overpopulation just the same. When a cup is full to the brim, additional increments make little difference, as far as the inclusion of the cup is concerned.

To relieve overpopulation many remedies have been suggested. They fall in the main into two categories, the redistributive or environmental, such as advocated in Dr. Lee's article, and the restrictive or biological, which includes birth control. Both types are perhaps necessary. While we heartily agree with Dr. Lee and others that improvements in the means of production and migration to more outlying regions of the country will go a long way in accommodating our surplus numbers, a policy of conscious restriction must sooner or later be countenanced. Such a conclusion has been reached for America by Pearl, East, Ross, and others, and I think it will equally, if not more urgently, apply to the Chinese situation. Besides, Carr-Saunders, the British authority, has shown conclusively that restriction, in one form or another, has been more or less active in all countries and during all cultural stages, albeit the people, constrained by custom or convention, may not have been at all aware of its significance. We read in his *Population*:

> Our argument has led us to see that regulation of numbers has always been, is now, and will always be an absolute necessity. . . . Limitation is, therefore, always necessary. If there is over-population, then more limitation is required, if under- population, then rather less limitation. Under no circumstances should limitation be absent. And it should further be realized that the need for limitation is no new thing. It is not that we have now arrived at a time when this necessity is forced upon us. The necessity has always been there. (p. 57.)

Now, if elimination of numbers will never cease to be an "absolute necessity," it simply behooves us to see to it that it shall in no way vitiate the nation's strength by draining off its best blood lines, as it actually does today in America and elsewhere. A nation that adopts a rational and selective policy of population limitation insures

for itself a better chance to survive another which lets blind customs and convention do the work. Birth control in the West has not up to this moment assumed the form of a well-worked out policy. People who are using or abusing it are simply victims of a newly established convention, just as abortionists are victims of an age-long custom. Of late years, however, the movement has come to enlist the interest and effort of more enlightened people such as Pearl, East, and Carr-Saunders, who are trained biologists and not sentimental obstetricians or spinster feminists, and it promises to be guided by principles backed less by a warm heart, but more by a clear head.

There is as yet no birth control movement in China. Perhaps there will never be one. A movement presupposes opposition and countermovements. But, playing upon the suggestibility of the modern Chinese, in the relative absence of reticence and prudery regarding matters sexual, and, what is more important, when the intellectual classes of the country are literally hungry and thirsty after palliatives of all kinds, birth control easily establishes itself as an institution without going through even the gesture of a movement stage. This is no conjecturing. Any observant reader can see for himself. Mrs. Sanger came; there were meetings held in her honor; she spoke on the contraceptive methods, greased cotton, and so forth; there was applause: birth control carried the day. But the next day we heard little about the subject, either pro or con. The third day we perchance came across books discussing most freely the various kinds of preventives. And still next day we found, as we still find, all these neatly exhibited in the show windows of all respectable drug stores. Birth control has been triumphant; it has been mute but none the less glorious. It has called for no active propaganda, no movement.

But danger lurks. Where there is opposition to necessitate a movement, the issue in question is never taken for granted, but is given serious consideration in the form of discussions, criticisms, and often heated debates, and thereby knowledge of its merits and demerits is driven home at least to the more discerning section of the public. Unfortunately such is not the case with birth control in China.

The first seed of Neo-Malthusianism was sown, as we all remember, among the more intellectual elements of our population. The interpreter of Mrs. Sanger's first lectures before the Peking audience was no less a personage than Dr. Hu Shih, the champion of the so-called New Thought Movement. Sometime before Mrs. Sanger's visit, Dr. Hu, it will also be recalled, in defiance of the old cultural regime, particularly familism (to use a term by Professor Kulp, formerly of Shanghai College) in this connection, had written a poem, in which he greatly extolled childlessness (无后主义); and he was of course delighted in seeing added to his preachment a practical finishing touch by no less a past master in the art than Mrs. Sanger.

But since then the knowledge and practice of birth control has not spread beyond the educated and professional classes and beyond urban centers where educated and professional people gather. There is of course no way to prove this. But when we think of the lack of educational facilities for the masses and the almost complete absence of any system of social hygiene, we are forced to infer that effective Neo-Malthusian knowledge can hardly trickle through the deeper strata than those already hinted at. The peasant as well as the unskilled labor groups must have

remained wholly undisturbed on these scores alone, not to mention their economic inability to secure the more effective of contraceptive appliances. The same might be inferred for the shiftless, the stupid, and the vicious of the urban communities, who, because of their low mentality or waywardness, simply cannot be induced to practice limitation, even where knowledge and means are readily available. Thus, a negative differential situation is being set up, in which a heavy premium is put not on intelligence, forethought, professional proficiency, and general qualities of leadership, but on stupidity, incompetency, and intractability; in short, the situation now obtaining in America and elsewhere in the West is being duplicated on this side of the Pacific, and may in the course of time prove more deplorable for reasons I have outlined in previous paragraphs.

We simply have to limit our population. There is not the slightest doubt about it. The central problem is, who is going to undergo the limitation? Will the intellectual leaders of the nation take the lead here as elsewhere. Decidedly no. It is true that they have already taken it. But there is no reason why they should keep on taking it. A race which is mindful of its future existence and prosperity through the careful conservation of leadership will soon come to see to it that individuals such as Dr. Hu Shih, shall, despite their sheer individualism, be induced, nay, coerced, if needs be, to leave a sufficiently large progeny behind them. "To leave a progeny" (有后主义) shall not only remain a familiar aspiration of the best stocks of the country, but also become as well a national and racial ideal.

Meanwhile the other end of the scale of social worth, or civic worth, as some British writers used to call it, must be induced to know what birth control is, means, and how it is practiced. But even here we need to be cautious, for the ordinary social scale may, and often does, not correspond to the scale of inherent worth. In order that no family of inherent worth will be penalized by too easy an access to it, birth limitation must be put under some form of governmental or municipal supervision, such as is now found in Holland. In the latter country upwards of 50 birth control clinics have been established, in which deserving parents can receive individual and confidential advice from trained doctors—deserving in the sense that they are either of very doubtful heredity, or physically too weak on the part of the mother to stand pregnancy and labor, or for various reasons unable to care for the young in any decent way. With the ignorant and improvident, who will not of their own initiative go to such clinics, trained nurses and social workers must be sent to their homes. With the lowest of social dregs, we need not bother about birth control; they must be restrained from taking any part in the reproduction of the race, preferably through segregation.

But before such positive measures can be put into effect, a good deal must be done by way of scavenging. The patent druggists must be prohibited to deal with preventive contrivances in the absence of proper authorization, not to mention all sorts of quacks, charlatans, and self-styled sexologists who are ever ready to prey upon the fear and credulity of the masses. Commenting upon the ultimate wisdom

of the present American regulations, which prohibit literature dealing directly with methods of birth control from going through the mails, Mr. Wiggam says:

> In the course of time this regulation may be repealed, with wisdom, but its repeal would be doubtful wisdom now. The provision has probably been a wise one, at least for the present. The great danger is, first of all, that all sorts of death-dealing nostrums would be advertized in this manner. **The management of organic evolution should not be placed in the hands of patent medicine venders**. And secondly, fathers and mothers have their own individual problems, and these problems can only be handled by careful personal consultations with medical advisors of the highest authority. Birth control advice by mail would lead thousands of women to diagnose their physical conditions themselves, whereas, the wisest physician on earth would not dare to diagnose himself. How much more dangerous, then, for some suffering woman to write out a disjointed, distorted, ignorant account of her physical troubles and ailments and then be trusted, after a guess-work diagnosis, to put even sound advice into practice. . . . **Thus the mercenary and unscrupulous would very largely control the whole racial situation** (*The Fruit of the Family Tree*, p. 326) (**Blackfaces mine**).

I quote rather freely in this connection, because Mr. Wiggam's remarks apply only too truthfully to conditions we are having in this country. The Chinese reader needs no reminding how, in the past few years, especially last year, the theme of sex has been commercialized and exploited, how pornographic literature has been circulating in the name of sex education and aesthetics, and how physicians of doubtful training and even an ex-professor of philosophy have posed themselves as specialists on sex, contraception, and kindred topics of profound human interest, and offered to diagnose complaints for the unwary public. Beware, a part of our racial situation is already in the hands of charlatans and mountebanks!

But after all is said, we must not fail to urge one point, and that is, the educated and professional classes must learn to realize their racial obligation and to fulfill it. They must learn to see that individualistic philosophy is at best a protest, it temporary relief, that the highest application of the Golden Rule is not so much to the present generation as to the coming, that "heredity is more potent than environment" (Conklin), that a college education for every child is not so indispensable a condition of his success as a high native intelligence, that the erroneous Spencerian deduction that a decrease in fertility necessarily accompanies an increase in intellectual activity has long been exploded, at least for man. And above all, they must no longer delude themselves into believing that their unwillingness to have children or more children is prompted by foresight, by a strong sense of responsibility and other idealistic considerations, whereas in most cases it is their reluctance to forego personal pleasures, luxuries, and to lower their standard of living once achieved, which are at the back of all.

For the low down in the scale of civic worth, regulated birth control is indispensable. But for those higher up, it will be deplorable indeed if in the near future we have to cry out: Halt, let us have birth release!

Chapter 7
The Problem of the Cultural Hybrid

> *The company of such a person cannot be wearisome to the foreigner or meaningless to the Chinese (or isn't it?), though it may be both to those who think that China's salvation is not to be found in a wholesale transplantation of everything that is identified with "modern cultural conditions."*
>
> —From a letter to the Editor by Tourist

The author of this passage has certainly put his fingers on one of the weakest spots of modern China although he has misunderstood what was intended to mean by "modern cultural conditions," which the present writer happened to use in a previous article. The misunderstanding will appear evident to the reader after an acquaintance with the following paragraphs.

The present writer has preferred to call a person who is "wearisome to the foreigner" and "meaningless to the Chinese" a cultural hybrid, taking culture in a very general sense. Such a person is of course most easily found among that class of individuals whom we have, for want of a more respectable term, called returned students. The returned student is indeed the cultural hybrid par excellence. As we are again on the annual run of seeing big batches of students off to other countries, particularly America, the writer has thought it proper to cast a few reflections upon the whole movement of studying abroad, and he does this in lieu of saying bon voyage to those who are about to embark for their oversea destinations.

The Cost of Cultural Hybridity: In recent years, a good deal has been written about the returned student and his social worth. The general tone has been one of doubt, if not downright dissatisfaction. In public life, he has of course always been an important factor—an a priori indispensable factor, but it has been asserted that unless he served in the capacity of some strictly technical expert and was thus able to stay on his job for longer periods and with fewer distractions, he has not infrequently heaped confusion upon the state of affairs already advanced in confusion. This has been true in politics, in public finance, in education, and in any other field

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. I, No. 13, August 23, 1928, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_7

of activity where, according to old Chinese usage, technicality is not such a necessary condition for tolerable success.

The returned student of the more sedentary types does not of course take any active part in public duties. But he is nevertheless important, for he has set himself to the task of formulating and introducing theories of reform. Though often of doubtful value and soundness, their theories have not failed each to command a following. For the last 10 or 15 years, need we remind ourselves, China has been a veritable hot bed to which have been introduced all kinds of social theories, tenable or untenable, ranging from nationalism at one end to anarchism at the other, with all brands of socialism dispersed in between, each championed by its introducer as the nostrum for China's evils. Fortunately, the hot bed has not been enough heated up, and not all theories have taken root. But the confusion born of a reckless propaganda on the one hand and of an immature mentality to which such propaganda, in the name of thought movements naturally and strongly appeals on the other is already enough appalling. And for this the returned students must be again held responsible.

Nor is the returned student any happy specimen in his private life. Of all types of modern Chinese, he is perhaps of the most awkwardly situated in family relations. His ideal of the so-called small family system necessarily makes him at loggerheads with his parents. He holds very singular opinions as to mate selection, and this in its turn leads to many unpleasant experiences which are so common in recent years that they have ceased to have much attraction for the tattler. His standard of living, his ideas about household economy may at times become potent raisers of differences of opinion in the family circle which is so unfortunate as to have to include a grey-haired generation.

Such is more or less the predicament of a great many returned students. The writer has put it down in very comprehensive terms, for the simple reason that it is either of common personal experience or is now very generally admitted.

Now why is it so? The usual answer is that we are living in a period of transition, and that people as a rule become mal-adjusted during such periods, and that the returned student simply suffers more because of his leading social position. But this cannot be the true answer, for the transition and whatever it implies have been largely brought about by no others than the returned student himself and his congeners.

The true answer is to be found in the peculiar cultural status of the returned student. Although by birth Chinese, he has become by discipline American Chinese, British Chinese, Japanese Chinese, German Chinese, French Chinese, or some further combination of these, as the case may be. Or, better truth to tell, he is neither sufficiently Chinese nor sufficiently foreign or non-Chinese to stand by himself as a harmonious, integrated, self-confident cultural entity. He is a nondescript, like the bat in the old fable. In short, he is a hybrid, if the writer may be permitted to borrow a perfectly respectable biological term. Now obviously if the hybrid does not fare well in the world of nature, neither would it in the realm of social and cultural life. It violates in both cases the principle of continuity and established harmony.

Adaptation Versus Individuality: But this must not be taken to mean that cultural hybridity is to be unconditionally depreciated, that is, that any coming together and fusing of cultures through such agencies as the returned student should be done away with. Certainly no. To persist in the analogy, hybridity might mean increased vigor, greater viability, and wide range of variation, provided, in the first place, that the nature and worth of the two culture parties are sufficiently known, and in the second, that only selected elements on both sides are allowed to come together. In short, successful hybridity follows, and follows only, rational discrimination and selection.

Now has our movement of sending students abroad adhered to anything like a discriminating and selective principle? The answer is unequivocally no. If there has been any principle at all, it has been one of laissez faire. In our extreme eagerness to adapt ourselves to the twentieth century world, and particularly after a long series of humiliating defeats, we simply plunged headlong into the process known as Westernization, of which the movement for studying abroad forms a central part. It was thought at that time that by so exerting ourselves we might make a pretty deep dive and thus hasten the process of readjustment; but the actual outcome was that we found ourselves, as we still do, in a whirlpool.

It does not seem to have occurred at all to those responsible for the movement that while adaptive modification of our cultural life was imminently necessary, it could not mean wholesale substitution of cultural modes and patterns, that is, at the cost of sacrificing our original individuality altogether. Modern students of anthropology have seen fit to condemn those Christian missionaries who, through their eagerness to save more souls, were responsible for the breaking up of some of the indigenous cultures of Polynesia and elsewhere, in our eyes lowly and poorly developed as they were. Wherefore? Because it is desirable that a culture once having achieved some degree of individuality is best left alone to maintain and develop that individuality, to the ultimate enrichment of the cultural stock of the whole of mankind. Now it is precisely this individuality that we Chinese, thanks to the returned students, are rapidly forfeiting.

For we have been taking up practically everything that the Western peoples have to offer us. We have been assimilating the technical methods and material advantages of Western Science—which is desirable and perhaps inevitable. But we are also revolutionizing, after Western patterns, our social ideals and institutions, our conception of values, and our ethical standards, which is undesirable and by no means inevitable.

The rationale of this distinction is readily seen, when it is remembered that, in the first place, while we easily admit that we are technically inferior to the West, it would be much more difficult to convince ourselves that Western social and ethical standards and institutions are any better than ours, even for those of us who have a love for the exotic; and in the second, that while any accretion in technical knowledge and methodology means a sure advancing step toward a better life, any fundamental change in our social and ethical standards would result as it already does, at least for a time, in an upset of the social equilibrium, to recover which would require

years and decades. The distinction will appear still more evident when we realize that whereas technical knowledge is objective and may be possessed by all with impunity, social values and institutions are subjective in the sense that they have developed as a result of a people's individual modes of adapting to a particular physical and cultural environment.

This is no a priori theorizing. Let us turn to Japan for practical evidences. Japan began to be westernized as early and as eagerly as we did. She has also had a movement for dispatching students abroad. But throughout the decades, she has held dear certain guiding principles, one of which seems to have as its basis the distinction that we have just been discussing. We have perhaps often wondered why, in spite of her rapid industrial development, her varied and valuable contributions to science, the social life of Japan has in its more fundamental aspects remained what it was before 1868. According to authorities like Dr. Inazo Nitobe and Mr. Tai Chih-tao, bushido is still the national code of conduct; the Japanese family is as intact as ever; the same old ideals of womanhood hold today as they have held for centuries. The reader must have observed for himself how Japanese families and womanfolk resident in this country are still impermeable to the frivolities of modernity, for instance, voluntary childlessness and hair-bobbing. In fine, the returned students in Japan and others who are responsible for her recent development have raised the material and technical life of their people to a higher plane without undermining the national and cultural unity that we identify as Japanese.

Evidence of equal validity may be sought in our own history. About 1,500 years ago, we may recall, there was a movement or rather a series of small movements for Buddhist students to go to India. Between the fifth and eighth centuries of the Christian era, from 200 to 300 went. It is true that the system of thought and beliefs which they brought back did not have much in common with the established social philosophy of the Chinese. But it is also true that those who participated in the movement did so largely of their personal faith and intellectual interest (and the intellectual appeal of Buddhism is unsurpassed by any other religious or quasi-religious system), and they entertained no idea of transplanting to China the social habits of the Hindus at that time. It is true that the grosser elements in Buddhism did at times cause serious social disturbances by converting excessive numbers of young men and women to religious celibacy, but it is also true that such disturbance never went unheeded by the government, which forced, for instance in the year 626 of the Christian era, just in the midst of one of the most notable waves of student emigration, thousands of monks and nuns to return to secular life. A review of the incidents that led up to this drastic measure will show us that our ancestors knew better what social and cultural unity and continuity means to national solidarity.

In our discussion so far, it is seen that while adaptation is a necessary condition to survival and progress, it does not pay to go so far as to lose all individuality a people originally has. In appropriating the elements of a foreign culture, it must be kept in mind that we the appropriators are the constant factor, and not they from whom the appropriations are made. To use a Chinese expression, there shall be no compromise with regard to the relative positions of the host and the guest. To be more specific, while we would like to harness all technical knowledge for a richer

and happier life, we must not let our land be the dumping ground of all kinds of ungrounded social theories, and ourselves the raw material for false reformers to experiment with. At present, we are doing just the reverse, and it is up to the better disciplined leaders of the future, who will be again largely returned students, to make amends.

Too Much of a Fad: But the absence of a selective principle may be described in much more definite terms from our annals of student emigration. As a result of our failure to distinguish the social and ethical from the technical and scientific in the assimilation of Western culture, there has never grown up a comprehensive policy with regard to the prescription of courses of study, the proper attitude toward Western standards and institutions, such as religion, the family, relation between the sexes, the different scale of social worth, theoretical and actual, and the like. Except in the case of a few of the government students in the early part of the movement, the selection of studies has been largely left to the discretion of the students and their families. This does not mean that there should be a hard and fast prescription of courses for every student going abroad: no authority can do that. But it does mean that a general and proper apportionment of different types of men of expert knowledge who are needed should be made so as to lessen the social waste and inefficiency necessarily attendant upon any transitional period.

As an example of social waste the writer may mention the excessive numbers who specialized in political science in the past. Personally the writer takes this to have been one of the most undesirable aspects of the movement for sending students out, for it has been at the root, among other factors of course, of the chaotic political condition of the past few decades. This is still true today. A smack of mechanics or any kindred subjects at least does no harm to national economy, but a smack of political science, which is by the way more easily acquired than most other subjects, at once swells the officialdom, to which the Chinese are known to have had close enough an affinity even before the introduction of the democratic idea that "everybody is by natural right a political animal."

As to the lack of a proper and critical attitude toward Western standards and institutions, the writer will not stop to discuss, for it is too obvious. The returned student of the past years has brought back with him anything ranging from the acknowledgement of a fictitious heavenly father at the expense of the earthly parents who gave birth to him, to the eating of fish on Fridays. Lately we have heard so much about the "modernization craze," we wonder who are at the back of it, besides the foreigner and the suggestible public.

But the absence of any selective principle is nowhere better illustrated than in the quality of the students themselves. Aside from a small number of "government students," who had undergone some form of competitive examination, and were better prepared for advanced learning abroad, the rest, including the "private students," who are going out in ever increasing numbers in late year, constitute as a whole a pretty haphazard lot. Some were very young; others were but poorly prepared for any advanced subject or even in the language in which all studies would have to be made; still others had no idea of what to take up even days after arriving at their destination. For most such students, there remained one form of preparation that

was always beyond reproach, and that was financial support, for they usually came from wealthy families; and there remained also one line of progress of which they were capable, and that was an undue raise of their standard of living, which their eager acquisition of the superficialities of Western cultural life necessarily entailed; and such superficialities they infallibly brought back, having had no thought whether they would fit at all into the scheme of things Chinese. This is perhaps not to be wondered at, as some of them were intellectually immature to judge things properly, and others were too unprepared to reach anything like intellectual maturity.

The reader who thinks that such a state of affairs is a part of the social drift and hence not amenable to control is invited to refer again to the Japanese experience. To mention but a few particulars which have seldom failed to impress the thoughtful, the Japanese student abroad is usually older, sometimes much older than the Chinese, which implies of course greater maturity and wider and deeper acquaintance with the cultural background of his own country; he usually specializes in some strictly technical subject and is already the holder of an academic degree when he embarks; and above all he has a set purpose to learn what is only deemed necessary. The Japanese student may be poor in pronunciation and awkward in etiquette, but he ultimately fulfills his mission, that of readjusting Japan with the least possible waste to the modern world. And the Japan of today is precisely what her returned students have made her, a nation of great technical efficiency—an efficiency which, however, has left the social and moral order of the people practically unmolested. Japan has not failed, in this matter of sending students abroad as in others, to select.

Is There a Future? The present state of affairs is of course not going to last. Nobody in his senses would hold that the movement in its present magnitude and unwieldiness should be continued forever, for that would imply that China will never be able to recover or to retain a relative cultural homogeneity. The present state of hybridity must indeed go, and all individuals concerned—the hybrids of various degrees—must gravitate to the new cultural forms which are sure to be made and are already in the making.

But before a change for the better can be effected, a fundamental attitude toward student emigration and toward being a returned student must be first cultivated. At the outset it will be remembered that no movement is itself an end, but always a means to an end. It cannot be too often stated that our end is the adaptation or adjustment of China to the twentieth century world. We simply had to adjust ourselves, and while adjusting, we cannot help forfeiting a part of our former cultural individuality. Thus viewed, the movement for sending students abroad is no more than a humiliating concession on our part. We hate any infringement upon our political sovereignty; we clamor for tariff autonomy; but in the more fundamental matter of knowledge, of thought, of scientific discoveries, we rest satisfied in being second and third rate imitators, and there is absolutely no prospect of when our obsequious mimicking is going to cease and a new era of cultural autonomy and independence will be ushered in. Sending students out and receiving students back has become such a yearly routine and matter of course that perhaps many who have been so favored have dreamed that their great-grandchildren might be even better returned students than themselves, or rather there is no thought for the morrow!

Studying abroad per se must cease to be the cultural ideal of many well-to-do families and aspiring youths. The general public must learn to look upon it no longer as something in itself laudable, but rather as a dangerous experiment to launch upon both for the individual and for the community, which he will come back to serve.

Having thus acquired some critical knowledge of the movement for studying abroad as we are having it today, and a more discriminating attitude toward it, we may touch upon the point of formulating a selective policy to be put into effect partly through an enlightened public opinion and partly through comprehensive governmental regulations. Such a policy, partly to reiterate, must consider as a minimum two things: first, the technicality of the subject in which the student is going to specialize; and the second, the degree of intellectual maturity of the individual. The first is to insure his serviceability upon his return in the difficult task of readjusting China to the world, one part of the task being the multiplication of his kind, through his own training, that is, the replenishing of his profession by specialists who will be saved from the necessity of going abroad. And the second will enable him to assume a critical attitude toward Western usages and morals, which guards against the assimilation of anything frivolous, superficial, promising to be disruptive of our own social and moral order, and inconsequential to the task of readjustment with which we are confronted.

Chapter 8
Browbeating Prostitution?

> *Nevertheless, the vociferous cry, "Down with prostitution", raised by many moralists of the last and of the present generation, is at once stupid and laughable. For all the anger in the world is merely an idle waste of energy, unless the institution against which that anger is directed has been thoroughly analyzed and understood, and until the causes of which that institution is the inevitable outcome have been discovered and uprooted.*
>
> —Robert Michels in *Sexual Ethics*

In the last few years, with the increasingly rapid development of urban conditions, there has been much agitation in China for various kinds of social and municipal reform. The agitation was at first limited to such metropolitan areas as Shanghai, Beijing, and Canton; but as a result of the success of the Nationalist cause, and following the establishment of municipal governments along modern lines, many hithertofore second-rate urban centers, including the capitals of many provinces, have come to the front championing officially the cause of social amelioration. The clamor from Nanking, which is now the national capital, has been particularly sonorous.

One of the urgent problems confronting the social reformer today is unquestionably prostitution. The campaign against it in Shanghai, to give an example near to us, was started more than a decade ago. In June 1915, as we may recall, the Shanghai Missionary Association appointed a committee "for the purpose of stimulating improvement in vice conditions" then existing. Late in next year, the Women's Christian Temperance Union petitioned the Municipal Council urging "that means be taken toward the closing of houses of ill-fame, and abolishing of solicitation in public thoroughfares." In 1918, seven local organizations, five of which were women's, requested the Council to appoint a Vice Commission, but this was not complied with until sometime later. But the interest of the Council in the subject was sufficiently aroused at that time, and acting upon its recommendation, the special committee of the Missionary Association undertook to organize a bigger committee to

---

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. I, No. 16, September 13, 1928, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_8

be made up of various local religious and philanthropic societies. The new committee came into being in May, 1918 and was called the Moral Welfare Committee, which was changed, however, to Moral Welfare League in 1920.

The Moral Welfare League was instrumental in bringing about, finally in 1919, the appointment of a Vice Commission by the Municipal Council. The commission, with the sanction of the Ratepayers, decided in 1920 on a five-year program of eliminating all brothels in the International Settlement, which provided that licenses were to be issued to all regular brothels for once, and that 20 % of the licenses were to be withdrawn each year. The provisions were carried out accordingly and efficiently—as far as the issuing and withdrawing of licenses were concerned.

To many zealous reformers, the 5-year period is evidently too protracted. The reformers of the type which the Nationalist cause has brought forth are of course impatient with such measures as adopted by the Vice Commission of the Shanghai Municipal Council. Thus, we see that the recent drive against prostitution in some of the Chinese cities, where there are now modern municipal offices, Nanking, for instance, is much more drastic and in summary. Daily reports from Nanking in the last few days show that the Municipal authorities are determined to have a sweeping clearance of the city at all cost. They are acting on the conviction that prostitution is, to say the least, a disgrace upon womanhood, a blight to national vitality, and a thorn on the sides of our ideals of equality and justice.

The writer has no intention to recount how prostitution was dealt with in Shanghai and is being dealt with in Nanking and elsewhere. But he does wish to show in this short discussion that all attempts at summarily repressing prostitution are quite futile, and sometimes worse than futile.

We need not go far to realize that futility is the fate of many reform movements, which choose the path of wholesale condemnation and suppression. What are the experiences we have had and are having in the International Settlement here after the Vice Commission and the Moral Welfare League had spent their sincere efforts? The answer will be obvious to anyone who passes through Hankow Road, Foochow Road, Yunnan Road, and their vicinity shortly after dark. That there will always be brothels and rendezvous houses in such a commercial center as Shanghai is not at all to be wondered at. Nor does it reflect too unfavorably upon the efficiency of the police that there are always high-class prostitutes riding about in respectable guise in the "white ways" of Shanghai. The wonder is that there is so much street walking, or, to be exact, street standing, and fragrant solicitation in the very heart of the Settlement where the police force is presumably at its most vigilant.

This is only what any casual observer can see and may be excused on the ground that it is now almost a decade since the adoption of the five-year program, and that the lapse in time justifiably means the lapse in effort. But to one who is better informed, the failure to suppress prostitution in the International Settlement is too palpable to be easily explained away. In the Report of the Commissioner of Police, included in the Report of the Municipal Council for 1921, we read:

> The net result has been that while 218 brothels have been closed officially, prostitution and its attendant evils have in no way decreased, but have merely spread over a much wider area with the consequent impossibility of any effective police control.

This statement calls for no elucidation. The closing of brothels is by no means equivalent to the elimination of prostitution, nor even necessarily to an "improvement in vice conditions." The propositions stand quite apart. Wholesale repression here simply results in sputtering expression elsewhere. This is as true with physical forces as with social tendencies, which derive their momentum from an instinctive back ground.

Turning to experiences abroad, we observe essentially the same thing. New York City was among the forerunners in trying to get rid of prostitution in summary, and for many years has been an example which the members of such organizations as the Moral Welfare League were in the habit of extolling. We are told, for instance, how in 1912 New York had 1831 brothels, and in 1917 only 303—a tremendous reduction to one-sixth of the original number in 5 years! ("Commercialized Vice in Shanghai," Pamphlet No. 3, Shanghai Moral Welfare Committee.) This was splendid, as far as the efficiency of the police went. But with the elimination of brothels, did the volume of commercial vice and other sexual irregularities bordering upon vice actually shrink and has it kept on shrinking since 1912 when the movement for repression was inaugurated? We do not know, we cannot know. What we do know is that the very recent report of the Committee of Fourteen on conditions in the city's night life "has stirred a hot debate as to whether New York's morals are better or worse than they used to be."

In the July 15, 1928, issue of the *New York Times*, there was an article by Mr. R.L. Duffus entitled "Now the Night Clubs are under Fire," from which the concluding words of the preceding paragraph were taken. The writer goes on to say:

> There is no doubt at all, however, that when a New Yorker, or a visitor to New York, wishes to be wicked he must follow a procedure far different from that of the old Raines law days. The "property" sandwich and the make believe hotel have gone the way of the horse and carriage. The old fashion saloon is a memory and likewise the saloon "back room." In their places, under the influence of the prohibition laws, has come an entirely new machinery for those who seek more or less questionable amusement after dark. The machinery is known under the general title of the Night Club.

The reader interested in the subject will find the whole article very pleasant reading, and may judge for himself whether human vice can be ruled out of court by simple legislation.

The painful truth is that matter of such profound human interest should not be "under fire," the hell fire of the Christians notwithstanding. To deal with a knotty affair by reducing it to ashes is never a positive and just method, even when it is possible. The trouble with the reformers of the passing generation is precisely that there is altogether too much righteous indignation and fervid denunciation, in short, too much of a Puritanic attitude and mode of action. With regard to the question of prostitution in particular, the additional presence of a strong measure of compassion for the "victims of men's lust" on the one hand and a delicate touch of prudery on the other renders of course any proper approach all the more difficult. And again, it must be remembered that women are getting more and more to the front in all social undertakings, and their greater affectability not infrequently contributes to the

complexity of the problem. Thus, the author of *Women's Wild Oats* wrote on the sentimentalism of English women as aroused by the question of vice:

> During the agitation for the repeal of 40 D Act, . . . never did I hear more nonsense talked than at the meetings I attended on the subject. Woman's instinctive attitude had a unique chance of displaying itself, and one wondered at the combined prudery and sentiment with which the subject is approached, while the most offensive part of their conventionalism was the sex-obsession, which was clotted, like a cream turned sour, on all their judgments.

That a movement for reform is usually started by churchmen or people of strong religious disposition is again somewhat unfortunate. While most religious people must be credited with a more watchful eye upon matters of community interest, and while among them are not wanting individuals who try to study the problem cool-headedly before any action is taken, their insistence upon the moral viewpoint amounting sometimes to an obsession prevents them as a group from seeing the problem as a whole, that is, seeing and weighing all facts and factors involved. It also creates impatience in the actual handling of the problem or in seeing it handled by others—a fact which sufficiently explains why it is always by them that the policy of summary repression is advocated.

The Shanghai Moral Welfare League, it will be remembered, was composed almost entirely by preachers, and Y.M.C.A. workers. Of 31 members who served on the General Committee in 1922, again, 17, or more than half, were women. While the writer is fully aware of their sincerity and public-spiritedness, it must be pointed out that their efforts have not been even tolerably repaid. The reason is not far to seek. As the name of the organization already indicates, there was an overemphasis upon the moral and humanitarian aspect of a problem which is at once physiological, economic, social and moral. As a result of the statement by the Commissioner of Police quoted above, there followed, from March to August, 1922, a series of correspondence between the League and the Municipal Council, in which the former manifested a dissatisfaction with the suppression work of the Municipal police, and the latter in turn felt uneasy at the pressure and inquisitiveness of the League members. In one of the replies from the Council, for instance, we read:

> Much as the Council is in sympathy with the aims of your League, as with every other effort to promote the moral welfare of the Settlement, it is our opinion that, easy as it is for the Moral Welfare League and others to advocate a more, rigorous policy of suppression, it is in fact practically impossible to do more than what is being done at present. That your League should hold a contrary view and consider more effective suppression possible, can, in the Council's opinion, be only attributed to your League's refusal to face the real facts of the case, and to the apparent confusion existing in the minds of its members regarding brothel-keeping, which is an offence, as distinguished from prostitution, which is no offence.

In any case, repression is not sound policy even in the absence of sentimentalism and exaggerated moralism. Flexner, the reputed author of *Prostitution in Europe*, summarized years ago the limitations and injustices of the repressive policy even when it is well put into effect. First, it does in no way help the person of the prostitute, who by the moment the policy is operative has already become a social wreck. Second, to be of real service, the policy "requires an abundance of institutional facilities such as now nowhere exist." If this last statement is applicable to the

Western countries, how much more truthfully does it apply to China? In the complete absence of scientifically managed reformatories, labor colonies, hospitals for the insane and for venereal diseases, the sudden restoration of a large number of prostitutes to ordinary social life cannot but leave the community in greater danger of demoralization and contamination than if they were kept in their admittedly "detestable trade." It will pay the municipal authorities of those Chinese cities who are impatient with the prostitution problem to take note of this fact. Third, the repressive policy is almost entirely one-sided in that while the woman is apprehended and made to incur all disgrace, the man, her partner in the dealing, walks his way unmolested. Final, and this is perhaps the most important, it is only the cruder and more unmistakable forms of prostitution that repression may tackle with comparative case. It is estimated that clandestine prostitutes are generally from 4 to 5 times as numerous as those who are recognized by license, and that the numbers who occasionally step into the borderland of ill-fame are still greater. To cope with these, the repressive policy will prove absolutely impotent.

Traditionally three different attitudes toward prostitution are possible. The first is one of laissez faire; the second is accepting it as a necessary evil and going about to regulate it so as to lessen its baneful influence; and the third is repression. The first two had been adopted by the Chinese at different times of their history, until the close contact with the West brought in the third, which, being in consonance with Christian ethics, has already had a long history in Christendom.

But with the development of the biological and social sciences, and with the growth of the conviction that social problems can be adequately solved by a study of its causation and a conscious control of the causal factors, a new attitude toward prostitution, or indeed toward any other problem of social pathology, is being evolved. Viewed genetically, no social problem is a synthetic expression of many factors. Then there is of course, with regard to the individual, the development of the concept of adjustment; an individual who becomes socially problematic or mal-adjusted is simply one in and about whom the factors are not harmoniously cooperative.

Inasmuch as upwards of 50 % of the prostitutes, according to Goddard and others, are feebleminded, inasmuch as even in time of peace there is usually a discrepancy between the numbers of the two sexes, with the female sex predominating, and inasmuch as there seems to be a native excursive tendency in the sexual life of the man, prostitution is a biological and psychological problem. Inasmuch as it is the outcome of poverty and inability to earn a living through more respectable channels, prostitution is an economic and industrial problem. Inasmuch as it proceeds from a lack of proper enlightenment and guidance during childhood, especially as respecting sexual development and hygiene, it is an educational problem. Inasmuch as it is consequent upon the absence of a normal home life through the divorce or desertion of responsible members of the family, or the absence of proper attitudes toward marriage and parenthood, prostitution is a social and moral problem.

The time is ripe to leave the problem of prostitution to the concurring efforts of the social scientists. The state may limit its duties to seeing to it through its police, that the tolerated presence of prostitution is no infringement upon public order, decency, and health. So long as these are effectively discharged, the difference

between abolition and regulation or regimentation is quite immaterial. The religious and the humanitarian, on the other extreme, may persist in keeping their watchful eye upon the problem and in directing thereto the attention of the public when necessary. But beyond this they had better not go, and any hue and cry raised in behalf of the problem will be quite out of place.

As an example to show the inadequacy of the current forms of organized force against prostitution, it may be pointed out that many active participants are unmarried women, who must be presumed to know little about the normal sexual functions, and less about the abuse and misuse of such functions, which are at the core of the vice problem. Further, if the correspondence drawn by Professor Michels between the old maid of the middle class and the prostitute of the proletariat is at all acceptable, the participation of spinsters in any campaign against vice will appear almost ridiculously self-contradicting, because the problem faced by the prostitute is really also faced by the campaigner herself. The difference is that in one, a better cultural and economic equipment has made the individual quite oblivious of or blind to her problem, and that in the other, a more wretched environment has thrust a pretty poor solution upon the individual, with or without her consent. The problem in both cases is the lack of proper adjustment of the sexual life in marriage and parenthood.

Chapter 9
Familism and the Optimum Family

There have already appeared in *The Critic* two special articles on the Chinese family system, the first by Mr. Jameson Chen in Vol. I. No. 7, and the second by Dr. D. K. Lieu in No. 17.[1] The importance of the institution in general, and the social prestige this institution has held in China in particular, perhaps justify a third.

That the family occupies a most fundamental social position is now generally conceded, even by individualists. It is at the very root of our social existence. Auguste Comte, true to his position as the father of the science known as sociology, pointed out a century ago that the unit of our social organization was not the individual, but the family. Sociologists of the passing generation, especially those headed by Cooley and Ellwood, have come essentially to the same conclusion. So have the students of this generation. Mr. Mowrer, for instance, has shown very convincingly that modern family disorganization must be largely attributed to the ascendancy of the individual at the expense of group control.

Students, who have called themselves sociobiologists, are even more emphatic in upholding the idea that neither the individual nor the society as a whole is the unit of human life, but the family is. Among these, certainly none has spoken more unequivocally than Dr. Schiller, better known as a humanist philosopher than a sociobiologist. Here is what he says in one of his recent books:

> We might ask them (modern statesmen) to contemplate a fundamental fact of social life, which Western civilization has never properly appreciated, and is now in danger of forgetting altogether. It is simply thus, that the biological unit of human life is neither the individual nor the State, but the family.

[1] Editor's note: Refer to the following two articles: Jameson Chen: "Reconstruction of the Chinese Family" and D. K. Lieu (刘大钧): "The Chinese Family System".

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. I, No. 20, October 11, 1928, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_9

> It follows that the first condition of social prosperity is an organization which is biologically sound, and that Individualism and Socialism are both profoundly wrong, and dangerous to human survival, if they cannot satisfy this first condition.

Dr. Schiller goes on to show that indeed neither individualism nor socialism can. The arguments advanced by him may be a bit jarring to the ears of the Westerner, who ever since the days of Renaissance, has glorified individualism in so many different ways, and more recently has allowed himself to be entangled in a welter of socialistic theories, that, it is scarcely any exaggeration to say, he has almost forgotten that he was born of parents and thus has a genetic past. But to the Chinese, Dr. Schiller's arguments should sound almost platitudinous. Individualism neither has place in our social philosophy, in spite of such strong exponents as Yan-chu, nor has the idea of state control—a fact which explains why patriotism in the modern sense was not known in the days of our isolation. Since the State represents the whole and the individual the part, and since the exaltation of the whole would mean a corresponding degradation of the part and vice versa, our sages have thought it proper to adopt a social philosophy, which would strike at the mean and insure a balanced development of the both ends, a philosophy that deems the family superior to both the State and the individual, a philosophy, in short, of familism.

Mr. Jameson Chen quotes with approval the following remarks of Professor Ross:

> In general I hold Western individualism superior, for both individual and social advancement, to Chinese familism. I rejoice that with us a man is free to decide, to act, to rise without being hampered by a host of relatives. . . . Still I believe we have gone too far in emancipating grown-up children from obligations to their parents. . . .

While we rejoice that Professor Ross fully recognizes some of the merits of familism, we wonder whether by giving individualism a superior place, the evils that he laments of the West can be successfully eradicated. He has apparently failed to notice that individualism is in itself an extreme philosophy, and that extremeness in the realm of ideas is pregnant with civil possibilities quite apart from those born of men's practical application. Familism may be overwrought, and was overwrought in traditional China to a very considerable extent, to the detriment both of the individual and the greater social group, but there is no inherent unsoundness in the system as Dr. Schiller has very clearly shown.

In the last 4 or 5 years, much discussion about the family has turned on the point of size, that is, on the question of how many generations, degrees of relationship, and individuals a family should hold. The traditional Chinese family is of course like an unlimited corporation, it gathers under one roof all living generations, all kinds and degrees of relationship, and individuals, born of a single couple who are usually also living. While it excludes all female members who are married with other surnames, it includes all the consorts of the male members taken in from

other families. Thus, a family may hold four or five generations and cousins of the third, fourth, and even remoter, degrees. This is called the "greater family" system. The family which is coming into fashion is of course one after the Western prototype, which includes under the same roof not more than two generations, and not infrequently only one, where the principles of Neo-Malthusianism are rigidly observed. Vertically, such a family has no great use of the grandparents, and horizontally, cousins of even the first degree are regarded as outsiders. This is the "smaller family" system.

The discussion of the comparative merits between the greater and smaller family systems has been both protracted and lively. The general consensus of opinion among the thoughtful is that some sort of compromise is desirable. But as far as the writer is aware, no constructive and practical suggestions as to how the compromise should be made have been advanced. Both Mr. Chen and Dr. Lieu have left us in unabated doubt as to what exact form the Chinese family, or indeed any family, should in the future assume. It is in view of this that the present chapter is apologetically presented.

The family that the writer wishes to see evolved and incorporated into our social system may be called the optimum family. It is briefly this. It should include all generations that are living, which usually do not exceed three, and no other relationships than those between the paternal grandparents and the grandchildren, between parents and children, between husband and wife, and between brothers and sisters. It of course assumes that the age-old patronymic system should hold in the future, and there is no reason why it should not. An optimum family is thus one in which any female sibling will eventually marry out and any male will have to start a family of his as soon as he marries and is able to be self-supporting. In case of more than one male offspring, the parents may live with each in turn at allotted intervals. In short, the principle of the optimum family holds that as the family grows in two dimensions, there should be longitudinal splittings between grown-up sibs, but never cross-sectionings between generations. The parts of a family must of course sooner or later separate, but let separation occur, to borrow an analogy, from bamboo-cutting, between twigs, or even fibers, but not at the nodes.

Let us now compare in some detail the three sizes of family organization. A rough diagram will perhaps help:



The "greater family" is obviously a sociological mistake. In the first place, it is numerically unwieldy and will eventually have its confines so broadened as to shade into almost a small community and thus to lose all significance as a primary group. In the second place, an individual is so tied up with and hemmed in by other individuals of the same as well as adjacent generations (as shown by the numerous reversible arrowheads) that sufficient development of the self is well-nigh impossible—a fact which explains the usual inequality of burden among family members. In the third place, individuals so tied up and hemmed in will inevitably find themselves in psychological difficulties, and misunderstanding and discords forthwith arise.

If the greater family is a sociological blunder, the smaller family is a biological one. It ignores almost completely the importance of genetic continuity by which the family is and should be particularly characterized. The smaller family system as found in the West recognizes that it is the duty of the parents to bring up and to educate their children, but the children are under no obligation to support, much less to render personal service to, their aged parents. In other words, while every generation is responsible for the development of the immediately succeeding generation, and while no generation is really free from obligations to another, the service and help between any two consecutive generations are not reciprocal. That such an arrangement is highly undesirable from the ethical standpoint is fully pointed out by Ross in a passage quoted by Mr. Jameson Chen. But from the biological or racial standpoint, the undesirability will appear even more serious. Children who grow up in a social atmosphere so characterized cannot be expected to have much racial

consciousness. A group that is ignorant, negligent, and even disrespectful of its biological past cannot be very mindful of its biological future, and it will suffer accordingly. Thus write Popenoe and Johnson:

> The doctrine of the continuity of germplasm might play a large part in religion. It should at least be brought home to everyone at some point in his education. Man should have a much stronger feeling of identity with his forbears and his progeny. Is it not a loss to Christians that they have so much less of this feeling than the Chinese?

As we see it, such a feeling needs no special education. Suffer your aged parents to stay with you and your children so that there will be constant association and interchange of sentiments, and at the same time devise some simpler and more intelligent means of remembering your direct forbears than the traditional ancestor worship, and a feeling of identity comes as a matter of course. This is exactly what the optimum family system provides for.

One thing in the West, especially America, that is so notoriously impressive to the Oriental visitor is the pitiful plight of the aged. The Westerner, with his rich Christian tradition, often lives and asks others to live, a life of fellowship and service, which is very good. But the writer has often observed with wonder that his charity has no beginning, at least that it does not begin at home, for his aged parents or grandparents who are often more helpless and certainly have a better claim upon his personal service than those who swarm the charity organizations are found either in an old peoples' home or to be eking out by themselves a lonely and miserable existence.

One more thing must be credited to the optimum family system. It is more human. All higher animals below man know how to take care of the young, but as the latter become full fledged or able to ply around by themselves, on they go; the service of their parents is never reciprocated. It is right here that we find the beginning of the "smaller family" system, but not the end, for it has come down to man to play its role as a human institution. But it is obviously an anachronism. Man, with his developed sense of obligation, should know better, and certainly no obligation is greater than that which is due to one's parents.

In short, the optimum family system proposes to correct the sociological shortcomings of the "greater" and the biological ones of the "smaller." Both the "greater" and the "smaller" systems have certain characteristic educational values, and these the optimum system will prove proficient to preserve.

In conclusion, it may be pointed out that our practical proposal is quite in line with the philosophy of familism. That the "smaller family" is too individualistic is now generally admitted. But the "greater family," on the other hand, tends to be socialistic, and to assume the form and spirit of a minute state. This is why "greater familism" tends to supplant patriotism. And in our opinion, neither the individualistic nor the socialistic tendency will insure national and racial welfare and prosperity.

Chapter 10
The Meaning of a National Examination System

The history of competitive examination not only for discovering experts of government but also for recognizing talent or merit for its own sake is a very long one. Before recorded history began, those who had and held the rein of the political organization did so either by virtue of military strength or by that of birth. In other words, once installed in a place, they and their descendants tended there to remain until some other and stronger force dislodged them. But this was presumably in the very early period. As soon as it was recognized that talent or virtue was not in the sole possession of the ruling class, and this probably happened with the beginning of recorded history, ways and means were devised so that individuals of more humble status might come up the social and political ladder. Thus, we read in "The Ceremony of Archery" one of the many books of *Li Ki*, the following, the translation here being at best a rough approximation:

> In the ancient times, it was once instituted by the king that every year the different feudal lords must recommend and send to the capital men of talent. These the king would examine in person in the Palace of Archery. Those whose deportment were in agreement with the rules of propriety and whose singing of odes was in harmony with the music, and further, who were able to make more score at the bull's-eye were selected to participate in a certain sacrifice held for the occasion. . . .;

And forthwith they were given some office in the government. To the early Chinese, it seems that not only personal carriage but also one's ability to sing and to manipulate the bow and the arrow constituted trustworthy indications of a cultured and well-balanced personality.

Now, how far such contests would actually single out the talented and the virtuous is another question. And how far they were incorporated as a function of government is yet another. Suffice it to say that the Chinese of the pre-Confucian era already sufficiently appreciated the importance of singling out men of talent and of attainment.

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. I, No. 26, November 22, 1928, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_10

With the advent of Confucius and his school, China saw the development and completion of a well-rounded social philosophy, which had as its basis the principle of social differentiation. No passage in the whole of Confucianism expresses this principle better than the following from *The Doctrine of the Mean*:

> Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity, and the greatest exercise of it is in loving one's relatives. Righteousness is the accordance of actions with what is fitting and proper, and the greatest exercise of it is **honoring the worthy**. The decreasing measures of love due to relatives, and the **gradations of honor** due to the worthy, are produced by the principle of propriety (Boldfaces the writer's).

It will be seen at once that the transition from the recognition of such a principle, embodying as it did the honoring of the worthy in proper degrees, to the development of a system of what the writer has elsewhere termed civil selection could not be a very long one. As a historical fact, the transition was short. Early in the Han Dynasty, a fairly well-organized system for "raising" the talented and virtuous from obscurity was instituted. This was first proposed by Tung Chung-shu (董仲舒), considered the most genuine of all Confucian scholars of the time. It was argued that since wealth and birth did not necessarily vouch for worth, it would be much better to hold high officials in charge of local governments, such as governors, prefects, and other functionaries receiving a monthly salary of 300 bushels of rice or over, responsible every year for two candidates to be chosen within their respective jurisdiction. Candidates so presented, however, would undergo no special examination, but be given simple offices outright and close to the emperor's person; and the latter together with his ministers would look out among them for particularly able individuals for the periodic refilling of posts in the ministry. This was substantially what Tung proposed to Wu Ti and was accepted and carried out accordingly. This marked the beginning of a nationwide system of civil selection of which there is definite record.

But it will be observed that it was a system of selection without competitive examination. Individuals were chosen upon personal estimates, which might not be fair even in the absence of prejudice and other influences brought to bear upon those who were making the choice. The system had not lasted very long, therefore, before miscarriages of justice became intolerable and the necessity for a change was generally recognized. In 132 A.D., as a result of a petition sent in by Chu Hsiung two different types of competitive examination were adopted, one on scholastic attainment in the classics to be taken by the literary class, and the other on the technique of handling official documents to be taken by those who were already serving in some minor official capacity. An age limit of 40 was also set for the candidates, since it was stated in *The Analects* that "intellectual maturity is not attained until one is well approaching forty."

From the Third century to the Seventh, we witness a steady deterioration of the system as advocated by Chu Hsiung. Some method of recruiting the presumably worthy was indeed in no time absent, but the principle and the practice of open competition in examination was given up and a reversion to the old criteria of birth and of personal estimate took place. At the beginning of the period known as The Three Kingdoms, in 220 A.D. to be exact, measures were taken to differentiate the

population into nine separate classes, from the upper few of which talented men and experts were to be henceforth drawn. The unit used in differentiation could not of course be the individual, but the family. This system was officially declared to have lasted until 600 A.D., but as a matter of fact it lingered for some time after this, that is, well into the first part of the Tang Dynasty. While it might have failed to accord honor to all those to whom honor was due, the system proved a great incentive to the development of genealogy as a branch of historical study. But this is outside the scope of our present inquiry.

In 610 A.D., during the short-lived Sui Dynasty, we find the beginning of a selective system, to which the one that our fathers and grandfathers had labored under might be directly traced. Any candidate who survived the examinations was for the first time designated the "Entered Scholar." The system was greatly extended during the great Tang Dynasty. The important improvements are to be particularly noted in the extended system. First, besides in literature, the candidate might apply for a degree in the classics, in law, or even in mathematics or calligraphy, or for a number of degrees in a combination of these subjects. All told from available records, the lines of expert knowledge sought and awarded with honor during different periods of the Dynasty ran up to over 50, forming a very remarkable array indeed. Second, any aspirant for a degree or degrees might apply for examinations direct to the authorities concerned and did not have to go through the sieve of recommendation by the prefect and other district dignitaries, and thus a good portion of the personal equation was made legally impossible.

The remainder of the story may be shortly told. Early in the Sung Dynasty, the subjects for examination were again reduced to the classics and belle letters. At one time, a knowledge of the classics was made the sole requirement (1070 A.D.); but in addition the candidates were asked to express in formal writing opinions regarding the current political and economic policies of the government or future policies yet to be formulated. This bit of innovation was to last until the whole examination system was finally abolished in 1905. The change effected during the Mongol, Ming, and the Manchu dynasties were largely in the nature of details. Suffice it here to note that the subject matter examined on tended to be increasingly more restricted to the Four Books and their greatly cumulated commentaries, the number of examinations in the hsien, the prefecture, the province, in the national capital, and finally close to the emperor's person became more and more overburdening, and the rules governing them inclined to be rigid, hair-splitting, and quite mechanical.

A proper and detailed evaluation of the historical examination system cannot be made at this time. But a fair judge will not fail to distinguish, to begin with, between the principle upon which the system had been based and the details of operation, which were involved in the system as a branch of practical politics. Despite all arguments to the contrary during the period of agitation for its abolition, the basic principle was a very sound one. Men are by nature unequal, and become more so as a result of appropriate training. Unequal as well are cultural and political responsibilities. And to match the differentiated types of men with responsibilities of varying degrees of importance, recourse must be had to a process of selection and assortment.

With regard to the details of operation, two different lines of facts must be also noted. The first had to do with organization, and the second with the criteria and standards used in selection. Concerning the details of organization, any harsh criticism can only reflect upon one's rashness and inconsiderateness. In a country like China, with her teeming population, and hithertofore a very backward system of communication, any administrative machinery of nation-wide scale might almost be viewed as short of miraculous. The relation among the central government, the governments of the provinces, and of the prefectures and districts was on the whole quite a loose one, but in this matter of "raising" the worthy, from the "Flower of Talent" to the "Han lin," they did seem to be pretty closely knit.

Our dissatisfaction rests perhaps with the criteria that had been in use in different, especially the more recent, periods. That they were often narrow and hence destructive of initiative and originality cannot be denied. This criticism became more applicable toward the close of the Tang system, and even more so in later times, when the attention of the whole educated world was made to concentrate upon the contents and hair-splitting commentaries of the Four Books.

But even here we need to be considerate. Such drawbacks neither did originate with the examination system, nor were they inherent in it, but were rather ascribable to the narrowness of intellectual outlook which had been characteristic of Chinese culture in general even before the days of Confucius.

Besides, educational psychologists in the country have lately come to take interest in the nature of the so-called octopartite compositions and have reached the conclusion that the ability to write such compositions properly would evince a fair measure of native intelligence and that mere memory of a wealth of bookish information would not avail the contestant. In short, the writing of such a composition is more comparable to intelligence-testing than to information testing. Now if this conclusion should be further confirmed, it would seem that our accusation as to the grave inadequacy of the criteria used in selection was quite overdrawn, if not misdirected.

Anyway, enlightened people now begin to see that the complete and sudden abolition of the national examination system in 1905 was quite a mistake. In the first place, it provided for no transition whatsoever before the modern system of recruiting leadership could be gradually and adequately worked out. The writer agrees perfectly with what Dr. Paul Monroe has to say in his observant and judicious book on China:

> Much of the trouble of the recent generation is due to the fact that when China came under the influence of Western learning and culture she abolished these examinations outright and thus the structure and the content of the old learning suddenly disappeared. (*China: A Nation in Evolution*, p. 272).

But more unfortunate is the fact that when the truly objectionable features of the examination system were done away with, out went as well the age-old social and political recognition of the prime importance of civil selection. The notorious intractability of the student class in recent years variously expressed in a general disrespect for seniority and experience, impatience with discipline, neglect of serious study, and an unwillingness to recognize the merits in others, is certainly traceable to the sudden abrogation of the examination system.

But there is little likelihood that the present state of affairs will long prevail. The political philosophy of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which is now being widely accepted, recognizes in a fair measure, on the theoretical side, the inequality of men's native endowment and the necessity for social and cultural differentiation; and provides for, on the practical side, in addition to the customary three-powered system, two new departments of government. The one is presumably to single out and put in due place the competent and the worthy, and is called the Examination Council, since it adopts the principle and method of competitive examination in discharging its duties; whereas the other proposes to deal with the incompetent and the unworthy who may be wrongly installed in responsible positions and is called the Censorial Council.

With the Censorial Council we are here not concerned. But the nature and work of the Examination Council falls well within the scope of our present inquiry. Thus far the functional details of the Council have been able to gather from press reports, there seems to be a definite tendency on the part of the authorities concerned to identify the proposed examination system with that of civil service to be found in England and in the USA. We wonder if this is a proper approach.

When Dr. Sun proposed that examination should be made an essential function of government, he derived, we presume, his inspiration from the traditional Chinese system, the history of which we have just barely sketched. But to think that the traditional system was the Chinese counterpart of the modern system for pressing men into civil service will be guilty of gross superficiality. True, our historical system did have a great deal of political significance, and at times such significance even seemed to predominate over all others, but taken as a whole, that is, viewed in its historical entirety, its function was principally educational and social. The main object was to winnow, to classify, and to give distinction and honor to those who because of virtue, talent, or attainment might exert some exemplary influence upon the common people who were not so favored. Thus, while the system incidentally offered a ready source for the replenishment of government functionaries, major or minor, it must not be interpreted as to have been instituted solely for such a utilitarian purpose. Take for instance, some of the finished products of the system, notably the "Han lins." Did they all go to swell the ranks of officialdom? By no means. The graduates of the Han Lin Yuan might be often installed as official historians, but their office was largely honorary and was coveted as such. Many a successful contestant in the provincial or national examination preferred to stay out of political life entirely and occupy himself with further study or with welfare work in his native community to which the traditional Chinese gentleman was always greatly attached and in which he was usually able to exercise a great deal of influence for good, as he was much esteemed for his learning and sagacity.

Chinese scholars of the older generation, in their enthusiastic moments to convince others that they too are conversant with Western ideas and institutions, would gladly identify the traditional Chinese system with civil service examination. Those of the present generation, ignorant of much of their cultural past and knowing at the same time both England and the USA had learned from China before they adopted any examination system for picking experts, would also gladly do the same. With

some of such scholars, indeed, a desire to accommodate and harmonize the East and the West would sometimes appear almost instinctive, and the present instance of identifying two really different examination systems is but one out of many. But they have been quite mistaken.

Civil service examinations pick men for jobs, but the old Chinese system picked them for their own sake, and jobs might or might not come to them. Personality was after all more important than the office. A successful candidate might cherish no desire for jobs at all, but rather for the honor and social distinction attendant upon his success; whereas the participant in a civil service examination pins his attention on a particular office, which, if he succeeds in acquiring, will insure his livelihood perhaps for the rest of his life. Such a participant is at best a finished product of a course of vocational training, whereas the aspirant of old represented presumably an embodiment of all cultural elements known and deemed valuable in his age.

The historical Chinese seemed to possess a special genius of combining politics with education, of which Confucius must be considered an archetype. The examination system offers by far the best example of a politico-educational institution. An overcritical observer may be disposed to argue that this was rather due to an inability to differentiate the two. He may be right. But we do not see wherefore the two must be differentiated, and how they can be in the last analysis. It is true that politics and education have been set apart to a certain extent in the West. But then we see that while religion, art, and science greatly flourish on the one hand, government is largely left in the hands of rogues, specifically known as politicians and demagogues, on the other.

It would be foreign to Chinese genius, then, to adopt an examination system merely for picking men for odd jobs in the government. Real government cannot be run by active office-seekers, but by personalities. Give distinction and honor to the competent and worthy primarily for their competence and worth, and there will be no exhaustion to the supply of experts for the operation of the state machinery. The man power for government will come as a matter of course. Perhaps each true to her national genius, modern America simply employs the competent and worthy, but gives them no distinction; England has seen fit to keep separate a system of civil service examination to do the employing and a Royal Society to do the honoring; but China contrived to combine both functions in a single institution. What the English and American systems have in store for those countries we do not know, but the Chinese system certainly worked and proved for centuries a staple source of national strength—a fact which has not failed to elicit remarks of high tribute from judicious observers of the West. (For example, Sir Francis Galton in *Hereditary Genius*, 1869 and F.C.S. Schiller in *Eugenic and Politics*, 1926.)

Chapter 11
Glimpses into the Universities

A truly spectacular phenomenon in the Chinese educational world in the last few years has been the rapid growth of institutions of presumably college or university standing in many of the metropolitan centers. They have come up almost literally like mushrooms, or, to use a more local simile, like bamboo shoots after a spring shower. Competition and other untoward circumstances have done their part in reducing from time to time the number of such institutions. But from a dozen to a score of them are still to be found within the metropolitan area of Shanghai. This number, of course, includes those universities whose establishment antedated the present period of phenomenal growth.

But as is true with the whole organic world, rapidity in growth may mean abnormality in growth, and, worse still, may spell speedy extinction. Have these universities developed properly? How do they compare with similar institutions of learning, that is, institutions similarly called, in the western countries? In short, do they deserve to be designated universities in the sense as is commonly accepted by those who have had more than an average amount of university training in the West?

The writer does not pretend to be able to answer these questions. They are rather for the specialist in university education. But a varied and fairly close contact with almost half a dozen such institutions in the last 3 years has enabled him to see that something is wrong. And that something is not in the line of finance, which is commonly and irresponsibly supposed, but in that of standards and efficient management in accordance with such standards.

The best way for the writer to show that this is the case is perhaps to tell the story as one out of several parties who suffers most from the present state of affairs, that is, to tell it as would a student who is going through one of such institutions, beginning with the entrance examination. But as the reader pushes through the following paragraphs, it must be kept in mind that while those institutions with a missionary

---

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. II, No. 3, January 17, 1929, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_11

background are not proof against other objections, they are much less subject to the criticisms that may be gathered from the following account. He must also remember that even with regard to those so-called private universities, not all criticisms will apply, as many of them are under at least quite conscientious leadership.

So let us start with the entrance examination. The absence of proper standards is perhaps better revealed here than elsewhere. Any casual observer will notice that the whole matter is seldom taken seriously. Aside from such drawbacks as favoritism which were common on such occasions even before the days of the modern educational system, other objections may be easily raised. The questions used in the examinations are seldom well prepared, not to say their standardization among the institutions and from year to year. Often no special committee is appointed for the purpose and the work is simply left in the hands of the registrar and one or two members of the faculty who happen to be caught, to pay for the guilt of not leaving the town during the vacation or of coming back too early for the actual opening of the sessions. The lack of well-organized administration is best illustrated by the following instance. In one of the institutions, it once happened that, for want of a better authority, a recent graduate from its affiliated senior middle school was coaxed into presiding over the entrance examination of a big group of would-be college freshmen!

Many an entrance examination amounts to little more than a gesture, required by good educational etiquette. When tuition and other fees constitute the most important item in the school budget, or when too few aspirants would hardly justify the establishment of a new department or a new division, the entrance examination relinquishes its normal function of a discriminating and culling sieve, and assumes one of an enticing trap into which many who are hungry and thirsty after a college degree readily and only too willingly fall. In one of the institutions, one of the departments was once so swelled with new students that the gentleman responsible for it earned from the student body the good title of "regiment recruiter." It is said that among the recruits thus gathered a few were not even graduates of the junior middle school!

The so-called transfers of course need not go through any competitive examination. When certificates of their past achievement are shown, they are let in together with their luggage with scarcely any ado. But it will be an unpardonable omission on our part if reference is not made to those schools where the scrupulousness of the authorities makes the success of any applicant quite precarious. Here, we find the computation and commutation of credits a real art. Some transfers are past masters in that, for to them repeated transference from one university to another will unfailingly mean an economy in time as well as in money for the acquisition of a college degree. And to withstand the onslaught of such transfers, it takes men of real business insight and integrity to take charge of the registrar office.

When the student is duly admitted, the next question in order is his enrollment into particular department. This should not bother in a well-organized college, where a student is not expected to begin his training as a specialist right in the first year, or in other words, where the first year or two is entirely devoted to the instruction of fundamental subjects and where a student has but little room for choice, and

where a fair degree of intellectual maturity in the second or third year will naturally lead the student into some line of specialization. This is but what a liberal education justly demands. But here we find things quite different; any newcomer is at once ushered into some particular department and therein to be loaded with almost a dozen subjects and often more than 25 or 30 h a week.

The traditional Chinese spirit of learning has been one of depth as well as breadth. While only a few had been able to attain both, many were there who acquired a broad outlook upon life and upon human relationships through a many-sided training. But at present, while breadth is certainly ruthlessly sacrificed, the attainment of depth yet remains to be seen.

Needless to say, in being enrolled into a department, the student spends but little effort on his own part. He may come to grief later on, but for the present he is blissfully ignorant of the difficulties and incompatibilities that may lie ahead in his path. He has and can have no choice. His family, his former teacher, his friends, or a sort of social pressure only vaguely felt, is often the active decisive factor in making the choice for him. As to his unsophisticated self, he has not even time enough to bewilder at the multifariousness of modern learning represented by an endless array of departments and divisions with which most of the universities under review are now bedizened.

Then comes the opening of the academic year and regular class work. Curiously enough, the one does not closely follow the other. It is not uncommon that an interval of a week or more might elapse between the opening ceremony and the assumption of classes, often apparently for no other reason than for the teachers and the students to warm up after a long summer's lethargic rest.

When regular class work finally begins, however, we experience even greater disappointments. Let us first turn our attention to the venerable professors. Of these there are two types differentiated by no other criterion than that of time spent in service of a particular university—during the year. An exclusive teaching service of 12 h or more a week makes one a "full-time" professor, and a service less than that number of hours, unless in the case of those who are doing administrative work in the school at the same time, makes another a "part-time" professor. But as a matter of fact, all professors, except a few, are part-time ones, since their service is coveted by more than one institution during the same year; and not a few are full-time ones in two or more institutions—a fact logically impossible, but which actually occurs. In other words, many are full-time professors simply by definition.

The monthly payment varies of course accordingly. A full-time professor is paid throughout the year, at least nominally, but a part-time one only during the months when there are classes. In some of the schools, teaching service is paid on an hourly basis, and sometimes the payment is promptly made upon the expiration of every hour. This is perhaps a very commendable system, and is only possible in this good age, for never was there a time in the history of China when poor teachers could eke out an existence by doing odd jobs!

The state of affairs depicted above points to either one or all of three or four facts. First, there are perhaps too many universities at a single place. Second, there are too few expert teachers to go around. Third, the salary for a full-time professor serving

only one institution at a time is not enough for the supporting and keeping in decency even a family of the modern size. And the fourth is that teaching is no longer an idle profession and is being elevated to the rank of skilled labor. As to which fact is the more significant, we are not in a position to judge.

A professor with a teaching period of 12 h or often many more is little better than an ordinary drudge and belongs to the order of besotted humanity; and as such no satisfactory work can be expected from him. One saving grace is that if he is so unfamiliar with his textbooks as to have to prepare for every course for the week, his task is much simplified by the fact that as the same course is offered in two or three different schools during the same semester, a single hour of preparation will be good for 3 or 4 h actual teaching. Many of the lectures to him are simple rehearsals, and later in the week the hour comes, the more eloquent he becomes.

As to the materials used for teaching, there are two different theories. The one holds that English textbooks should be used wherever possible, since they offer something more definite for the students to grasp. The second theory, on the other hand, maintains that textbook knowledge is often narrow and stereotyped and may not fit into the national background and prefers lecturing with the help of more or less detailed notes or synopsis to be issued to the students. At present both are in practice, but there is a strong tendency to give up the use of English textbooks altogether in some of the schools, apparently because the knowledge of English to the students has been deteriorating, or because the teachers are now more of a type which is not quite conversant with the English language.

But any thoughtful reader will see that it is exactly in such connections as this that the work of standardization is made impossible and whatever standards already established are undone. When textbooks, which are nothing but results of earlier accumulated teaching experiences, are resorted to, the student acquires at least that much which is contained within the covers. Whatever else he may fail to learn, a minimum amount of knowledge in a subject is set for him from which there can be no evasion. So it is with the teacher. Whatever else he may fail to impart to the students, he must at least be thoroughly acquainted with the contents of the book, else his status and reputation as a teacher will be in jeopardy.

Now, let us see what the absence of a textbook and the extensive use of lectures in a course may lead to. Whatever the future may have in store for us in the way of producing first-rate professors, there is no denying that the present teaching force, to say the least, is quite inexperienced. The so-called part- or full-time professors as a body are certainly less experienced than those writers of the textbooks which they frown to use, and in all probability they are much less well informed with regard to the particular subjects being taught. Thus, the importance that can be attached to the lectures and lecture notes appears in a quite different light. Anything that a teacher does not know or knows only hazily may very well be left untouched in the notes and in the lectures without the students ever knowing it and thereby casting any doubt upon his scholarship and eloquence. It is not uncommon that the result of a semester's work in a particular course amounts to only a few sheets of disjoined lecture notes. Or, to state it differently, a whole hour's lecture contains as much substance as can be simply described in four or five lines.

No matter whether the textbook method or the lecturing method is used, the students as a rule do not have to do much, if any, reading out of the class. The libraries in these universities are mostly very inadequately equipped, and a comprehensive reading list for any subject cannot be made out. But when a textbook is required for the course, daily assignment may be made for preparation and the industry of the students may be tested either by quizzes or by recitations. But when lectures and lecture notes take the place of the textbook, assignments are out of question, the necessity for preparation is no longer felt, and daily recitations become impracticable; and the students, as passive receivers of sound waves, are often left to doze through the long hours. Things of this nature are of course not peculiar to the universities here, we also find them for instance in those on the other side of the Pacific in the form of "pipe courses" and the like, but they are certainly by far more common with us.

The average Chinese university student today had practically no student life. As we already have said, he is overloaded with often more than 25 or 30 h of class work a week, whereas half of this number of hours is sufficient to keep any conscientious youth busy. He does and can do nothing except attending classes. He exercises no faculties other than that of hearing. Very few know how to make good use of the library, poorly equipped though it is and even if he has time. As victims of the lecturing method, many cannot even read plain English, and to them a large part of the stack room will forever remain a mystery. And the number of such victims is rapidly increasing. On the other hand, they are flooded with cheap periodicals and literary works from the modern Chinese press—publications with a purpose but devoid of substance or devoid of both. They are absolutely powerless to resist them, still less to exercise any intelligent choice.

While success in competitive examinations was the most important condition upon which a scholar of the old regime gained his cultural status and social recognition, it is now quite out of fashion among the university students; even, a good deal of odium is attached to it. Accordingly, in the place of competitive examinations during and at the end of the semester, writing research papers has come into vogue. The new method has at least one thing to commend itself for it has one psychological advantage, and that is, it is very flattering to both the teacher and the students. Now even the freshmen are writing research papers, and in the absence of sufficient reference materials, such papers are said to evince more originality and greater flights of imagination than usual.

The absence of discipline in other sphere of student activity than the strictly scholastic is too obvious to the general observer to call for further comment.

We may easily push the story to its logical end, that is, to wait to be present on the commencement day. But few though the glimpses thus far gathered, they are significant enough to bear out the contention put forward in the beginning of the discussion that the matter with the universities is not one of finance but one of proper standards and efficient management in accordance with them. Indeed, why, to begin with, must an institution of at best the scope of a small college be ostentatiously styled itself a university? Wherefore must there be a great many departments and divisions, while there are not enough teachers and even students to fill them?

In fact, it has happened more than once that the number of professors and instructors in a single department exceeds that of the students in that department! Where is the necessity, further, of offering many fairly advanced courses in the first and second years, while the students have yet no grasp of the fundamentals in any subject? And of listing many more when one is not at all sure who are going to teach them? Thus, in addition to the absence of standards and to poor management, we find here a woeful lack of, what shall we call it, intellectual modesty; and quite probably, the former is but a product of the latter.

A university degree is of course today a social or, shall we say, a sociable necessity. While it is more a cultural embellishment in the West, it is more an economic asset here with us. But the whole world agrees that it now belongs to the category of social indispensables. But in the West, the universities do maintain some minimum standards beyond which they would not lower themselves, and they are certainly well managed. The same is with the Japanese universities. The American colleges and universities are unexcelled in administrative efficiency. While their standards may leave much to be desired, they are certainly much higher than what we can detect in the universities here. Yet, trained observers have found "very good ground for believing that the intellectual caliber of the students has declined markedly during the past twenty to thirty years" (Professor Leta S. Hollingworth, *Gifted Children*, 1926, p. 286). What the present confused state of affairs in the universities here may lead to 20–30 years hence, we shudder to imagine.

Chapter 12
Notes on Modern Marriage

Modern marriage is almost a contradiction. Modernity has little room for the age-old institution called marriage. Else the latter needs to be redefined before it will get into its surroundings. The ancients such as the Romans defined marriage as "the union of a man and a woman entraining the obligation to live in inseparable communion." The Chinese used to have almost exactly the same notion. This of course has now only an ethnographical interest. Far more acceptable is undoubtedly the definition formulated by Westermarck over 30 years ago, that marriage is "a more or less durable connection between male and female lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring." Yet, how many modern marriages will abide by this definition? A glance at the statistics of divorce and of childless marriages wherever obtainable at once gives the answer.

But if modern civilization is to sustain itself, to keep what it has already accumulated, not to say to grow and to soar greater heights, some system of replenishing human numbers must always find a place in the entire scheme of things. Perchance marriage in one form or another, as defined by Westermarck, may recover its former vogue and prestige, this time divested of its metaphysical or even theocratical incrustations.

A greater biological as well as sociological appreciation of the importance of marriage, however, must be first cultivated before the age-old institution can be properly reinstalled in place. While not forgetting to be critical, the writer proposes to discuss the whole problem from such an appreciative standpoint. The discussion, to be fairly comprehensive, will hope to cover the following subtopics: (l) What is marriage for? (2) Marriage selection: its criteria and the role of the parents; (3) Consanguineous marriage and interracial marriage; and (4) The future of monogamy.

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. II, No. 9, February 28, 1929, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_12

It is quite platitudinous to ask what marriage is for. It is almost like asking what eating and drinking are for. But it is one of the sad truths in human experience that the greatest platitude is often one which is understood least, not to say it is being practiced in actual life.

The object or function of marriage is primarily twofold. On the one hand, it satisfies, in a socially acceptable way, one of our major instinctive needs, sex. And on the other, it helps to perpetuate our kind. With the advance of culture and the increase in importance of the individual as such, a new and secondary function gradually asserts itself—one of romantic life and companionship between the sexes. In Western societies, and especially since the rise of romanticism, as a life outlook, this function has assumed a magnitude which tends to quite overshadow those of sex and reproduction.

In Oriental countries, notably in China and Japan, owing to the important role played by the parent in the family, yet another function has been evolved and is even in these days of general revolt against authorities much in evidence. Marriage in these countries is contracted partly for the sake of serving the aged parents or, rather, parents-in-law, in the eyes of the married woman. Marriage in the traditional Oriental eye is thus a part and parcel of that system of family ethics known, for want of a better term, filial piety.

In the Far Eastern countries, there has been also the tendency for the functions of reproduction and of filial service to combine into one, that is, to regard the bearing of children as a filial tribute to ancestors, in fact, the most important tribute that one is capable of, according to Mencius and others. The rationale herein involved is easily grasped. The worst thing that can happen to a man after his death is to starve over an empty altar, an altar devoid of sacrificial offerings and bereft of any caretakers who should be his direct descendants. It was for the sake of obviating such spiritual embarrassment on the part of bygone ancestors, according to the afterthought of our philosophers, that marriage was once instituted. So viewed, marriage acquires a considerable amount of religious significance, and almost assumes the importance of a sacrament—not to a personal deity as with the Christians, but to one's deceased ancestors who are taken to possess a collective personality.

While there has been a tendency for two of the functions of marriage to coalesce in the East, quite another tendency has manifested itself in Western social life. It is this: that the functions of sexual gratification and of romantic love, when at first hardly separable, become gradually dissociated, and incline to drift farther and farther apart, until we come to a *reductio ad absurdum* in what is known as Platonic love.

In the West again, there has existed for some time already another tendency of dissociation of the functions. It is a dissociation between reproduction and sexual gratification. It is of course the theory and practice of contraception that has made this dissociation possible.

There are thus four major objects or functions of marriage (1) sexual gratification, (2) reproduction, (3) service to parents, and (4) romantic life and companionship. Out of these four, the Chinese youths of a generation or two ago were, to speak generally, cognizant of only the first three. And even these perhaps did not clearly appear to them as separate items; for (2) and (3) were by force of social heritage

more or less united; united would also appear functions (1) and (2), since they were physically contiguous. Thus to them, the question of the objects of marriage did not call for particular concern.

The youths of the modern West who are contemplating marriage will also take notice of no more than three out of the four functions. But the three form a different combination, in which the function of romantic life is substituted for service to parents. Thus, neither to them is the question "Wherefore is marriage?" especially puzzling.

But to the Chinese youths of the present day who are so fortunate as to have remained immune from a *tedium vitae* resulting from personal maladjustment on the one hand and from lending an ear to false social prophets on the other, and in whose hearts therefore still throbs the normal desire for the company of the opposite sex to be satisfied someday through acceptable social ways, the question "Why marry?" becomes one of utmost seriousness. Standing on the causeway of two converging cultures, they are at once aware of the many separate functions that marriage may assume, and are at a loss to pin properly their attention and emphasis. To them, the functions enumerated above appear not only distinct, but are quite irreconcilable.

About a year ago, while serving as literary editor of one of the Chinese dailies in Shanghai, the writer had the opportunity of sounding, through the questionnaire method, the consensus of opinion of many educated Chinese youths on various questions affecting matrimony, parenthood, and family life in general. Regarding the question "What is marriage for?" the readers of the daily were asked to list in the order of importance the very functions we have been considering. The result, over 300 answers in all, is tabulated as follows:

Function		Order of importance I	II	III	IV	Total votes
Service to parents	Votes by men	61	70	78	63	272
	Votes by women	12	14	12	7	43
Romantic life and companionship	Votes by men	86	42	86	58	272
	Votes by women	15	6	12	12	43
Sexual gratification	Votes by men	25	71	48	128	272
	Votes by women	8	9	10	23	43
Bearing and rearing of good children	Votes by men	100	89	60	23	272
	Votes by women	15	16	11	3	43

By multiplying the figures under I by 4, those under II by 3, those under III by 2, and those under IV by 1, and adding the products for each function, the general consensus of opinion as to its order of importance may be determined:

Bearing and rearing of good children	943 points	(I)
Romantic life and companionship	814 points	(II)
Service to parents	794 points	(III)
Sexual gratification	619 points	(IV)

If only the votes of women readers are considered, we reach a somewhat different conclusion:

Bearing and rearing of good children	133 points	(I)
Service to parents	121 points	(II)
Romantic life and companionship	114 points	(III)
Sexual gratification	82 points	(IV)

It is interesting to note from the above that whereas the relative positions of the two more primary functions of marriage, reproduction and sexual gratification, are quite secure, those of the two others, romantic life and service to parents, being largely cultural products, are not. They occupy alternately the second and the third places. If we compare the number of points that each of these secondary functions has been accorded, it will be seen that the two are really competing for the second place at close range. When the votes of both sexes are considered, the function of romantic life appears better off only by 20 points. When only those by women are considered, the function of filial service appears better off by seven points—a difference equally negligible. This is to be expected. As has already been intimated, we are today, like Hercules, facing a crossroad. The newer points of view beckon us from one direction, while the older ones are yet powerful enough to attract us from another; and many of us are unable to reach a decision.

But we have not yet reached the end of our analysis. The writer had suspected before he drew up the questionnaire that romantic life and companionship between the sexes as a function of marriage must by far overweigh the rest of the functions, if the trends of social life as might be gleaned from news events and personal discussions were to be at all trusted. But the suspicion apparently did not come true; the function in question, according to the general estimate, only occupies the third or, at best, the second place.

But it will easily occur to the reader, as it did to the writer, that the individuals who answered the questionnaire cannot belong to a single type. They certainly differ in age, and also in educational attainment, and as a consequence, they must also differ in social outlook, which is a product of age plus educational attainment. To put it differently, while all are susceptible to Western ideas and standards, and while all are retentive of traditional Chinese ideas and standards, the degree of susceptibility on the one hand and of retentiveness on the other cannot be the same for all. Further, it will also occur to the reader that since modern Chinese education and scholarship consist largely of borrowed wisdom from the West, the degree of an individual's educational attainment will correspond fairly closely with that of his being Westernized in outlook and practice.

Granting all this, we may push our analysis further by correlating the different degrees of educational attainment of the answers to the questionnaire with their individual opinions as to the comparative importance of romantic life and companionship as a function of marriage, and then see if the latter still retains the second or third place throughout. Of the degrees of educational attainment,

three are here recognized, namely, completion of grammar school education, of secondary education, of college education, and their equivalents:

Educational attainment	Romantic life: order of importance	No. of voters	% of voters	No. of points
Grammar school	I	0	0.0	167
	II	2	8.7	
	III	12	50.0	
	IV	10	41.3	
Secondary education	I	41	26.1	239
	II	24	15.3	
	III	47	29.9	
	IV	45	28.7	
College education	I	56	47.9	307
	II	23	19.7	
	III	28	23.9	
	IV	10	8.5	
Points not correlated for lack of data				101
Total points				814

It is at once seen that, speaking generally, the higher is a man's educational attainment, greater importance does he attach to romantic life and companionship as a function of marriage. In fact, with those who were college bred or are just going through college, this function actually assumes the position of first importance; whereas those who received only grammar education, not a single individual accords it the first place. Those who have gone, or are going through middle school, come rightly in between. There is evidently a great deal of wavering and uncertainty in their judgment as to what place this particular function of marriage justly deserves; for, being in the midway of their education, which largely means being converted to Western ideas and standards, they are the very people whom the force of the old as well as that of the new pull with almost equal tension.

But our discussion so far has only touched upon the natural drift of things. Western ideas and standards including those relative to marriage have indeed come in like tides and people are simply wafted in them. Many progressive thinkers of the day have endeavored to show that a whole-hearted acceptance of them will be profitable. Perhaps they are right. But upon closer examination, the position of these thinkers is really one of rationalization, it is the reverse of the one represented by the sour-grape fable, it is like saying "Since we have to eat it no matter how unpalatable, let's say it is sweet." And many there are who think it is sweet.

Many modern Chinese youths, thanks to a thorough Western education and to the progressive thinkers, are in such a predicament regarding their marriage question. They maintain, in spite of themselves, that love, which really belongs to the category of unknowns and unknowables, individual happiness, romantic companionship including what is extolled as postnuptial courtship and chivalry, must be at the very

basis of a true and enduring marriage. For love and individual happiness in marriage, they are willing to sacrifice anything else for which the institution is also intended.

Under the spell of individualism and the pleasure philosophy, they even forget to reason that had their parents come under the influence of the same philosophy and had had the mean to live it out, the world would have waited in vain to be graced by their presence as a new generation and to see the same philosophy held in turn by them.

Thus, even a little reflection upon man as a social and biological being will bring us to realize that no matter how highly we may value our cultural idiosyncrasies, the primary functions of marriage are best left to keep their primary places. While the average man may not be powerful enough to extricate himself from the grip of circumstances, and may have to order his life under their dictates, enlightened people do now see that conscious control of social processes is a feasibility. They are the people who have to come realize that under whatever cultural conditions the bearing and rearing of healthy and intelligent children will remain, and will be made to remain, the first important function of marriage. Men must leave enough progeny to keep their cultural idiosyncrasies alive, respected, and appreciated, if not for anything else. There is really little need for the biologist and eugenicist to raise the alarm that human racial heritage is at stake, if this much is understood.

In summing up, let it be reiterated that of the four objects or functions of marriage, the bearing and rearing of sound and sane children deserves the strongest emphasis, if our social and cultural life is to sustain itself and to grow. In the above paragraphs, nothing has been said as to the ultimate place that the function of filial service should take. But those who agree with the writer's point of view as expressed in "Familism and the Optimum Family" (*The China Critic*, Vol. I, No. 20) will see that a place of preference must be accorded to it, in spite of the current general attitude to the contrary; not because it is a heritage peculiar to the Far Eastern peoples, but because of its great social and ethical value, when not overdone. The other two functions, romantic life and the gratification of sexual desire appear to the writer, or to anybody who knows something about biology and physiology, to be two stages, of a single function. Romance that does not culminate in sexual gratification is debilitating, and sexual gratification unattended to by any romantic touch is morbid.

If man lives by mere instincts, there is little room for problems of the kind that we have been discussing. The same will be true if he lives by intelligent guidance. But as a matter of fact, he lives largely by false intelligence, and no more false intelligence is to be found elsewhere than in the fields of marriage and politics, and no greater hotbed of such false intelligence is to be found than modern education. "Wherefore is marriage?" is a platitudinous question only to those who are little stuffed with false intelligence on the subject.

Chapter 13
Chinese Colonization in Manchuria

13.1 A Word of Introduction

The colonization of Manchuria by the Chinese in the last few generations must be counted as one of the most significant instances of impulsive or spontaneous migration,[1] characteristic of modern times. Both in nature and in scope, it is quite comparable to the movements, now still in progress, that have brought the Americans of New England to the Pacific sea board. Though Manchuria has not been such an ideal country for prospectors, the Chinese colonization movement is not without its "forty-miners", and its "cover-wagons". But the story still remains to be told.

The writer does not propose to tell the story in its more romantic aspects. That has to await some one more temperamentally gifted, and better acquainted with the exigencies of frontier life. But to give from available data a short account of how the colonization movement has grown and developed, what is its present status, and how it may bear upon the future welfare of the Chinese as a cultural and racial group is for him a relatively more handy task. But as the writer is neither a native of the Three Eastern Provinces (as Manchuria, in deference to Chinese sovereignty, would be more properly called), he does not claim to speak with any unassailable authority.

[1] T. S. Foster, *Travels and Settlements of Early Man*. Pp. 53–54.

Originally submitted to the third biennial session of the Institute of Pacific Relations held in Kyoto from October 28 to November 9, 1929. Its main content was published in four articles repectively titled "Japanese and Korean Immigration into Manchuria"、"Early Chinese Colonization in Manchuria"、"The Qualitative Aspect of Chinese Colonization in Manchuria"、"Recent Chinese Colonization in Manchuria" in *The China Critic*, Vol. II, Nos. 44, 45, 46, 47, October 31, November 7, 14, 21, 1929, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_13

13.2 Colonization Movement During the Ming Dynasty

A detailed history of Chinese colonization in Manchuria cannot yet be written. Too many gaps are there that only careful research can hope to fill. What is given below is admittedly fragmentary and incomplete.

It cannot be far from truth to think that Manchuria, being contiguous to China proper in land and easily accessible by war, had been from very ancient times a home for Chinese stragglers. That many individuals and individual families from China proper must have managed to settle in the Liaotung Peninsula during the long stretch of Chinese history may reasonably be taken for granted. But organized colonization did not begin until the latter part of the fourteenth century when the Mings drove out the Mongols and became themselves de facto masters of North China. Before this, and ever since the Tang dynasty, or farther back, since the Han dynasty and the Three Kingdoms, for a period of over eleven centuries, it will be remembered, North China had been repeatedly overrun by Mongol and Tangus tribes, and the Chinese enjoyed at best only a nominal control over the regions inside the Great Wall, not to say those beyond it; and naturally, colonization on a large scale would have been unthinkable in those days.

But in those days, it will be further recalled, the Chinese, while engaged in gradually assimilating the northern barbarians, were themselves taking time to spread southward, filling up what is now the provinces of Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, and Kweichow; and even now the force of southerly expansion has not spent itself. The successive waves of Hakka migration are now generally regarded as some of the most prominent landmarks in the process.

Returning to our story, we find that almost no sooner had the Mings unified the country, than a policy of extensive colonization was adopted. The first Ming Emperor, Hung Wu (1368–1398), was a man of insight and of foresight; he saw from the very beginning the necessity of filling up all the spaces recently vacated by the defeated and retreating Mongols. People from congested regions in the south were even ordered to migrate to the north, and many new settlements sprang up almost overnight. Such settlements were, as may be expected, partly military and partly agricultural and pastoral, and the adult males constituting them may be regarded as forming a sort of self-supporting militia, living upon what they themselves produced from the land they were developing and protecting. They were of three different sizes. The largest had a membership of adult males of about 5,600, representing generally an equal number of households, and was called a wei. The settlement with a membership of 1,200 was called a "su of thousand households," and that with a membership of 112, a "su of hundred households." Of every 100 adult males in the settlements, 30 were expected to do military duty, the other 70 worked in the fields. The following is a list of the weis that were instituted in Manchuria during and shortly after the reign of the first Ming Emperor.[2]

[2] *Shu Wen Hsien Tung Kao*. Section on Geography.

Mukden	ca. 1370
Mukden	ca. 1370
Liaoyang	1371
Liaoyang	1373
Liaoyang	1373
Liaoyang	1375
Kingchow	1375
Haicheng (Newchwang)	1376
Kaiping (Hsiung-yao-cheng)	1376
Tungning (in Kirin)	1380
Fuchow	1381
Liaoyang	1384
Tungning (in Kirin)	1386
Ichow	1387
Acheng (in Kirin)	1387
Tiehling	1388
Peicheng	1390
Peicheng	ca. 1390
Peicheng	ca. 1390
Peicheng	ca. 1390
Peicheng	ca. 1390
Peicheng	ca. 1390
Acheng	1390
Chinchow	1391
Chinchow	1391
Chinchow	1393
Chinchow	1393
Ichow	1393
Mukden	1398
Mukden	1398
Kaiyuan	1409
Kaiyuan	1409
Peicheng	1410
Hsincheng	1430

It will be seen that practically all the weis were within the confines of the present province of Liaoning. The three or four in Kirin are open to doubt; owing to changes in the names of localities, correct identification is now often impossible. But we read in the Ming records that there were in all 184 weis and 20 sus in Kirin, for which officers were appointed; but as there did not seem to have been any definite allotment of land to each wei and su, the historian had hesitated to list them. The Province of Heilungkiang was then in all probability entirely in the hands of native nomad tribes.

But from the meagre data we do possess, it will be clear that as early as the latter part of the fourteenth century, fully a 100 years before Columbus landed in

the West Indies (which marked the beginning of many things in the West, particularly colonization), the regions in Manchuria watered by the Liao Ho were already being colonized by the Chinese. Calculating upon the basis of the 34 weis alone, each with 5,600 households, we would find a total of 190,400 households or separate families; and multiplying these by 5.5, which is about the average size for the Chinese family, both historically and at present,[3] we easily arrive at a million for the whole population. But this is obviously not the whole truth. It will be recalled that these were but the first households and individuals that were induced or ordered to move into Manchuria between 1370 and 1430, a short open of 60 years. They only constituted the basic Chinese population, from which a rapid growth and expansion must be assumed to have taken place in the years which followed and preceded the Manchu Conquest. The latter began to be felt around 1620, about 200 years after the last recorded settlement in our list was ordered. Further, when the nature of the circumstances is taken into account, the rate of growth of the Chinese settlements must be assumed to have been very great, perhaps quite comparable to that of the American population of New England during the eighteenth century, which was variously estimated to be doubling itself in 25 (Hyle, for Rhode Island alone) 15–20, and even in 13 (Euler) or 10 (Petty) years.[4]

While all this is admittedly only of an inferential value, it may be pointed out from definite records, that when the Manchus had captured what is now Mukden and made Liaoyang the Capital (1621), Chinese colonists were forced by the 1,000 to retreat inside of the Great Wall. In 1622, when Kuangning, now Peicheng, fell into the hands of the Manchus, "not less than a million" Chinese lost their homes, had to find refuge inside of Shanhaikuan, and the government had to rehabilitate in what is now Tientsin, Peiping, Hochien, and Paoting. A million is quite a round number, and mathematics, as Prof. East of Harvard believes, has not been the strong point of the Chinese; but this bit of historical evidence would at least indicate that Chinese colonists in the Liao Valley must have waxed strong in numbers since they first came to settle there in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

That Chinese colonization in Manchuria during the Ming dynasty was of much biological consequence and was not of a purely military and economic character may be inferred from two other lines of facts. The first is that, for the purpose of frontier protection, garrison houses were established quite apart from the settlements. One of many such stations was located in what is now Fengcheng, near Antung and the Korean border. The other and more important line of facts is to be gathered from the genealogies of many Chinese families,[5] which contributed to the formation of the Manchurian weis. It will be seen that their members who went north at the order of the government, then in Nanking, did so not as isolated individuals, but brought their wives and children with them.

---

[3] This cannot be an over-estimate for rapidly growing communities, especially with the Chinese. The present average size for families in the same regions has been estimated to be 8–9.

[4] E. M. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads*. P. 52.

[5] For example, the *Genealogy of the Fan Family*. 40 Vols. Section on family dispersion.

More facts bearing upon Chinese colonization in Manchuria may be found in such encyclopedic works as Shu Wen Hsien Tung Kao. In the latter, in the section on land revenues, references were made to colonization in Manchuria for the years 1382, 1395, 1406, 1429, 1509, 1570, 1577, and 1622. It was in 1622 that "over a million" Chinese made their retreat before the advancing Manchus, marking for a time the end of a long period of peaceful and successful colonization. In the year 1395, Yung Lo, then a prince and later the third and perhaps the most energetic of the Ming rulers, was recorded to have made a personal visit to the colonies. The land allotted to the colonists during the reign of Hung Wu amounted to 1,238,600 mu, or roughly 188,000 acres; but around 1550, it was increased to 2,915,866 mu, or roughly 442,000 acres. But this was only the officially allotted acreage located in the close vicinity of the settlements. The acreage that had been appropriated from time to time without official sanction as the settlements grew and expanded must have been many times the figures found in the records.

Beside the military and agricultural functions, Manchuria colonization served in a relatively few cases also legal or penal purposes. Able but recalcitrant officials were not uncommonly sent into exile with their families. Of the far-reaching consequences of such exiles, more will be said in a later section.

13.3 "The Manchu-Manchuria Policy"

To the advancing Manchus who were militant and intolerant, the Chinese colonists had of course to give way. The less adaptable colonists returned to China proper, whereas the more adaptable ones submitted to the new rule and were enrolled as Chinese Bannermen, or Hanchiungs. The number who did this must have been quite large; well over 200 families of different surnames are represented in the records as having served in important military as well as civil capacities, especially during the first years of the Manchu conquest. Of this number of families, the great majority had "lived for generations" within what is now the Province of Liaoning; a few, about half of a percent, however, had "lived for generations" in Kirin, showing that Chinese colonization during the Ming dynasty did reach the Western slope of Changpei Mountains.[6,]

The Manchus had reason to look upon Manchuria as their patrimony, and naturally their attitude toward Chinese colonization could not be very friendly. While they found it expedient to absorb whatever was left of the colonies, they determined to discourage any further migration of Chinese into Manchuria. This determination finally led to a definite policy of exclusion.

The policy of exclusion, however, was not adopted and acted upon until 1668, almost a generation after the Manchus entered the Great Wall. For the first years, they found that the evacuation of the Liao Valley by Chinese colonists proved a

[6] *Tsing Tung Chih*. Section on Genealogy.

decided disadvantage to their own people, who had not become adapted to agricultural life and who must have valued the measure of cooperative harmony which they had established with the colonists. So in 1653, the government saw fit to draw up a set of regulations with the explicit purpose of inducing the Chinese to migrate and settle. Volunteer recruiting agents were awarded positions, either military or civil, in the governments of the districts, the importance of the position being proportionate to the number of settlers that the individual was able to muster. The settlers themselves were given monthly allowance of grain, a certain amount of seeds for every five acres of land opened up, and 20 heads of cattle for every 100 settlers.

The regulations were repealed in 1668. But during the period when they were in force, the Chinese population seemed to have grown very considerably. Abbe Huc, the famous Jesuit missionary and traveler, wrote of the conditions then obtaining: "The Great Wall was freely passed . . . the Chinese population of Pe-Tche-Li (now Hopei) and Chan-Toung (Shantung) bursts like torrents upon Manchuria." *The Gazetteer of Shengking* states, of the same period, that more than a dozen hsiens, the traditional Chinese unit of government ever since the third century B.C., were created in order to accommodate the new influx of settlers and others who catered to their wants. It shows that in dealing with large numbers of Chinese who were accustomed to settled rural as well as urban life, the semimilitary government by Banners proved no longer adequate. But when the regulations were repealed, the tide turned, as may be seen from the following meagre figures.[7]

Year	Number of male adults	Increase over last count
1661	5,557	–
1664	10,329	4,773
1667	27,012	16,643
1668	33,572	6,560
1669	34,762	1,190

Thus began the long period of exclusion. But the enforcement of the "Manchuria-for-Manchus" policy had required constant vigilance on the part of the government in the form of repeated edicts of warning and patrol and state troopers on the boundary line between Manchuria and China proper. Such efforts of vigilance may be summarized in the following chronological table:

1668—Repeal of Regulations of 1653 referred to above
1739—Chinese settlers in Kirin and Fengtien forced to become naturalized
1740—Edicts dealing with exclusion of would-be Chinese settlers, naturalization of older settlers, and deportation in 10 years of those not willing to be naturalized
1746—Edicts prohibiting Chinese to go beyond Shanhaikwan

[7] *The Gazetteer of Shengking*.

1750—Deportation ordered, after the expiration of 10 years
1750—Deportation from Dolansor of settlers with families. Edicts prohibiting intermarriage between Mongols and Chinese
1750—Edict prohibiting Chinese to go beyond Shanhaikwan, Haifeng Pass, and the boundary line between Manchuria and Mongolia as marked out by the Willow Fence
1751—New rule in effect that only Manchus, not Chinese, were eligible as magistrates
1762—The office of civil governor in Shengking became subordinate to that of the viceroy
1776—Edict prohibiting settlers to go into Kirin, that is, beyond the southern extension of the Willow Fence
1799 (?)—Another edict to the same effect
1803—Edict emphasizing the prohibition of Chinese settlers with families to go beyond Shanhaikwan
1824—Measures taken inducing Manchus residing in China proper to move back and develop the country so as to counteract the growing influence of Chinese settlers. These proved a failure within 5 years
1870—Same measures inducing Manchus to move back to Heilungkiang. Complete failure

Measures of this kind might stem the tide, or even turn the tide of Chinese immigration for a time, they could not, however, break and stop it. Chinese settlers kept on coming into Manchuria. Even the first prohibitive edict (1668) did not seem to have had much binding force. It should have been noted earlier that of the present Three Eastern Provinces comprising Manchuria, Shengking (later Fengtien and now Liaoning) had from the very beginning both the equivalents of a viceroy and governor, the other two having only military authorities. In other words, only Shengking was treated in a measure as a province. Now, of the 52 governors that successively sat in office between 1644 and 1751, 34 were Chinese, 17 were Chinese Bannermen, and only 1 was Manchu. Similarly of the 293 minor officials below the governor, 247 were Chinese, 28 were Chinese Bannermen, and only 18 were Manchus. The preponderant share taken by the Chinese in the provincial Government is most significant. In the absence of statistical material, they show most convincingly that Chinese settlers enjoyed a steady growth in number and influence in spite of the pressure brought to bear upon them by the respective edicts of 1668, 1740, 1746, and 1750. They show further that as the Chinese community expanded and civil life became increasingly varied and intricate, officials of pure Manchu extraction and even those appointed from the Chinese Banners were no longer sufficient to cope with the situation.

Another fact tending to show that the Chinese community had grown during these years despite many disabilities was that, in 1726, the prefecture of Fengtien (the prefect of Fengtien and the Governor of Shengking being identical) was enlarged to include Kirin, Ninguta, and Potune. This can only mean two things, either that the Chinese population in Shengking had so increased that more land was

needed to accommodate them, or that the Chinese communities originally in the three localities had themselves grown in complexity so as to justify and require a change in the mode of government better in accord with Chinese traditions.

The latter alternative is easily the more probable. In fact, as early as 1676, there were over a 1,000 families within the city of Kirin. From time to time since 1661 labor was needed for the construction of junks in the dockyards for which the city of Kirin was then famous, and the Chinese had always been responsive to the call. In 1682, for instance, a large number of settlers moved there, and a fleet of over 40 war junks was the result. In Ninguta, too, there was a large Chinese community, which first had quarters outside of the city walls, but later about 1675 moved into the city, as the latter was vacated by the Manchu Bannermen, who had to go south on an expedition against Wu San Kwei. A good description of some aspects of social life in these cities, characteristically Chinese, is to be found in at least two or three works, at least one of which was written by a scholar among the settlers.[8]

But more direct evidence as to the prevalence of smuggling in those days is not lacking. In 1746, for instance, the governor of Shengking, one by the name Ho Pei, was reprimanded for having allowed batches of smugglers, amounting to "tens of thousands" to pass through Shanhaikwan.

After 1776, when the prohibition against settlement in Kirin was first proclaimed, the Chinese settlers began to push forward in a north-eastern direction into what is now Changchun and Hsinming, instead of going east. This continued for many years. An official investigation in 1799 found in Changchun 3,330 Chinese families, cultivating an area of land amounting to 265,448 mu, or roughly 41,000 acres. A dozen years later, by 1812, the same community had gained 7,000 additional souls, and the total land area had become about 3,200 m^2. Now all this had absolutely no legal backing. Quite on the contrary. In making Changchun a new center of expansion, the settlers assuredly committed no offense against the letters of the edict of 1726, for Changchun was then hardly a part of Kirin. But as Changchun was located close to the northeastern extension of the Willow Fence, the settlers really stood in danger of defying the edict of 1750, which did not seem to have been superseded by later edicts. But anyway, the government was then busy with putting down the Peilien rebellion and was not in a position to reckon seriously with the settlers, it did nothing besides, on the one hand, making Changchun a part of Kirin so that the settlers already there might receive a watchful eye from responsible authorities and, on the other, issuing in 1799 a new edict reenforcing the terms of the edict of 1750, so that prospective settlers would be discouraged. That neither of these measures was of much consequence has already been made evident to us by the figures for 1812 above referred to.

Sometimes under extenuating circumstances, concessions were made by the government itself. In the summer of 1743, for instance, when the central part of Chihli (now Hopei), including the city of Tientsin, suffered from drought, the afflicted population was specially permitted to move into Manchuria. Again, in

[8] K.C. Fang: *Ninguta Chi Lieo*.

the next year, when Shantung and Honan became involved in famine, more people were allowed to go beyond the Great Wall unmolested by the guard on the borders. The same thing happened again in 1792, when another famine due to drought visited the region south of Peking (now Peiping).

The edict of 1776 making settling in Kirin unlawful and another in 1826 authorizing the establishment of karlens or reservations for settlers may also be regarded as a form of concession on the part of the Manchu Government. It had finally come to realize that complete exclusion of Chinese from Manchuria was out of the question, that the problem had already taken root, and that the only feasible measure was to localize it and prevent further ramifications.

But the greatest concession by the Government was yet to be made. During the first years of the reign of Tao-Kwang (1821–1850), the expeditions against the Mohammedans had so depleted the national treasury that new sources of revenue had to be sought or created. To the vast tract of virgin land in Manchuria, the attention of the Government was very naturally directed. "Up to the reign of Tao-Kwang," wrote Huc, "the regions watered by the Songari (Sungari or Sunghuakiang) were exclusively inhabited by Manchus: entrance into those vast districts was prohibited to the Chinese. . . . At the commencement of the present reign (Huc's travels took place in 1844–1846), these districts were put up for public sale, in order to supply the deficiency in the Imperial treasury. The Chinese rushed upon them like birds of prey, and a few years sufficed to remove everything that could in any way recall the memory of their ancient possessors. It would be vain for any one now (1844) to seek in Manchuria a single town, a single village, that is not composed entirely of Chinese." Huc's words have of course to be taken with a grain of salt. But the important changes brought about by the concession, once made, may easily be inferred.

The prohibitive laws to Chinese colonization were finally repealed in 1878, particularly those that dealt with the bringing along of families. But the disabilities, long fostered, of a prospective Chinese settler, were not wholly done away with until 1905–1907, when both Kirin and Heilungkiang became regular provinces.

13.4 A Period of Steady Growth 1858–1928

We have seen from the preceding sections that Chinese colonization in Manchuria was at first confined to what is now the province of Liaoning. When it expanded, the direction of least resistance was to the east, into what is now Kirin. But when the Manchu Government made repeated efforts to clear Kirin of all Chinese settlers after 1776, the movement began to be deflected northeastward, thus making Changchun a new centre of expansion. The movement in this direction was greatly facilitated by the public sale of land in the 1820s in the upper reaches of the Sungari. From thence, it may be reasonably assumed, the movement began to bifurcate and to spread far more freely than it had hitherto done. Eastward it entered Kirin, this time from the north-west, avoiding altogether the north-eastern extension of

the Willow Fence, the northern terminus of which occurred between Shulan and Yushu; and northward into Heilungkiang.

One Russian writes of this period: "In the 18th century, this process (of northward extension) was not very manifest, and its influence made itself felt only in the southern part of North Manchuria. In the 19th century it increased, especially in the period between 1820 and 1850, when the current had already reached Hulanchien, to the north of Harbin." Of the same period Huc wrote in his travels: "You may now traverse Manchuria to the river Amour without being at all aware that you are not travelling in a province of China. The local coloring has become totally effaced." These words were perhaps a bit premature. Huc himself had never been in Manchuria; and we must not lose sight of what Mr. Pelliot once said of Huc's writings: "On Chinese history in particular, no orientalist would ever dream of looking to the works of Huc for authoritative information."

But the Russian author's (probably I.A. Mihailoff's) statement, first quoted, cannot be far from the truth, for we definitely know that in 1860, Tebzina, Commander of troops in Heilungkiang, presented a report "requesting official sanction for the emigration (from the Manchu point of view) of Chinese to Hulan, for the purpose of providing funds for the upkeep of the troops, by means of levying taxes on ploughed lands." This move brings out clearly that by the year 1860, the necessity for regulating Chinese colonization, so as to avoid further conflicts arising from leasehold relations between Chinese leaseholders and Manchu landlords, had been generally recognized. The request was answered in the affirmative, and about four million acres were granted for settlement; the size of the grant being of course in a measure indicative of the aggregate size of the immigrating communities. It will be remembered in this connection that the conclusion of the Treaties of Peking and Aigun about this time helped materially in bringing the request and the grant to pass.

But colonization on large scales presupposes good transportation facilities. These were of course lacking in those early days. Population movements then in the relative absence of external hindrances were largely of a fortuitous character[1] and so necessarily slow. During the middle years of the reign of Kang Hsi (around 1683) navigation in the Liao Ho, the Sungari and many of their tributaries were greatly developed for the transportation of food into Kirin and Heilungkiang. For transport in the Sungari alone, there were 40 junks each holding over 800 bushels. But these facilities seemed to have influenced Chinese colonization only very directly and incidentally, as they were instituted entirely for the benefit of the Manchus who had not yet known agriculture. So seemed the first mail and military road built between Aigun, Mergan, Tsitsihar, Potune, and other cities in Kirin and Shenking finally to connect with roads of China proper. But the opening up of Yingkow or Newchwang as a treaty port in 1858 marked a turning point in the history of Chinese colonization. In earlier days, the sea route across the Gulf of Pechili proved sufficiently perilous for most settlers as not to have been much used. It was partly the precariousness of transporting food across the sea for the support of garrison forces that had led the first Ming emperor to institute colonization in 1380.

After Yingkow had been opened for trade, steamboats plying between Tientsin, cities on the north of Shantung promontory, and those of the Liaotung Peninsula, began to be common. That both trade and steam navigation must have proved a

strong incentive to as well as a better means for more active migration to the North is evidenced in the marked increase of Chinese population in Manchuria around and after the year 1870. Not only were the surrounding regions of Mukden and Kirin becoming much more densely peopled, but also areas north of the Yalu, around Hailung farther to the north, and in the vicinity of Harbin still farther to the north, were invaded by large numbers of colonists. It was further evidenced by the creation about the same time of three more prefectures: the prefecture of Changtu for Shengking, and those of Kirin and Changchun for Kirin. Twenty-one additional hsiens were also created, eight for eastern Shengking to the north of the Yalu, and thirteen in Kirin, eight of which are watered by the upper reaches of the Sungari. But on the whole, it seems that the process of extending civil rule to these districts had been slow and inefficient; for as late as 1875, places such as Tatungkou, West of Antung, were infested by bandits.[9] The opening up of Heilungkiang was by the nature of the case slower. But before the expiration of the nineteenth century, Chinese settlers were to be found way up to the north and northeast; the only regions left untrodden were those close to the banks of the Ussuri and the Amur, and west of the Hingan Mountains, known as Hulunbeier, or Barga.

The opening up of North Manchuria has really a slightly different story to tell—a story which should have been earlier noted. Following the example set by the Russians, who had begun to build fortified posts north of the Amur, the Manchu Government proceeded to found cities south of it. Aigun was the first to be built (1684), which was followed by Mergan or Nunchiang (1686), Tsitsihar (1691), Hulanchien (1734 or even earlier), and Hailar. The city of Potune, already referred to in a preceding section, was built as early as 1692, almost a generation before it was caused to be included for a time in the province of Shengking. Potune, it may be further noted, later became the center for the development of colonization in Mongolian territories to the west, part of these now being included as a northern extension of Liaoning Province since the Republic.

It will be difficult now to ascertain how much Chinese settlers as such contributed to the formation of these early cities, with the exception of Potune. In all probability, they did not contribute much. In those years, the only Chinese who were permitted to tread upon North Manchuria were members of the garrison forces or other soldiers commissioned on special occasions for the maintenance of peace and order in frontier districts, and also a small number of political and criminal convicts. It was some of their numbers who finally settled down, formed first rural communities.

These latter later became consolidated and began to take on urban aspects. This is probably the way the cities came into being. Such cities were not built, they grew; what was actually built and whose erection could be dated was the mud or wooden walls. We may agree with one of the authors of *North Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern Railway*, when he says: “There are reasons to assume that it is just this military element who became the first Chinese (non-Bannermen) farmers in the province of Heilungkiang.”

[9] Petition to the government by Chung Shih. *Ching Shih Wen Shu Pien*.

Shortly after the expiration of the nineteenth century, however, another new factor, a new transportation facility, had appeared to help swell the ranks of Chinese colonists in North Manchuria. We refer of course to the Chinese Eastern Railway built 1898–1903. After 1858, when Yingkow was opened for trade, and especially after 1878, when all laws designed to disable Chinese colonization were repealed, the influx of Chinese settlers of course has experienced no interruption. But it has awaited the railway or railways to bring it to its present magnitude. The Russo-Japanese War unwittingly also helped to scatter the colonists more widely and further to the North.

That the stream of Chinese colonists into Manchuria has tremendously widened itself since the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway may be gathered from the following lines of facts.

In the first place, before the Manchus abdicated, they found it necessary to extend the area of arable land in Heilungkiang farther to the northeast of Hulan. An additional grant of over 4,000 sq. miles, including what is now the combined area of Wangkueihsien, Tungpeihsien, and Hailunhsien.

In the second place, as the settlers have grown in number and cultivated land in area, agricultural produce must have grown in quantity. And this has actually been the case as is obvious from the following table[10] which, however, owing to many extraneous reasons, does not give as regular a showing as it should:

Shipments by C. E. R. of grain in thousands of tons			
	Local	Export	Total
1903	106	6	112
1904	35	15	50
1905	35	12	47
1906	50	20	70
1907	67	122	189
1908	81	192	273
1909	66	342	408
1910	97	432	529
1911	92	643	735
1912	98	482	580
1913	92	478	570
1914	84	439	523
1915	133	711	844
1916	170	529	699
1917	156	846	1,002
1918	182	563	745
1919	131	524	655
1920	144	831	975
1921	116	1,215	1,331
1922	240	1,281	1,521
1923	240	1,502	1,742

[10] *North Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern Railway*. 1924 edition. P. 8.

The third line of evidence may be sought in the rapid rate of population increase—a rate which mere natural increase cannot account for. The present population of Manchuria has been variously stated between 27,713,000 (The Research Office of the South Manchuria Railway, December, 1927), 25,264,000 (Mr. H. P. Howard's weighted compilation from all sources, 1928), and 24,530,000 (Liaoning Provincial Government, July, 1928). When it is recalled that in the census of 1910, the total figure for the Three Eastern Provinces was 14,917,000, the rapidity of the increase is evident. Population in Manchuria has almost doubled in 20 years, whereas for China as a whole, the number of years required for doubling, according to the latest estimate, would be 60 to 70.

When only Kirin and Heilungkiang are considered, the rate of increase will appear still more impressive. The Economic Bureau of the Chinese Eastern Railway estimated in 1924 the total population for both provinces to be 11,900,000, being bigger by 1,300,000 than that estimated by the Liaoning Provincial Government in 1928. Comparing 11,900,000 with the corrected estimate of 2,000,000 for the nineties of the last century, we see that the increase during the past 30 years has been about six times. "If we remember," says a Russian writer, "that during the last 25 years the population of Russian Far East (where Russian immigration has not been important) has grown approximately two and a half times, then the rapid growth of Manchuria's colonization will become apparent."

It will be noted that a part of the population that contribute to the impressiveness of the rate of increase are not permanent settlers. They are seasonal laborers and do not possess land themselves. They come largely from Shantung in the early spring and return in the fall when harvest is over.

In the last few years, we no longer need to rely much upon inferences and estimates. We are now in a position to know fairly accurately the number of new settlers or laborers coming in every year. The following figures were collected by Mr. Shinosaki, of the Oriental Development Company, for the years 1923–1928:

	Migrants entering Manchuria	Migrants remaining in Manchuria	Percentage remaining against those entering
1923	390,000	105,000	27
1924	430,000	196,000	45
1925	490,000	275,000	59
1926	590,000	293,000	49
1927	1,065,000	748,000	70
1928	938,000	544,000	58
Total	3,903,000	2,161,000	54

From the above table, two things are at once evident. The first is that the numbers who are knocking at the door, be they seasonal laborers or bona fide settlers, have greatly increased during recent years, especially since 1927. The sudden rise was already observable in the fall of 1926, when "contrary to the tendency during the same season of any previous year, many 100,000 of Chinese immigrants arrived and continued to enter in increasing numbers throughout 1927." The second is that not

only increasingly more have been coming in, but also increasingly more have stayed as permanent settlers, again especially since 1927. The following figures for those who landed in Dairen, where the records are believed to be better kept, bring out the comparison still more clearly:

	Migrants landing	Migrants leaving	Percentage leaving	Percentage remaining
1922	170,000	103,551	61	39
1923	172,014	122,474	71	29
1924	167,206	113,248	68	32
1925	197,392	97,130	49	51
1926	267,062	129,642	49	51
1927	599,452	141,859	24	76

A more detailed set of figures of Chinese migrants entering Manchuria at Dairen, Yingkow, Antung, or Shanhaikwan between 1922 and 1927 is appended at the end of the paper.[11]

It has also been observed that before 1926, not many women and children disembarked at the different ports, but they increased quite considerably after that date. The following figures point to the correctness of the observation:

Women and children landing at Dairen						
From	Tsingtao	Chefoo	Lungkow	Tientsin	Other Cities	Total
1925	6,651	2,448	1,775	2,377	2,023	15,474
1926	18,742	4,141	2,069	4,654	855	30,461
						45,935
Women and children leaving at Dairen						
For	Tsingtao	Chefoo	Lungkow	Tientsin	Other Cities	Total
1925	2,903	1,017	785	334	865	6,002
1926	2,966	1,631	1,003	815	496	7,011
						13,013

Summarizing these figures and reducing them to percentages, we get:

	Returning	Remaining
1925	39 %	61 %
1926	23 %	77 %

As to the causal factors of Chinese colonization, the processes the colonists have to go through before they arrive at their future homes, and the life they lead after having settled, we shall desist from discussing in any detail. All these aspects of Chinese colonization are undoubtedly of much sociological interest and have been

[11] Editor's note: appendix not found.

fairly fully treated by Mr. Walter Young in his "The Chinese Labor Migration to Manchuria". But for our present purpose, it suffices to know that Chinese colonization is becoming increasingly a fait accompli.

13.5 Japanese and Korean Immigration into Manchuria

The immigration of Koreans into Manchuria had had a fairly long history. As Korea had never been quite independent of China until 1894, it is reasonable to assume that a certain amount of exchange of population must have taken place at all times, although exact information is scarce. But when the Manchus began their conquest, as many as over 40 families asked for enrollment in the Banner troops and some of them subsequently achieved more or less distinction. These families presumably became a permanent part of Manchurian population. During the Mongol dynasty, it was said, the Mongol officials were in the habit of employing Korean servants. The ability to do so was a measure of prestige. Such servants were of course brought over through Manchuria. Now, how much the pride and pomp of Tartar officials had indirectly and unwittingly contributed to the make-up of Manchurian population in those early days is open to grave doubt.

During the 1860s, when the forests in the Hwun Ho Valley to the east of Mukden began to be opened up, a considerable number of Koreans migrated across the Yalu to supply the needed labor. Since that date, the influx of Koreans seems to have been quite constant, though necessarily slow. The investigation conducted in 1881 by the authorities of Kirin found that regions North of the Tumen, parts of what is now Holunghsien and Yenchihsien, were almost entirely peopled by Koreans, and that the land under plough amounted to about 10,000 acres, and that the Koreans at home across the river had for many years depended upon the agricultural produce of their more adventurous countrymen. The authorities recommended naturalization in their report to the Government. The growth of Koreans north of the Tumen, it will be noted, later gave rise to the well-known boundary dispute between China and Japan, when Korea had become a Japanese dependency.

The present Korean population in Manchuria, according to statistics collected by Mr. Shinosaki of the Oriental Development Company in 1928 is distributed as follows:

Liaoning	135,245
Kirin	437,591
Heilungkiang	7,449
Total	580,285

This is perhaps an underestimate. Another Japanese source gives for 1927, a year earlier, the gross total of 678,000; and the estimate of the Research Office of the South Manchuria Railway in 1928 is still higher: 760,000. In May 4th, 1929, issue of the

Manchuria Daily News (in Chinese), a Korean educator gave the result of his own investigation—an estimate of between 800,000 and 900,000: of these about half live in "Chientao," a name which the Japanese have given to the region to the immediate north of the Tumen, where in fact there are now more Koreans than Chinese; and the other half scatter about in the valleys of the Yalu, and more recently, the Liao Ho; the latest tendency has been for the immigrants to move farther north, into Heilungkiang, where resistance is least. The Koreans in Manchuria are now cultivating a land amounting to about 150,000 acres, mostly rice fields.

The immigration of Japanese into Manchuria is of far more recent date. It did not begin until after the Russo-Japanese War, when the Kwantung Leased Territory was transferred to Japan. But it seems that Japanese immigrants as such have been slow in taking advantage of the leased territory: and up to the present year according to the estimate made by Shinosaki in May, the total figure for Japanese in the country is barely 200,000. They are distributed as follows:

Kuantung Leased Territory	102,000
Cities along the S.M.R. Railways	91,000
Other parts of Manchuria	5,000
Total	198,000

The S.M.R. *Report on Progress in Manchuria* gives the higher estimate of 240,000 for 1928.

It will be seen that not much of a success has attended Japanese immigration. Not only is the total number quite small, as compared with the Koreans or the Chinese, but also of this number by far the greatest majority are engaged in as officials in the leased territory, or in business, or in activities connected with the South Manchuria Railway and its affiliated or related enterprises. Only 404 individuals actually occupy themselves in agricultural pursuits, and of this small number, be it further noted, only 97 are true farmers, the rest being engaged simultaneously in non-agricultural pursuits.[12]

One author wrote about Japanese immigration in Manchuria to the following effect: Shortly after the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese Government had the project of sending 200,000 emigrants into Manchuria each year for 10 years. But as the matter now stands, what was contemplated for a single year has not been quite accomplished in quarter of a century; now in order to make the project appear in a different light, the matter of immigration is entrusted to the Oriental Development Company.[13]

Now, it is not our present purpose to learn how Japanese immigration is carried out or what are the motivating forces at the back of it. All we need to know is that it so far has not met with much success, and many intelligent Japanese leaders admit this.

[12] *Manchuria and Mongolia Year Book* (in Japanese), 1929.

[13] *China Weekly Review*, Vol. 48, No. 7.

13.6 Manchuria and China's Population Problem (The Quantitative Aspect)

China proper is generally believed to have too many people. A great many social problems are traceable to overcrowding. China's total population has been variously estimated in recent years from 300,000,000 to 800,000,000, depending upon the ability for empathy in the estimator. More refined methods in the last 2 or 3 years have fixed the total to be somewhere between 470,000,000 and 490,000,000, including Manchuria and their outlying regions, or between 440,000,000 and 460,000,000, when these regions are not included. But whichever total is taken, it is all the same that for many years past in China, the population has been pressing hard upon the means of subsistence.

But when we refer to overpopulation in China, we usually fix our thought upon the 18 provinces, which constituted the old China proper. The outlying regions are as yet only sparsely populated.

Many measures have been suggested for relieving China's population pressure. The control of famine, greater industrialization, birth limitation, and colonization of the outlying regions are four of the measures that have received most adherents. To say that all these measures are of great value and all are more or less practicable sounds platitudinous. But it will be seen that colonization is by far the most feasible measure for the present.

China has recently won the enviable title of the Land of Famine. Famines must of course be controlled, as far as it is within human scientific ability to do so, and certainly a great deal of effort for study and investigation must yet be enlisted. But many writers on Chinese famines often seem to have forgotten that famines, at least chronic ones, belong in part to the category of natural disasters. The increasing desiccation of North and Northwest China, which are primarily responsible for the alternate droughts and floods, and secondarily for the famines, are certainly beyond control.

Industrialization is being resorted to. But it is at best a slow process, especially in a country where some of the chief requisite minerals are deficient or wanting. Besides, industrialization is no unmixed blessing; by a too rapid displacement of craftsmen, it is already creating the problem of unemployment. A recent book by Mr. Stuart Chase shows that in its advanced stages, industrialization can no longer be much relied upon, as the new types of machinery are becoming increasingly automatic and tend strongly to reduce the number of workers tending them.

Birth control is now spreading in China. China extended her welcome to Mrs. Sanger as early as 1921. But for this relief measure to be effective, it will take generations.

Professor O.E. Baker of America has advised better land utilization through using power-driven machinery. As a relief measure, it is more feasible than industrialization, particularly in China, and its benefits will be more lasting. While efforts should be made to realize Prof. Baker's proposal, we must not be led to think that success will be with us in one or two decades.

It leaves colonization to enlist our immediate attention. It will be easily apparent that not all outlying regions of China are fit for this purpose, and that certainly none of these regions is better suited to large-scale colonization than Manchuria. Past experience alone is sufficient to show that this is the case.

We do not need to dwell upon the fact that Manchuria is fairly rich. It is certainly richer than China proper. It has earned the name, "The Granary of the World". When the reputed "Land of Famine" is pitted against the "Granary of the World", it seems only logical that some adjustment between the two should be made.

Manchuria has a total land area of 383,000 m^2, and a population of 27,513,000. The density is therefore about 72. The 18 provinces has a total area of 1,533,000 m^2, when this is shared by a population of 440,000,000, each square mile is on the average accommodating about 290 persons. So the density here is fully four times that of Manchuria.

The same comparison holds good for cultivated land per capita in the two regions. According to the estimate made by Professor Baker, China proper and Manchuria have together a total cultivated land area of 180,000,000 acres. Of this total area, Manchuria shares about one-sixth, or 30,000,000 acres, and China proper five-sixths, or 150,000,000 acres. When those are divided by the respective populations of the two regions, we arrive at 1.12 acres per capita for Manchuria, and 0.32 per capita for China proper. The ratio is again about 4:1. Professor Baker's per capita values for the two regions are respectively 0.98 and 0.365, which would mean that in the amount of cultivated land the average Manchurian Chinese is almost three times better off.

About 25 % of the land area in Manchuria is arable, whereas the land already under cultivation is only not quite 12.5 % of the total land area. This means that another 30,000,000 acres is still virgin and awaits development. It means further, that, provided there will be no serious disturbance in the standards of living in the near future, Manchuria is in a position to support an additional population as big as the one it is supporting now.

If we assume that population in China proper is increasing at the rate of 10 (1,000), the total annual increase will be about four millions. Certainly, Manchuria will find no difficulty in drawing off and absorbing a part of this increase annually for, say, about a dozen years. Manchuria of course stands in no obligation to absorb the whole of the annual increase inside the Great Wall; in the first place, it will have to leave room for its own annual increase; and in the second, China proper itself will endeavor to solve a part of the problem in other ways, such as hunting up more arable land, within its own confines, which, according to Professor Baker's estimate, is quite extensive.

One who knows the limited value of emigration as a measure of relieving overcrowding can have no extravagant hopes about colonization in Manchuria. But one easily realizes that, under the present circumstances, a moderate amount of colonization, scientifically and systematically carried out, will give the more congested provinces at least a respite for a good inhalation; and a good inhalation goes a long way in reestablishing the working order of any organic system.

It needs scarcely be said that the adjustment between the Land of Famine and the Granary of the World may assume a different form. It has so assumed in the past ever since the beginning of the colonization movement. We refer here of course to the shipment of food from Manchuria to China proper, particularly when the latter is having its lean years.

13.7 Manchuria and China's Population Problem (The Qualitative Aspect)

We have seen in the preceding sections what Manchuria has meant, and may yet mean, to China's population problem in its quantitative aspect. Indeed, it is to this aspect of the population problem that much effort in the past has been directed. We will now confine our discussion more to the qualitative aspect of the problem and has so far been little surveyed.

Migration, or colonization, especially that of the impulsive or the spontaneous variety,[1] such as we find in the present case, has also great selective value. In other words, it has also biological and qualitative bearings upon the population from which the migratory movements proceed. The progress and prosperity of the early New England States, the American Pacific coast of today, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand owes much to such selective influences. Chinese migration into Manchuria is no exception. In the early days of the movement, when the Ming emperor Hung Wu issued the order to the head of a family for contributing its share, it was, we have reason to assume, the more enterprising of the brothers that answered the call. On the whole, the Chinese, after long centuries of settled life, seem to possess little of what the West would call *wanderlust*, which disposes one to exploration and to extensive travels. But whatever is left of this venturesome spirit among the Chinese, it cannot fail to be selected on such occasions.

The famines in recent years in Shantung and Hopei exercise about the same sort of influences that the Emperor Hung Wu unknowingly exercised centuries ago. They force the more active, the less inert, to migrate. Many of these people have to be forced to go, it is true; but there are others, many times the number that prefer starvation to migration. The writer begs permission here to quote rather extensively from Professor Huntington's book, *The Character of Races*.

> In Mukden there is more activity and life than in any other Chinese city that I have visited. Activity and progressiveness are said to be still more evident in Harbin, and most of all in the far north, where the town of Aigun on the Amur River, opposite Blagoveshchensk, is reported to be inhabited by Chinese who seem quite unlike their countrymen in their modern spirit of progress and in their bustling activity. It is sometimes affirmed that this is because the Chinese have become Russianized by contact with the relatively large Russian population. In a certain way this is true. But why has not contact with the British at Hong Kong done still more to give a British quality to the Chinese there? Nothing of the kind has happened, although Hong Kong had a considerable British population for a

generation or two before the Russians had much contact with the Chinese in Manchuria. The answer seems to be a recent and drastic selection in Manchuria, and only a mild selection in Hong Kong.

Manchuria is inhabited almost entirely by Chinese who have recently come from the conservative provinces of Shantung and Chihli. In general the merchant classes and city people are from Chihli, and the farmers from Shantung. Here is what happens. Owing to the constant economic pressure, people from those two provinces migrate more or less at all times, but especially when there are famines. They go to Manchuria not only because that province is near and is under Chinese rule, but because until the nineteenth century it was only sparsely populated. The regular proceeding is for the Chinese men to go first without their families. A man newly come from Chihli works for a while for some one in Manchuria. Then if he is successful he starts a little business for himself. Once in 3 years, as a rule, he goes back home, usually staying 5 or 6 months. From time to time he brings with him other men from his village. For a while they live together as a single big family. But at last the merchant who succeeds, decides to have his family with him rather than several 100 miles away. He can afford to set up a house, and he does so. Because he is competent and successful—because he is the best man out of 20, or 50, or a 100—his family comes to Manchuria and his children become permanent parts of the population. Of course he still calls Chihli his home, but the Englishman who settles in Australia calls England home. In due time the merchant's sons grow up. The more adventurous among them go farther north, just as their father did before them. When they succeed they likewise bring their families to the north, and still another stage in the selection of competent types is accomplished.

The same thing happens among the Shantung farmers. Each year toward the end of winter they come by the hundred thousand to Manchuria, some by rail, but many tramping hundreds of miles on foot. Spreading out into the country they are ready to work for the farmers as soon as spring breaks. In the autumn they go back to their families, only to swarm north once more at the end of the winter. But some are not content to be merely hired laborers. The more ambitious and energetic get hold of small pieces of ground. At first they cultivate these and at the same time work for others. But in a year or two they get enough land to support a family. Then a shack is built. Next year at the time of the northward migration there is a wheelbarrow on the road. On it sits the grandmother surrounded by a promiscuous heap of bedding, boxes, bags of rice, cooking-pots, and all the simple paraphernalia of a Chinese household. The proud owner of the Manchurian shack sways between the shafts of the wheelbarrow, his oldest son bends low in front, tugging at a rope over his shoulder to help his father with the heavy barrow. The wife walks behind bearing on her shoulder a bamboo pole with a basket on each end and a baby in each basket. And with her trudge one or two other children. Thus they toil along the snowy path to their new home, unconscious that they have been selected by their innate ability to people a new land. If the father is competent and ambitious his work soon makes his land increase in value. Then he sells out, moves north once more, this time in a cart drawn perhaps by two horses and a mule. Once more he succeeds, and then sometimes moves on a third time. Thus northern Manchuria is being peopled by the most competent of the inhabitants of Chihli and Shantung.

Professor Huntington's statement may easily be verified by anyone who has gone through the cities of Mukden, Harbin, Aigun, and their surrounding countries.

Then we have corroborative testimony of Dr. Chang Po-ling, the President of Nankai University, in a speech before the International House, New York, March 15th, 1929. About one-tenth of the enrollment in Nankai is supplied by Manchuria; and these students from Manchuria, says Dr. Chang, are "always

physically stronger and stouter than the others, and noticeably more energetic and active than students from interior."[14]

A measure of selective influence is even seen in the matter of sending political and criminal convicts into exile. This has been true of many countries which have their beginnings in colonization. So it seems in Manchuria. The Manchu conquest of China would not have come to pass, had it not been for the handful of exceptionally gifted leaders supplied by the Hanchuings or Chinese Bannermen. Now, many Bannermen were descendents of political convicts sent into exile by the Mings. The family of Fan (范), which rendered so much assistance to Nuerhachu (努尔哈赤) and his successors, for instance, were descended from a man by the name of Fan Yo (范岳), who was a native of Kiangsi and was sent into exile during the reign of Hung Wu for some political offense. But four generations later, one of his descendents became a Minister of War in the Peking court. Fan Wen Cheng (范文程), who was really the brain of Nuerhachu and his immediate successor, was the great grandson of this war minister. This is one of many families of the kind that the writer had looked into with some detail. Those who know the early history of the Australian Commonwealth and of New Zealand, or even America, for that matter, will agree with the writer that instances of this nature are not very exceptional.

Thus, it is seen that Manchuria has been serving China not only as a granary but also as a nursery, as it were, for the able and gifted, who otherwise would have been stunted and have irrevocably lost, to the impoverishment of the racial qualities of the Chinese people.

13.8 Concluding Remarks

It is time to end this protracted discussion. We have seen that Chinese colonization in Manchuria has been a long historical process, the beginning of which antedated even Columbus for more than a century; and that what we see in recent years is only a natural approach to the climax of the process. We have seen further that colonization has meant greatly to China and the Chinese people, economically as well as biologically, and may mean more in the future.

But we have seen at the same time that owing to geographical propinquity and historical relations, upwards of a million Korean and Japanese immigrants are now within the borders. What is their status, and how will their relations with the native Chinese be governed? Will China persist in her laissez faire policy and suffer increasingly large numbers of foreign nationals to come in, or will the inflow be somehow regulated after a fashion suggested by the experiences of many Western countries? These are the questions that must be settled. To settle them adequately will need to enlist the best effort of not only China, but Japan, and other countries as well.

[14] *China Weekly Review*, Vol. 48, No. 9.

Further Reading

Chu, C. (1928). History and present status of Manchurian colonization. *The Eastern Miscellany, 25*(12), 9–22 (in Chinese).
Hsi-nung. Recent trend emigration into Manchuria as shown by figures. *Kung Shang Semi-Monthly, 1*(1) (in Chinese).
Hsu, S. H. (1926). *China and her political entity*. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch.
Huntington, E. (1924). *The character of races*. New York: C. Scribner's Sons.
Lai, Y. *The question of the Chinese eastern railway* (in Chinese).
The South Manchuria Railway, *Report on progress in Manchuria 1907–1928*.
Young, W. Chinese labor migration to Manchuria. *Chinese Economic Journal, 1*(7).

Chapter 14
The Third Session of the Institute of Pacific Relations

The third biennial session of the Institute of Pacific Relations was held in Kyoto, Japan, from October 28 to November 9, 1929. The first two sessions took place in Honolulu in 1925 and 1927.

The following states or countries sent delegations to the Conference: Australia, the British Empire, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the USA. The Australian delegation of 11 was led by F. W. Eggleston, formerly Attorney General and Minister of Railways of the State of Victoria, and also by A.H. Chartoris, Professor of International Law at the University of Sydney. Of the other Australian delegates, Miss Persia Campbell must be specially noted for her work on Chinese labor emigration into countries within the British Empire. The British group proper was made up of 15 members, headed by Viscount Hailsham, Lord Chancellor in the late Conservative Government. Of this group, 6 are well-known professors or men of scholarly distinction, particularly A.J. Toynbee, the great authority on international history, and Lionel Curtis, Honorary Secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Other members of great interest may be mentioned: Dr. S.K. Datta of India; M.J. MacDonald, Labour M.P. and son of the present Labour Prime Minister, and Edith Lyttleton, delegate to the League of Nations Assembly for number of years.

Canada was represented by 29 members, headed by Newton W. Rowell, formerly the president of the Canadian Privy Council. Of this number almost a half were leaders of big commercial or industrial enterprises, including the chairman of the group. New Zealand had a delegation of 7, and W.B. Matheson, an agricultural economist and Government representative at the International Agricultural Conference

---

In preparing this chapter, the writer has made free and extensive use of Dr. Chester Rowell's *Summary of the Third Session of the Institute of Pacific Relations*.

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. II, No. 48, November 28, 1929, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_14

at Rome in 1927, was the leader. The American delegation had a membership of 45 and was led by Jerome D. Greene. The following members of the American group will be of particular interest. Of the group of professors we find Wm. H. Kilpatrick and James T. Shotwell of Columbia University; Robert F. Park and Quiney Wright of Chicago, the latter for the present academic year teaching in Tsing Hua; G.H. Blakeslee of Clark; C. Walter Young of George Washington, the well-known American student on Manchuria. Then we have Carl L. Alsberg, Director of the Food Research Institute at Stanford University, President Leighton Stuart of Yenching, R.S. Greene of the Rockfeller Foundation and S. Fessenden of the Shanghai Municipal Council. There were 8 additional delegates from the Philippines.

Japan, being the host nation, had of course the largest number of participants, 47, not including the invited delegation of 7 from Korea. The chairman of the group was Inazo Nitobe, well known as a forceful exponent of Japanese culture to the West. Among the more important members, we may mention Masanao Hanihara, formerly Ambassador to the USA; Shunzaburo Komura, formerly a diplomat in China and also a sinologue; Professors Jotaro Kawakami, Yusuke Tsurumi, well known as lecturers and writers particularly in America; Professors Shiroshi Nasu, expert on population and land utilization, and Masamichi Royama, the Japanese student on Manchuria and Manchurian problems; Yoshiro Sakatani, Member House of Peers and formerly Minister of Finance; and Yosuke Matsuoka, until recently Vice President of the South Manchuria Railway Company.

China sent out a delegation of 31, of which David Z.T. Yui, L.T. Chen, C.L. Hsia, D.K. Lieu, T.K. Tseng, S.T. Wen, A.L. Tai, Quentin Pan, and Miss Y.F. Wu were from Nanking and Shanghai; Po-ling Chang, M. Joshua Bau, Franklin L. Ho, Shuhsi Hsu, P.C. Hsu, D.C. Wu, L.K. Tao and Mrs. Sophia C. Zen were from Tientsin and Peiping; S.Y. Jowe, P.F. Nan, E.C. Ning, Sherman Soo, C.C. Tung, T.Y. Wang, Paul Yen, C.F. Wang, and Mrs. C.F. Wang were from Mukden and Kirin; Misses T.S. Tseng and Chi-liang Kwei from Changsha and Wuchang; Y.L. Lee, Y.H. Tsao, and Miss Lucy Wang were from Canton and Foochow.

Thus for the first time the whole of the Pacific area was presented, including all the peoples in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean and all the countries exercising sovereignty therein. The important exception was of course the Pacific countries of Latin America, although we may regard the observer from Mexico, Manuel Gamio, as a strong indication of the willingness of these countries to participate in this new cooperative enterprise in international relationship. Other countries and organizations sending out observers were Russia (2), France (1), the Netherlands (1), the League of Nations (2), and the International Labour Office (3). The whole membership of the session, including the observers and the members of the Central Secretarial of the Institute, ran up to 218.

It will be interesting to note the occupational distribution of the membership. Of the full delegates, 33 were women. The largest single group was 72 “professors,” of whom 12 have been or are college presidents. The technical experts of the Conference were secured largely from this group. Next came the business group, which had 44, including about a dozen bankers. Twenty-five may be most comprehensively described as publicists, including ex-ambassadors, social workers,

and many other nonoccupational activities. There were 18 journalists, including representatives of all the important press associations in the world and the editors or publishers of many of the newspapers in Japan. Religious workers numbered 17, lawyers 6, labor leaders 4, and physicians 2. Five of the delegates have titles of nobility and two titles of knighthood, and seven were members of parliament of their respective countries. Several others had been members of the cabinets or governments of their countries.

The Conference opened on October 28, with a public session in Hinode Auditorium. Inazo Nitobe, Chairman of the Conference, delivered a distinguished opening address, the principle response to which was made by Lord Hailsham. Messages of greeting were then read from the Prime Minister or Chief of State of each of the member countries. China's message was from Dr. C.T. Wang, and was read by Dr. David Yui. The concluding remarks of Dr. Nitobes opening address may be quoted to show the spirit in which the whole Conference was held:

> We meet here under circumstances which I hope will not strain our patriotism or overtax our piety. Not for indictment of others, not for propaganda of our own faith, not for a passionate appeal for a national cause, not to settle a controversy, but the deliberate orientation of problems that may cast a shadow over the Pacific—have we come together. I am aware that there are grave questions still awaiting solution between several countries represented here. But this is no place to force settlement. Indeed it is exactly to avoid a forced solution of any political or economic issues that we are now meeting. Harangues, propaganda, boycott, are not the method of the Institute . . . We have to adopt a more efficacious method of procedure. It was Confucius himself who taught men to fight like gentlemen if they must fight at all. We shall exercise the international mind and take up the programs of the Conference fairly and objectively, with malice toward none, with charity for all.

At the evening session of the same day, brief abstracts of the "opening statements" were given by the leaders of the different delegations, and the full printed statements were also distributed:

Eggleston:	Opening Address of the Australian Delegation.
Borden (read by Rowell):	Memorandum Respecting Canada's International Relations and Their Development since the Last Biennial Conference.
Yui:	China and Pacific Relations during 1927–1929.
Nitobe:	Japan's Preparedness for International Co-operation.
Matheson:	Opening Address of the New Zealand Delegation.
Benitez:	The Philippine Situation.
Greene:	Opening Statement of the United States Delegation.

In addition to these, a printed message from Shibusawa entitled "Peace on the Pacific: Japan and the United States" was read at the session. The Mexican observer later distributed to the Conference a paper with the title "Commentaries on the Indo-Iberic Countries of the Pacific," which may be taken as a statement from the Pacific nations of Latin America.

The main body of the work of the Conference began on the 29th, in the Miyako Hotel, where the Conference had its headquarters and half of the members sojourned, the other half staying in Kyoto Hotel. The members were divided from day to day

into 3–6 "round tables" for the discussion of questions in the agenda. These were held each morning during the Conference, for 2 weeks. As a guide to discussion, syllabi and reading lists were prepared by special committees and distributed to the members usually a day ahead or earlier. To these round tables only members and observers were admitted, in order to insure the freedom and frankness of discussion. Evening meetings of the entire Conference, including families of members, friends, and newspapermen, were also held. They were given over to lectures followed or not followed by general discussion. The afternoons were assigned to committee meetings, national group gatherings, to sight-seeing, and to a remarkable series of entertainments prepared or arranged for by the Japanese Council of the Institute. The Chinese members, however, had comparatively much less time for recreative activities, as they had more and longer group meetings to attend, both in the afternoons and in the mornings shortly before the round tables.

The round tables of the first 3 days, October 29–31, were devoted to the subject "The Machine Age and Traditional Culture." The effect of the machine age on the decay of traditional cultures, particularly as to such aspects as architecture, manners, and art, were discussed with consideration of the ideals to be aimed at. The effect in the social field, upon marriage, the family, and religion, was considered on the second day. During the discussion of this interesting but comparatively non-controversial subject, the members also became conversant with technique of the Conference and established a basis of personal acquaintance for the more difficult questions to follow.

On the third day, the topic of Food and Population was also introduced for discussion. Two special round tables were allotted to it, one led by Dr. J.B. Condliffe and the other by Professor Quincy Wright. The discussion was thrown open after members from different countries had each made a statement regarding the population policies of their respective homelands. Much attention was paid to the question of emigration as a measure of relieving population pressure in some of the countries. A third round table was assigned to the same topic on November 6, in which the consensus of opinion seemed to be in favor of the idea of the desirability of more equitable population distribution irrespective of national boundaries, provided of course that the distributive process must be properly regulated by the countries concerned as to quantity, to the necessity of naturalization and of cultural and economic adaptation.

The round tables of the rest of the first week were devoted to China's foreign relations with particular reference to the twin problems of Extraterritoriality and Concessions and Settlements. The discussion was marked by the presentation of a definite plan for the relinquishment of extraterritoriality by Professor James T. Shotwell, together with suggestions by Professor Kenzo Takayanagi and Dr. M. Joshua Bau, and others. The opinion favoring the abolition of this anachronistic system seemed to be very widespread, even in the absence of Professor Shotwell's plan. The main obstacle to abolition, as aptly pointed out by Professor Shuhsi Hsu, seemed to be the psychology of fear on the part of foreign residents—a psychology which had little justification even in earlier days.

Somewhat similar remarks may be made with regard to the question of concessions and settlements. The discussion on this topic was much facilitated by the presence and active participation, on the one hand, of Dr. C.L. Hsia, whose studies of the question had been recently summarized for the use of the Conference in his "The Status of Shanghai," and on the other, of Mr. S. Fessenden who has had much experience in connection with the Shanghai Municipal Council. In accordance with the policy of the Conference, no decision was reached and no recommendations were made with respect to all these questions.

The first three mornings of the second week, November 4–6, were devoted to round tables on Manchuria. At a public evening meeting, the subject was discussed by Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, formerly Vice President of the South Manchuria Company, and Professor Shuhsi Shu of Yenching University. The discussion raised a number of controversial points; so in the following morning, Mr. Matsuoka was given a chance to reply to Professor Hsu at a meeting of all members before they dispersed for the different round tables. One session of one round table was devoted to North Manchuria and the present issues between China and Russia over the Chinese Eastern Railway. But as the Russian observer was quite reticent over the question, the discussion did not seem to have gone very far. The other sessions centered their attention upon South Manchuria and the problems presented by the economic interests of Japan and the increasing magnitude assumed by Chinese colonization movements from Shantung and Chihli, particularly in recent years. The discussion was perhaps the most lively in these round tables. Although no decision and recommendations were made, the free and frank exchange of ideas certainly brought about a better acquaintance with the facts of the problems, which is, or should be, the first step toward the settlement of any question.

On November 6, additional sessions were also held for the questions of extraterritoriality and concessions and settlements. A new round table was created on the same day for the discussion of the financial element in China's foreign relations. The question has of course largely to do with foreign investments in China, for which Mr. D.K. Lieu, Editor of The Critic, had prepared a quite detailed data paper. The extra round table on food and population on the same day has already been noted.

The mornings of the following 2 days, November 7–8, were given over to the discussion of a new topic, the diplomatic relation in the Pacific, with no particular reference to any special country. The question of extraterritoriality in China was accorded an extra session on the eighth, the need for which was called forth by the belief on the part of some Western members that abolition of extrality would mean at the same time practically the automatic rendition of the concessions and settlements. The last morning was devoted to group meetings and round tables on the future of the Institute. Criticisms were heard on the way the Conference was organized. It was generally felt that for coming conferences there should be earlier preparation so that many men of expert knowledge may be released from duties of the Program Committee and the Conference may be benefitted by their participation in the round table discussions. Professor Toynbee, for instance, served during this

Conference on the Program Committee, and most people did not see him until the day when he appeared for the first and last time in one of the round tables to hear and himself to offer criticisms on the organization and modus operandi of the Conference.

The Pacific Council accepted the invitation of the China Council to hold the next Conference in China, 2 years hence. Dr. Yui was elected Chairman of the coming Conference. Mr. Jerome T. Greene of the United States group was elected Chairman of the Pacific Council, and Dr. Inazo Nitobe the first Vice-Chairman, and Mr. Newton B. Rowell of the Canadian group the second Vice-Chairman. Action was also taken for a better definition of the status of the Philippine and Korean groups in the membership.

Not the least valuable part of the Conference was the numerous data papers that were distributed to the members. The number of such papers may be distributed under the following heads, roughly corresponding to and in the order of the different topics discussed in the round tables:

1.	Culture and cultural relations	35 titles
2.	Natural resources, food supply, and population (including colonization and migration)	12 titles
3.	China's foreign relations	14 titles
4.	Industrialization	6 titles
5.	Manchuria	15 titles
6.	Interracial and international relations	17 titles
7.	Peace versus war	6 titles
	Total	105 titles

Of this total, 17, or roughly one sixth, came from the Chinese group.

Chapter 15
Selection and Athletic Prowess

The recent national athletic meet held in Hangchow has demonstrated beyond the peradventure of doubt some of the benign aspects of the effect of natural selection among the Chinese. The result of the meet showed that practically all championships went to athletes coming from marginal areas of the country. The leading position taken by the Cantonese has long been an established fact and the success they achieved this time is no cause for surprise. But in addition to the southerners, we had during the recent meet delegates from Mukden and Harbin whose extremely high attainment was entirely unexpected. The men athletes from the Liaoning province easily took the lead in the field and tract meets; and so did the women athletes from Harbin; and the single fastest running man and woman were found in these two groups respectively. The two fastest long distance runners were again members of the Mukden delegation. Could these be mere happy coincidences? Of course not. One common explanation is that as northerners they are longer-legged, which is evidently true. But not all or even most long-limbed people are swift. Another explanation is that they have undergone more practice, which is not true. For in this matter of physical education as in other things, Mukden and Harbin, both being newly developed centers, cannot be expected to have as much experience as in most large centers inside of Shanhaikwan; and, besides, no amount of practice will make the lame walk. The true explanation is to be found in selection. The Three Eastern Provinces have been for the last few hundred years, at least, the receiving station of active colonization chiefly from the provinces of Shantung and Hopei, where war, pestilence, famine, and the general pressure of population have all along compelled the more energetic, the more farsighted and the more enduring to move out. The descendants of these emigrants or colonists constitute now over 90 % of the population of Manchuria, and it is from these that the athletes represented in the recent meet were picked. When it is remembered that thousands of Shantung colonists

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. III, No. 16, April 17, 1930, unsigned; see also "Manchuria as China's 'Life Line,'" *published in The China Critic* Vol. V, No. 32, August 11, 1932)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_15

reached Harbin or other centers in the extreme north on foot, formerly following the river courses, but now alongside of the railway tracks, and when it is further remembered that they had been for this habit of long-distance hiking invariably nick named pao-tuei (跑腿) or "running legs", is it any wonder that both the fastest and the most enduring runners should be now found among their progeny? The same general explanation applies to the Cantonese whose migration southward occurred earlier in Chinese history. Many successful candidates in the recent meet, while geographical grouped otherwise, will be found upon inquiry to be Cantonese or northerners in the vicinity of Peiping and Tientsin where richer and more varied life has attracted large numbers from the surrounding countries who would otherwise perhaps have moved farther north beyond the Great Wall just like some of their kinsmen did.

Chapter 16
Bon Voyage to Chekiang Refugees

As a measure of relieving the famished conditions in southeastern Chekiang, the provincial government recently scheduled to send 100,000 to the North-Eastern Provinces. The famine refugees are to be brought to Shanghai whence they embark for Manchuria. The first batch, about 300, and the second, about 500, reached the city a few days ago and both embarked on 26th inst. Both the provincial government and the famished people are to be complimented for this undertaking. Emigration, or rather colonization in the present case, as a governmental policy is indeed as old as Chinese history, but seldom has it been undertaken solely and deliberately with the view of equalizing economic situations in two different parts of the country. Batches after batches of colonists were sent over to the regions watered by the Liao by the first Ming Emperor, but they were to be there largely for military purposes. In more recent times, millions from Shantung and Hopei have gone beyond Shanhaikwan, but these went of their own accord and enjoyed little or no governmental supervision. But the present move taken by the Chekiang government is clearly different; it is one which is not only properly planned and organized by the political authorities but is also undertaken with the explicit economic purpose of helping develop one region while relieving the pressure felt in another. Of the families and individuals who joined the movement we must further observe that they, unlike their forefathers, are less tied down to their soil and their ancestral tombs—a characteristic which is said by some foreign observers to be inherent in us and to be at the basis of our inability to gain upon and to keep pace with the dynamic West. The colonists under the Mings were virtually snatched away from their ancestral hearths; many a sad tale of parting, which was practically equal to one rendered by the hand of death, is yet to be read in some of the family histories. The individuals and families that embarked on 26th inst. help demonstrate that we have now largely outgrown such sentimentalities.

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. III, No. 18, May 1, 1930, unsigned)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_16

Chapter 17
Patrilineage and the Surname in the New Civil Code

In the preparation of the unfinished sections of the civil code, the Legislative Yuan at Nanking is understood to be encountering a number of difficult points, the final settlement of which calls for some sociobiological consideration. These sections have largely to do with marriage and family relationships.

One of the first questions that have been raised is the raison d'etre of patrilineage and the family name. According to some, with the gradual but sure disappearance of the religious function of the family, the two has outlived their usefulness. Formerly it was believed—and we may say that it is still believed in many quarters of the country—that it is a great pity that an individual should die without having someone surviving him, to perpetuate his name and to offer him libations. But this belief is being fast relegated to the realm of outworn traditions. Others argue for the outright abolition of the surname on the ground that the institution is an obvious violation of the principle of sex equality, as it has been patronymic throughout Chinese history.

But from our point of view, there is much to be said for the idea of lineage; and even for patrilineage, reasons in its favor may be advanced. There is no gainsaying that the religious usefulness of keeping up one's lineage is fast losing its appeal. But the desire for perpetuating one's memory is a psychological reality of no mean significance and has to be reckoned with, particularly as there are philosophical thinkers, since Spinoza, who maintain that a man's real immortality is to be found in memories of this kind. With the disavowal of spiritual immortality after death, some such form of psychological immortality is bound to find increasing favor. Then there is the biologist's argument for holding to the idea of lineage. In the now well-established doctrine of the continuity of germplasm, the biologist finds man's new and only real immortality; and with the spread of scientific biological knowledge, it is to be expected that there will be a greater incentive for man to leave a progeny and

---

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. III, No. 24, June 12, 1930, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_17

a stronger desire to have the latter identified unmistakably as his. One ready means of identification would be of course the family name.

The only justification for the lineage to be patronymic and not matronymic is that the course of social evolution has so shaped it and that it has become such an integral part of our as well as the Western social system that any radical tempering with it may mean a complete upset of the social equilibrium. While patrilineage may have contributed incidentally to the intensification of sex inequality, it is, contrary to the accusation often brought against it, far from being at the root of women's inferior social position. The very fact that in America to-day patrilineage is still in general use while the social status of women has made big strides is convincing evidence that the two are not necessarily incompatible. But in any case, a practical reformer would see that it is utterly foolish to barter away the security of a whole social order based upon patrilineage for the pittance of a nominal realization of a social theory which has but little empirical and scientific backing. Do scientific thinkers on this subject like Havelock Ellis not tell us that the concept of equality is not applicable to sex and that what we actually have is only functional equivalence? Do they not tell us also that biologically woman is after all the stronger sex, and that more men than women die at practically all ages and far more women live to extreme old age than men? To whom shall men appeal for such inequalities, if they are bent on regarding them as inequalities?

But thus speaking we do not mean to preserve the present system in its entirety. We need some important modifications and it is hoped that such modifications as are found necessary will be incorporated into law. We think that it is only logical that in the near future a daughter will be legally permitted, as in Japan, to perpetuate her father's name, particularly if she is the only offspring or all offspring are of her sex. In the last few years, Chinese women have agitated for the right to property inheritance, and they have quite succeeded. But a right must be reciprocated by some form of obligation; and no obligation is more natural than to assume and preserve in good faith the surname of one from whom the property is acquired. During the heat of agitation for the right to property inheritance, the present writer had heard it frequently commented by the older generation that for a daughter to inherit property without inheriting at the same time the family name is really unfair to her brother or brothers, for in the past it has been a great unwritten law that if there is to be inheritance, it is to be inheritance of both property and name, both right and obligation, for the assumption of the name carries with it the duty of observing the anniversaries, tending to the family records, looking after the family temple, etc. Now will be modern Chinese woman who insists upon equal right to inheritance of property do these things or would she at least tend to the family records which is quite secular in import and other duties in family life which modern conditions may suggest and institute?

Another modification of the patrilineal system naturally suggests itself when a daughter is permitted to inherit the family name. At present, a man who is not favored with a son may find a male heir in the collateral lines of his relatives on the paternal side. Often he is compelled to do so, particularly if he has during his life time accumulated a considerable personal fortune. Although this method of creating

heirs has long received legal sanction, it has really a limited significance from the sociobiological standpoint. While a good heir thus created may discharge tolerably satisfactorily the formal duties of a son and descendant, he is biologically more or less completely cut away from his adopted parents. Strictly speaking, he is no part of their combined streams of germplasm, although he may be a part of a nearby tributary on the paternal side. Even socially, the arrangement is often very unsatisfactory. The heir may be a grown-up, and his adoption may have been decided upon among half a dozen aspirants at the very last moment, that is, very shortly before the old man's death, who had for a number of years struggled in vain for a male offspring of his own. Thus between the two generations, there can have but little psychological bond which on the part of the younger may lead to a more or less lasting memory of the past, which as we have already said is a sine qua non of the idea and institution of patrilineage. An heir so adopted is really less worthy than one adopted from childhood from among orphans and waifs of unknown parentage. We do not propose to discuss the bitter disputes and even family heads arising from a plurality of heir presumptives who claim to have equal claims to the heirship and do not hesitate to back up their claims with force; these are only too apparent.

But the evils of creating heirs out of agnate relatives are easily done away with when once the right as well the duty of inheritance by a daughter is legally recognized. If there should be objection to this as it may entail the necessity of matrilocal residence for the daughter's husband, or if the legator may prefer a male descendant to a female, arrangement may yet be made for the daughter's son to be the lawful legatee, that is, for the grandson to be the inheritor of his maternal grandfather. This is in fact not an uncommon practice already in many highly respectable families in this part of the country, as is obvious from a perusal of their genealogies. The arrangement is logical, natural, and presents no break whatsoever in the biological continuum, which is or at least should be made the physical basis of any attempt at defining lineage. What we need now is only to give the arrangement a legal sanction. While for childless couples provisions must yet be made for the adoption of heirs among more remote relatives; the present arrangement has the further merit of discouraging childlessness among the well-to-do and of inducing them to see that a female offspring is just as valuable as a male one and there is really no need for discrimination. As to the old custom of appointing an heir for one who died before marriage or even before reaching majority, we propose that it should be legally discountenanced, as it is perfectly meaningless.

The authorities of the Legislative Yuan have evidenced a great desire in their work of codification to give due weight to scientific facts and principles. Such a desire is certainly to be respected and complied with; it is rare among legislators. The present writer knows nothing about lawmaking, but he has tried in this chapter to show at least two things which are well worth considering. The first is that we have no justifiable reasons for discarding the family name. Positively the family name has materially contributed to social solidarity and order; and negatively it is by no means in conflict with some of the cherished notions of our day. But as in the past, many evils have arisen as a result of too inflexible a usage of family names which is in turn a necessary consequence of a highly developed patriarchal system,

it is proposed that in the matter of inheritance, the matrilineal form under certain conditions shall receive equal endorsement from law as the patrilineal form. In the second place, it is pointed out the idea of lineage, of which the surname is a convenient social expression, has a strong biological basis, and the problem for law is not to do away with it, for that is impossible as long as there is sexual reproduction in man, but to clear away much of its social, moral, and even religious complication and to make it more purely biological, hence the suggestion for making daughters or even daughters' sons inheritors of family names as well as property.

Chapter 18
Consanguineous Marriage and the Law

In a previous issue of *The Critic*, we had occasion to discuss the place of patrilineage and the family name in modern Chinese social life and in the new civil code parts of which are still being prepared. But some of the most difficult points which the lawmakers are now facing have more to do with the institution of marriage than with family relationships. We propose to discuss the relation between consanguinity and the matrimonial institution in this chapter.

The so-called prohibited degrees are found in marriage laws the world over. Arguments advanced for them are of course largely biological. Prohibitions as regards direct line marriage or with such close collateral line marriage as between brother and sister and between uncle and niece and aunt and nephew may be justified on sociological grounds alone. Social experience has long taught us that for the maintenance of social order it is desirable that blood relatives living under the same roof or in some other form of close proximity should not become partners in marriage. Scholars at their leisure may find a more profound explanation in incestuous aversion both as a biological and psychological theory, but for the layman the social argument is quite sufficient.

But to collateral line marriage between relatives other than those just indicated, particularly to marriage between cousins of different degrees, the objection is largely biological. With patrilineal societies, cousins, besides being of various degrees, are of two classes: the offspring of brothers, who are of necessity of the same surname, belong to one, and those of sisters or brothers and sisters, who are of different surnames, belong to the other. In some countries, some members of the USA for instance, all cousins within prescribed degrees are not allowed to marry; in others, such as China, only those of the former class are not so allowed. In the latter case of course, the argument of social order is as often appealed to as the biological argument of sterility.

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. III, No. 26, June 26, 1930, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_18

But why must cousins of different family names be legally prohibited from marrying? Is the biological argument commonly advanced against such marriage entirely sound? Some such questions, we believe, are now confronting the more scientific-minded of the legislators in Nanking.

As far as the present writer is aware, marriage between cousins, even first cousins, of two different surnames has never been explicitly made a prohibition in Chinese law codes. It is true that a few legal writers have spoken against it such as Yuan Tsun (袁準) during the time of the Three Kingdoms, arguing mainly upon the ground that first cousins stood to one another in the fifth degree of mourning (3 months)—a ground which was entirely formal and hence in actual social practice little heed was paid to it. On the other hand, a number of writers have spoken in its favor, Hung Mang (洪邁) during the Sung dynasty and Chu Shan (朱善) during the Ming dynasty, to name but two instances. In any case, the practice of "hetero-familial" first cousin marriage has been very widely recognized, nay, often specially encouraged on the ground that "it would further consolidate the emotional attachment of two families (亲上加亲). In fact, there is some strong evidence that at one time in the history or prehistory of the Chinese people, marriage between the offspring of brothers and sisters, or cross-cousin marriage, was the only socially acceptable form."

But the introduction of Western ideas into the country in recent years has meant disaster to many a cherished practice and institution, and first cousin marriage has not entirely escaped the bombardment of those who are over-anxious to apply scientific principles, or what appear to them to be scientific principles, to social life. They had already been told by the ancients that consanguineous marriage between persons of the same family tends to be sterile; they are now further enlightened by biologists that in the matter of physical inheritance, the maternal relatives are as much a contributor as the paternal and that what may actually result from consanguineous unions is not so much sterility as physical and mental defects in the offspring; they at once jump to the conclusion that cross-cousin marriage and marriage between offspring of two sisters tends of inherent necessity to produce dire consequences. That such a conclusion seems to have won wide recognition during recent years is evidenced by the fact that it was quite unhesitatingly incorporated as a part and parcel of the draft code prepared by the Codification Bureau about 2 years ago prior to the establishment of the Legislative Yuan. Although the present writer at that time took occasion to suggest to the Bureau, through one of its members, that what they were then trying to incorporate is but a half truth or a semblance of truth, the suggestion apparently fell on barren ground, as the completed draft very soon proved.

Now, the more truthful conclusion is that consanguineous marriage or inbreeding, as the biologist calls it, is per se not harmful. In other words, closeness or remoteness in blood relationship of the two partners has in itself little or nothing to do with the quality of their children. It is rather the quality of the partners themselves that will bear a causal relation to that of the offspring. If both partners have defects, they of course tend to become intensified in the coming generation, but if both possess particularly valuable characteristics, these too are going to be handed down in an accentuated degree.

Now, what complicates the situation is the frequent presence of determiners for the so-called recessive defects in our blood streams. By a recessive trait, we mean one which does not appear in the physical or mental makeup of an individual when the determiner or set of determiners for it is single, that is, when only one of the parents has been responsible in transmitting it, but which will surely become manifest in the individual when both of his parents have had a hand in the transmission. In brief, when inherited in a single-dose condition, the characteristic makes no overt appearance, but when the dose is doubled, it at once does. One of the best-known instances of a recessive defect is albinism, or the more or less complete absence of pigment in the skin and in the iris.

An albino child may be born to a couple who appear to be perfectly normal and are well pigmented. But an albino man marrying an ordinary woman may have children none of whom differs remarkably in any respect from children of ordinary unions. Phenomena of this kind of course at once set the layman to wonder and to look for what appear to him to be plausible explanations. To a biologist it has long become clear that in the first union, both the husband and the wife are themselves potential albinos, but neither possesses the defect in a double-dose condition and hence neither is personally afflicted; but the single doses inevitably combine in the child and so the defect becomes explicit. In the second union, the situation is entirely different; while the defect is a double dosed one in the husband and hence is manifest, it is reduced to the single-dose condition upon being diluted, so to speak, by the blood stream of the wife who is both extrinsically and intrinsically normal as far as albinism is concerned, and hence none of the children receiving the combined blood streams, while all embodying possibilities for albinism for still later generations, is personally afflicted.

But we do not suppose that any layman will come to such an explanation without consulting a textbook in biology. The usual mode is rather that he would proceed and stumble upon a plausible explanation himself. With regard to the result of the second union outlined above, he wonders, but soon forgets, or at best reaches the conclusion that albinism is not inherited or at least not inherited in this particular case. But with regard to that of the first union, his mind cannot become at ease so soon. After some casual inquiry he finds that in not a few cases, the partners in the first type of union are first or second cousins or otherwise more or less closely related, and his off-hand conclusion is that a union contracted between close relatives is productive of albinism.

The gentleman is quite right, as far as he has patience enough to look for and see. Recessive defects like albinism do appear more abundantly and frequently in the fruits of inbred unions. The closer the blood relationship between two individuals, the greater will be the similarity in their hereditary constitution, and more likely will it be for the single-dose determiners to come together upon marriage and express themselves as concrete traits. But the gentleman could have gone further in his observations, casual as they may be, and allow himself to stumble upon a grandparent, a great-grand-parent, or, if his patience does not run out, perhaps a great-great-grandparent, common to both partners of the first type of union, who was himself or herself an albino. If he had gone that far, and if, in addition, he had gone some

distance with other cases of the same type of union, the partners of which have no ancestors in common or even belong to quite different racial stocks, it will become at once clear to him that it is after all the blood, or the germplasm to be less figurative, that tells, and not the closeness of relationship.

Such is the verdict of biologists on the question of consanguineous marriage. How differently it reads from the "scientific" explanations in the memorandum appended to the draft *Family Code* of the Codification Bureau or from the majority of the more recent opinions offered to the Legislative Yuan for reference by jurist bodies or individual legal writers? We do not say that their views are wrong or are entirely ungrounded, but we do maintain that the want of sufficient biological knowledge has led them to mistake an occasion for a cause and a sequential relation for a cause-and-effect relation.

But the scientific verdict upon the effect of consanguineous unions means more than what has just been indicated. It does not only pronounce that such a union, when entered into by partners who are free from gross recessive defects, is perfectly harmless, but it also happily declares that when valuable traits are present, they are thereby accumulated or at least preserved and insured against dissipation. History offers many an instance in which a long reigning dynasty owed for its longevity and greatness not a little to the avowed institution of extremely close consanguineous marriage. The ancestry of the famous Cleopatra, perhaps the most beautiful woman in Western history, shows the closest inbreeding between collateral lines possible. Of the dozen Ptolemy kings and queens, the marital conditions of seven are now known, and of these, four are known to have contracted full brother and sister unions, two uncle and niece unions, and one first cousin union. Yet, the Ptolemies as monarchs were not in any way worse characters than the average European monarch since their time, who might be the legitimate fruit or a union entered into in strict accordance with the canon law of the Christian Church. Quite on the contrary, they furnished a number of able and illustrious rulers and gave to Egypt and its surrounding countries a polished and brilliant civilization. Cleopatra herself was the product of a brother and sister union. It is true that she was responsible for the final downfall of the dynasty, but it would have been true also that had she been born a less enchanting and fascinating character, the dynasty might have been spared by the Romans; and if fascination and beauty is a gross defect born of close consanguineous marriage—as the Christian ascetics coming upon the scene not long after her undoubtedly thought it was—it is no mean one.

Consanguineous marriage has also been one of the most important factors in the production and perpetuation of many big families which have contributed inestimably to the advancement of culture, both in the West and in the East. To mention but one recent illustrious example. Charles Darwin, the architectonic genius of evolution, married Emma Wedgewood, his first cousin on the maternal side and granddaughter of Josiah Wedgewood, a Fellow of the Royal Society and the founder of the famous Wedgewood pottery. Darwin's own parentage is too well known to need any introduction here. Of the six sons born to this cousin marriage, four rank among the great men of England, and of these three are F. R. S's, and the fourth is the leading figure in the eugenic movement in England and one of the leading world

figures in the same movement. Now in the light of recent biological findings, Darwin had certainly acted most conformably and scientifically, but in the light of the Article XV of the draft *Family Code* which we Chinese had seen fit to draw up about 2 years ago, Darwin was an infamous trespasser and was to be legally prosecuted! England would have suffered no mean deprivation in her cultural attainment and influence, had she possessed a code to the similar effect and equally circumspective of her biological future. Fortunately she has none, in spite of the active eugenic movement within her borders!

More illustrative examples are to be found in our own history. It has already been pointed out that unions between first cousins of different family names have been common throughout Chinese history, but it still awaits to be told that in none of the historical periods had the practice been more widespread and more frequently resorted to than the period between the Three Kingdoms and the Tang dynasty, a period of almost seven centuries, during which people attach so much social prestige to big and famous families that marriage choice among the higher classes became narrowly confined to a very small number of families. During the Ch'in dynasty, for example, marital selection was restricted to such families as Wang (王), Hsieh (谢), Wei (衛), Yang (羊), Shan (山), and a few others. Now marital selection, when so restricted, would very naturally and inevitably lead to frequent first cousin marriages. Restricted marital selection had its basis in the law of assortative mating, and assortative mating is only the next step to consanguineous mating, when the criteria used become extremely narrow and few; and the most feasible form of consanguineous mating under the circumstances peculiar to patrilineal society of the Chinese type, would be one between cousins of different surnames. The two or three biggest families during the Ch'ins were unmistakably the Wangs, Hsiehs, and the Weis, the former two were also the most long lived; and it was among these families that we find the highest frequency of cousin matings. The whole network of marriage relationships among these three families and others of almost equal note can never be reconstructed, as their genealogies had long ceased to exist, but inferring from the fragmentary facts we yet possess, some such conclusion as we have just made is inescapable.

Now, the interesting thing to notice is that it was from these same families that the greatest quota of able and scholarly leaders of the time was recruited. We do not think this was a mere coincidence. *The Biographical Dictionary* to this day has on record short sketches of more than 40 Wangs, some 30 Hsiehs, and 8 or 9 Weis, all of the same families; the last mentioned having suffered an early extermination in the hands of political enemies. It may be argued of course that the political and social ascendency of these families was due more to nepotism and family pull, which remains to this day such an inevitable social force, than to intrinsic worth intensified by consanguineous marriages. But here is another test which could have but little to do with family pull. We refer to the art of calligraphy. Calligraphy in China, unlike in Western countries, is as much an art as painting, and an adept in it depends as much upon hereditary aptitude as a painter does. To such a view few would take exception except perhaps the ultrabehaviorists. Now, the significant thing is that while the Ch'in dynasty, of all periods in recorded Chinese history,

must be credited with the greatest number of best calligraphers, it was these few families in particular that had contributed most brilliantly to the art. But still more significant is the fact that most of the unsurpassed masterpieces came from the two families Wang and Wei, containing each eight or nine masters of the first rank and culminating, respectively, in the genius of Wang Hsi-tzu (王羲之) and Madame Li (衛夫人). The historian tells us that the latter master bore a relation to the former as tutor and pupil, and that therefore the greatness of the one was attributable to the greatness of the other. But was it so? Can education and training alone create real artistic greatness? A deeper venture into the more unfamiliar and less frequented nooks of history soon revealed that previous to the generation to which Hsi-tzu belonged, the Wangs and the Weis had been on most intimate terms and "had for many successive generations entered into cross-cousin marriages." Thus, it would seem that the tutor–pupil relation between two of the greatest, if not the greatest, calligraphers in all Chinese history, was but a convenient arrangement, the real cause of the greatness of both lay much deeper than is commonly appreciated.

Had the lawmakers of the Ch'in and still earlier dynasties acquired the little scientific knowledge that we have today, and had legislated accordingly, calligraphy would perhaps have long become an extinct art and, in the complete absence of any lofty standard, we might have been spared with the agony of having to decipher the scribble and scrawl of the motley youths of the present generation.

In addition to excellence in handwriting which is well known, the historical periods under discussion were also remarkable for the production of many men and women noted for physical beauty and personal charm. The annals of the Ch'in dynasty, more than those of any other period, abounds in references to handsomeness of figure and carriage, exquisiteness of character, ability as conversationalists and the like, most of the individuals so characterized can be readily identified to be members of the particular families we have been discussing. Could this be another coincidence or was it again largely attributable to close and narrow sexual selection and to the aggravating influence of frequent cousin marriages?

But our question does not end here. It has been suggested as a partial justification for the provision against cousin marriage in the draft code referred to above and in similar provisions elsewhere, that since recessive defects are quite common in man and since their presence or absence in antecedent generations cannot be in all or most cases ascertained, cousin marriage is after all better legally discountenanced than left to follow its own natural course. The suggestion is a good one, but it is as good as the hasty conclusion that cousin marriage tends of necessity to produce bad traits. A better suggestion would be that meanwhile steps should be taken to provide for facilities for the investigation and recording of family histories and that those families—and those families only—in which latent or recessive traits of an undesirable character are actually found, shall be advised, through eugenic education and, more specifically, personal clinical service, to refrain from entering into cousin or other similarly close consanguineous unions. The advice to be meted out is of such

a nature as to call for the most differential and individual treatment, and individual treatment is precisely that which the law is most incapable of.

We have thus far shown that consanguineous marriage is in and by itself not harmful; that it is only harmful when there are recessive defects in the families which go into the union; that consanguineous marriages between families with valuable traits should not only be left unmolested by law but should be otherwise encouraged; that consanguineous marriages between families known to possess recessive defects are best advised against marriage through educational channels and not to be legally forbidden, for as the law allows for no discrimination, its enforcement would, while preventing the defects from overtly appearing, inevitably lead to the dissipation and waste of valuable traits which have taken centuries of social selection to establish themselves. But we may go a step further and declare that any legal provision against cousin marriage as we Chinese have had it throughout the centuries would inevitably spread and disseminate the recessive defects to more extensive sections of the population. It is only too obvious that suppression of a recessive defect from disappearing through keeping it always in a single-dose condition is not the same thing as its extermination or eradication. To achieve actual eradication it is best to allow or even encourage strains with latent defects in common to join in marriage so as to allow a free rein to their overt appearance, and to advise or warn against marriage whomsoever so unfortunate as to be personally inflicted, so that the defect in question will be no longer handed down as far as these particular strains are concerned. Under our antiquated conception of social values and ideas of personal and familial responsibility, the arrangement may cause embarrassment and inconvenience to the individuals and families involved, but it would mean a decided gain, a veritable act of purification, for the race and racial heritage as a whole. Thus, it would seem that someday consanguineous marriage, coupled with rigid segregation of those in whom gross defects known to be inherited as recessives are manifest, will become, if science has at all anything to say in the realm of social relationships and social values, the most acceptable and desirable form, because it is perhaps the only avenue through which the race may be purged of its constitutional defects and have its valuable qualities safeguarded and accented.

In conclusion, let it be made doubly clear that this chapter is meant to speak for cousin marriage as it has been practiced in China in all periods and to point out that the recent tendency in legislating against it is quite ill-advised. It does not intend to speak for consanguineous marriage between relatives of the same family name, as that involves sociological considerations which are not less weighty than the biological ones, although the writer agrees in a general way with the modifications suggested in the draft code of the now defunct Codification Bureau. The reference to the Ptolemies in the course of discussion was only to show that since biologically even brother and sister marriage does not end in disaster where the stock is sound, it follows that still less harm is normally to be expected from a marriage of cousins who are not handicapped by ancestral defects.

Chapter 19
Genealogy in China: A Neglected Phase of Historical Study

Genealogy is one of the many intellectual pursuits that the Chinese people may justly be proud of. The Chinese has perhaps the longest recorded genealogies of all peoples. In Europe, the Irish pedigrees are known to be the longest, to which most of the prominent families of modern times are said to be traceable. The early Irish kings were descended from the kings of Scythia, the fourth of which in line was Goadhal who was a contemporary of Moses (C. 1320 B.C.). This would mean that the longest recorded genealogy in the West falls short of that in China by about a millennium and a half. Some of the peoples of the South Sea Islands are noted for their skill in genealogy, more particularly the Moriori of the Chatham Islands and the Hawaiians. "The Moriori," writes Mr. Foster of the University of Bristol in his *Travels and Settlements of Early Man*, "surpass all other Polynesians in the length of their genealogies which go back for 182 generations, or, on the computation of 25 years to a generation, for 4,500 years, that is to say, approximately to 2600 B.C. The nearest approach to these prodigious records is supplied from Hawaii, where genealogies include 145 generations, or on the same method of computation 3,625 years to approximately 1725 B.C." But such records are not records in the true sense of the word, they were simply registrations in memory and were the work of the remembrancer, called tohunga among the Maori of New Zealand, for instance. But in China, the records are both long and duly put down in black and white. If we take the partly legendary Yellow Emperor or still better, his father Sao T'ien, as the starting point, we have a pedigree which would appear longer than that possessed by the Moriori by a couple hundred of years, since the Yellow Emperor was recorded to have begun his reign in 2697 B.C. In any event, whatever value one may attach to such legendary records, the extreme antiquity of Chinese genealogies is not to be gainsaid.

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. III, No. 38, September 18, 1930, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_19

In the beginning, genealogical records in China were of course only kept of kings and feudal lords and the big families in their service. The work was early assigned to a particular functionary or a number of functionaries of the government. In *Chow Li*, a classic dealing with governmental organization of the Chow dynasty, references are two different groups of functionaries having to do with the records of the royal family. One group was composed of blind men whose duty was to recite from records, upon special occasions, the names of the king's ancestors. These perhaps represented the survivals of the remembrancers in the days when there were yet no written records in China, and were therefore comparable to the *tohungas* of the Maoris. The other group, composed of functionaries aptly called "Minor Historians," was in charge of making and keeping records, in which not only "the order of generation" and the "lines of descent" but also the "order of birth" and individual achievements were duly registered. The records of the royal family were called "Imperial Pedigrees," and those of the houses of the feudal lords and of distinguished vassal families were called "Source Book of Generations." Fragments of both of these, reedited by later writers, are yet to be found incorporated in some of the classics and editions of ancient works.

During the period comprising the Warring Kingdoms, the Dynasty of Shi Hwang-ti, and the two Han dynasties, conditions were not favorable to the development of genealogy as a branch of historical study. Nothing is more subversive to the development of family life, and consequently to that of the keeping of family histories than a state of affairs in which war played the most prominent and ubiquitous role. Such a state of affairs existed throughout the period of the Warring Kingdoms and the inevitable result was that the whole population was kept in constant migratory movements either for the positive purpose of siding with some particular feudal lords or for the negative one of avoiding destruction. In any case the love of family life and family tradition built up in previous centuries became thereby dissipated and quite incapable of expression. Peace and order was restored during the Hans, but the imperialist policies of the day were such as to produce an equally stifling and stunting effect upon the impulses leading to the making and keeping of family records. Fearing that the numerous big families in outlying provinces, mostly scions of the feudal lords of early days, might, with their wealth and influence, prove unwieldy and a source of anxiety for the imperialist cause, the emperors, in successive decrees, ordered the removal of these families to the district in which the national capital was situated. That meant of course forced migration, which as we have seen was not conducive to the development of the feeling and desire for keeping genealogical records. Big families were ones from which the keeping of such records was most legitimately to be expected, and it was these very families that were forced to give up their ancestral homesteads and, with them, the feeling of identity with their forbears. Thus, throughout the period under discussion, aside from the records of the imperial family, very few genealogies are now known and practically none has been handed down. That genealogical knowledge was at a very low ebb during this period may be evidenced by the single fact that Liu Pang, the founder of the Han dynasties, knew neither the surname of his mother nor the name of his grandfather, and had to be satisfied with referring to the latter as "Sire of Feng," his native district (now Hsuchow).

But beginning with the Three Kingdoms and down to the end of the Tang dynasty, the tide turned. In fact, this period, between the third century and eighth century inclusive, must be regarded as the golden age of genealogical development in the whole of Chinese history, or indeed in any history. Let us examine the work of this period in some detail, delving into as much other related historical facts as the lay reader would care to know.

The genealogical achievements of this period may be logically viewed under five headings: (1) The National Genealogical Office, (2) The number and esteemed position of genealogists, (3) The place of genealogy in the library, (4) The wealth of genealogical works, and (5) The collaboration of genealogy and history.

The National Genealogical Office —Certainly by far the most important point to be noted in connection with genealogical development during the period between the third and eighth centuries A.D. is that from the very start the keeping of family records, not of the ruling houses alone but of all important families, became a matter of national concern and was accordingly taken up by the central government. At first, from the third century to probably the early years of the sixth century, the work was entrusted to a number of officials under the direct control of what might be considered the cabinet in the governmental organization of the time. But it was not until the early years of one of the short-lived Six dynasties, the Liang dynasty, that these officials were made to constitute a separate office, a bureau. From thence until the end of the Tang dynasty, the genealogical bureau formed consistently one of the 21 bureaux under the supervision of the cabinet. During the latter dynasty, it was definitely recorded that the prime minister was the *ex officio* head of the genealogical bureau.

The chief functions of this office or bureau were plainly the collecting, editing, and keeping of genealogies. In *Tung Chih*, one of the three Tungs or encyclopedic works prepared single handedly by three scholars at three different periods, and indispensable to any student of Chinese social history, is found the following description of the functions of the bureau:

> The genealogical bureau had existed in a number of dynasties. Aside from a number of workers attending to the routine of collecting and keeping the genealogies, scholars noted for their knowledge of the past as well of the present, were engaged to study the genealogies and to edit or re-edit them. Any official or family that was known to keep a genealogy was asked to hand in a copy to the bureau to be examined as to the authenticity of its contents and to be shelved in the archives. A corrected duplicate was also kept in some other place. From thence on, the genealogy might be used for constant reference. Private records desiring to check up its contents and to make revisions might then apply to the bureau for assistance, and the bureau would in turn call for the service of private records for latest additions.

The writer of these lines might have added that the work of editing done by the scholars was really of two kinds. One was to edit the records of single families, and the other was to edit together records of a great many families belonging to a same region or district to form what is known as "Co-ordinated Genealogies." One of these coordinated editions covered 18 *chows* comprising 116 *chuns*, respectively the largest and the second large administrative units of the time, and was issued in 712 separate books (卷).

The present writer would like to call particular attention of the reader to the existence of this national genealogical office, because it is something that has never been attempted anywhere else, not even in the countries of modern times. Private institutions for similar purposes are now found in many countries. In the USA, for instance, there is one in Washington D.C. established in 1916 by the famous inventor of telephony, Alexander Graham Bell. But in spite of its location, it is a purely private enterprise and has little or no connection with the government. In Japan, a similar organization existed some years ago in Tokyo which undertook in 1913 the editing and publication of the *Abbreviated Genealogies of Noble Families* prominent in the Meiji era of reconstruction. But that was also a private enterprise.

The Number and Position of Genealogists —Numerous scholars during the period under consideration were genealogists, some of whom made genealogy the exclusive subject of research, others were at the same time noted historians or were in charge of civil service administration. Official history of the period made specific mention of over two dozen genealogists, most of whom, being prominent in other lines of work as well, have separate biographical sketches. Of the two dozen, two lived during the Ch'in dynasty, 11 during the following six short-lived dynasties, and the rest during the Tang dynasty. The total output of these scholars constituted well over 2,300 books (卷), which were no mean achievement. Perhaps six of these genealogists deserve some special notice. They were Chia Pieh (Ch'in dynasty), the editor of the *Co-ordinated Genealogies* of 712 books referred above; Wang Hung (Chi dynasty), who was known to be able "to meet and converse daily with a 1,000 guests without, in addressing them, missing up their official names and names used in social intercourse"[1]—a feat which would be utterly impossible without a thorough, intimate, and up-to-date knowledge of the respective family histories of these guests; Wang Sen-ju (Liang dynasty), who had written more on genealogy and edited more genealogies than anybody else in Chinese history; Lu Ching-tun and Lu Tsung (both of Tang dynasty) whose works, while themselves had long ceased to exist, had apparently influenced the Japanese genealogists at a time when Japan was literally thirsty and hungry after knowledge from the mainland; and finally Lin Pao whose *Genealogical Source Book*, in 10 books, has come down to us as the only rare specimen of the vast amount of genealogical writing of the period.

Another interesting point to be noted in this connection is that at the height of the development of genealogical study, a number of scholarly families had made themselves particularly well known for being families of genealogists. Of these, the most remarkable was the family Chia, which the foreign press in Shanghai has recently seen fit to pronounce as "Ku", as evidenced in the frequent appearance of "Ku Ching-teh" in the limelight of the news of the day. The family Chia produced five noted genealogists in six generations extending over six dynasties. Chia Pieh, noted above, was the first in the line. The Wang family, starting with Wang Hung, also

[1] The traditional Chinese takes special pains not to address one by one's official name

made a specialty of genealogy, with Wang Chieh, the grandnephew of Wang Hung, contributing most to the total stock of 2,300 books already discussed.

The Place of Genealogy in the Library —Wang Chieh, just referred to, was also a noted bibliographer. He was among the first to classify books into categories. Of the seven categories he established, one was specifically for pedigrees and charts. Later bibliographers and encyclopedic writers and official historians, who were wont to include in the official history of a dynasty a section on books written by scholars living in that dynasty, all followed his example. Thus, we now find there are special sections listing the works of genealogy in two of the three Tungs and also in the official histories of the Sui and Tang dynasties. All these were of course called forth by the remarkable volume of genealogical works that kept on pouring out during the period. This volume had already reduced itself to little or nothing by the time when the two Tungs were prepared, but as the encyclopedic writers were still familiar at least with the titles and authors of the numerous genealogical works, they had found it advisable to include as complete a bibliography as they could make it.

We witness also in this period that genealogy as a branch of historical study underwent some internal differentiation. Six different types of genealogies were noted by later writers, namely (1) imperial genealogies treating only the pedigrees and achievements of rulers; (2) genealogies of the collateral lines of imperial families including families with which marriages had been contracted; (3) coordinated genealogies of distinguished families; (4) coordinated genealogies of particular districts; (5) genealogies with the families or family names arranged in the order of the rhymes; and (6) genealogies of individual families. Of these six types only (5) and (6) are today to be seen, and only (6) is now in use. Coordinated genealogies of particular districts had ceased to be written by the time of the Liang dynasty.

The Wealth of Genealogical Works and Their General Accessibility —We have already touched upon this in discussing the number of genealogists. Here, we will give a few definite figures, as definite as the Chinese historian, not versed in statistics, had made them. The 2,300 books referred to in an earlier paragraph were distributed as follows:

Type	No. of titles	No. of books
Imperial genealogies (1) (2)	27	199
Coordinated genealogies (3)	35	1,054
Coordinated genealogies (4)	12	849
Genealogies arranged after rhymes (5)	8	58
Genealogies of separate families (6)	68	205
Total	150	2,365

These figures in all probability represent only a portion of the total output of genealogical works during the period of 500 years, which was within the knowledge of the historians of the Sui and Tang official Annals. The figures about the first four or five types of genealogical work might be fairly accurate, as these were all officially edited and kept, but the figure for the sixth type, genealogies of separate

families, must be quite incomplete, as many might not have come within the pail of official attention and therefore had no duplicates in the official archives. These are no mere inferences. A writer of recent times, in working up a commentary on the bibliographical section of the Sui official Annals, was able, by cross references to other ancient writings, to fill in 55 additional titles in the division on genealogy, of which 45 were genealogies of separate families. We do not know how many he was not able to supply.

Practically all of these 45 titles, carrying each a few fragmentary genealogical facts, are found in the commentary made by a writer of the Liang dynasty upon a book of much biographical interest written by another in the Sung dynasty (not the one contemporaneous with the Kitans and Nuchens). The commentator evidently had a very wide and intimate knowledge of the genealogies of the more important families of the time, and had little reticence in impart it to others, for, at the time of making the commentary, the families involved were still flourishing. Of course, the publication of this commentary, or indeed the book itself, might have occurred much later, but the very fact that the commentator, as well as the writer of the book, having had no connection with the genealogical bureaux as far as we know, could have easy and frequent access to the numerous genealogical records and make extracts from them would be enough to show that at that time such records were not merely kept, but were available to the public for various purposes including study by interested scholars. That this must have been the case will be made more evident in a later paragraph when we come to examine the functions which the genealogical records were made to serve during this period.

The Collaboration of History and Genealogy —During this period, many genealogists were at the same time official historians in the employ of the government. Others were historical commentators, and they made ample use of their genealogical knowledge in illuminating some of the more obscure books of history. In the commentaries of each of the oldest four of the *Twenty-four Histories*, also separately known as the *Four Histories*, many facts taken from genealogical records are to be met with.

Of the later official Annals, a few actually depended upon genealogical records for raw materials. The official history of the Tobas was compiled upon the basis of "genealogical records of hundreds of families." The dynasty of the Tobas, it will be remembered, was contemporaneous with the short-lived dynasties mentioned above and hence was within the period of maximum genealogical development. One of the earliest manuscripts of the Tang official history prepared during the reign of the notorious Empress Wu was said to have drawn profusely from family records. "Whatever was therein written had reference to genealogical and biographical records of individual families," says a later historian. The history that is best known to have utilized family records is of course the *New History of Tang Dynasty* prepared by Ou-yang Hsiu and his associates and later accepted as official. Therein a special section, comprising several books, was given over to condensed descriptions of the origins and to tabulation of genealogical facts of all the families each of which had supplied the dynasty in question with at least one prime minister. Ou-yang

Hsiu evidently acted in accordance with what was advocated by one of the leading historian and genealogist of the Tang dynasty. Other writers on history and historical method since his time have insisted on including a genealogical section in all official annals and provincial and district gazetteers.

With the passing of the Tang dynasty, and the falling of China into the hands of a score of rabble dynasties, the golden age of genealogy in China came to an abrupt end. Since then not only has there been no improvement in the technique of making, keeping, and handling genealogical records, but also whatever had been accumulated during the centuries was demolished almost overnight in the heat and confusion of civil strife that characterized the short period of half a century known as the Five Dynasties and Sixteen Kingdoms. The present writer can well afford to conclude his short account of genealogical development at this point, since nothing will be gained by dwelling upon it any longer. But he yet feels incumbent to answer one question which must have by this time suggested itself to the reader and must have already aroused a certain amount of impatience. The question is: Wherefore was this luxuriant growth of interest in genealogy and genealogical work?

The answer is fairly simple. Unlike genealogical records of today, East and West alike, which are quite colorless and cannot be made to serve any fundamental social need, those of the period we have been examining had, among others, two very important functions to discharge. Genealogy was then the basis of civil service administration. The well-known method of examination came into vogue only in the latter half of the period, prior to that time selection was made partly by repairing to the genealogical records of families which had proved quite productive of leadership and ability in affairs of government, and partly upon recommendations of a special group of officials appointed by the government and stationing in the various districts whose duty was to classify the population under their jurisdiction into nine grades, from the upper few of which new functionaries of the government were to be recruited. These officials would themselves have to resort to genealogical records in forming their opinion, in making the classification and, finally, in offering recommendations. These facts at once explain the statement made in an earlier part of the article that during this period many genealogists were at the same time responsible leaders in civil service administration, Wang Chieh for instance.

Genealogy formed not only the basis of selection of officials but also the basis of marriage selection. This function had really two different aspects. The Chinese of those days, and many still today, had the superstition that a marriage contracted between two families of the same surname tended to be sterile. Now, many of the surnames current then and still current today were offshoots or splittings of a single surname in olden times and the only way of avoiding marrying a person of erstwhile the same surname was to look up the genealogies, trace the lines to the sources, and see if they converge. This was one aspect. The big families of the period were noted for their family pride which was at once a cause and an effect of the development of genealogies. They naturally had a strong aversion toward marrying into families below their social and cultural level and tended to be fastidious when any choice was to be made. A well-kept genealogy, and one replete with illustrious personages, would be a great asset in the matrimonial market, not only as

a piece of social ornamentation alone, but also a veritable document, officially authenticated, to which the doubting party to the marriage transaction might repair for detailed facts and proofs. That was the second aspect.

Genealogy as a form of intellectual pursuit in China has doubtless degenerated since the Tang dynasty. The process of degeneration has taken place in three ways. First, what was at first an official and national activity has now become a purely private concern. In point of facts, verification is now quite infeasible and is not desired by the average family historian. In point of method and technique, standardization is now out of question. The result is that many genealogies available today cannot bear to see the light of the day; they are even devoid of literary qualities. Second, genealogies are now kept simply after a fashion and are quite useless. Many desirable facts are either wrongly recorded or not recorded at all. The important functions that genealogy served in those early days, official selection and marital selection are not only not found today, but also are quite forgotten by the average genealogist. Last but not least is the fact that genealogy has today lost the hard-earned status as an independent historical study. It has become a subject from which many respectable students of history and historical method would be fain to keep away. It has long lost its position in the bibliographical and encyclopedic works since the early years of the Mongol dynasty when the last of the three *Tungs* was published. But the pity of it all is that few Chinese genealogists today realize that there was once a veritable golden age in the history of that field of study in which they have seen fit to engage themselves.

Chapter 20
The Late Mr. Yuan Hsi-tao

China must be counted among those countries which have made education one of the foremost, if not the foremost, functions of human life. The emphasis on education is indeed at the core of the whole Confucian tradition. Confucius was primarily an educator, so was Mencius, and Shuntse, after him. But the Confucian emphasis differs from that which is found today in that it is laid not so much upon the process of education itself, which is mechanical and methodical, as upon the personality of the educator, which is truly dynamic.

Modern emphasis upon education has succeeded in producing a cohort of educationists, who, as defined by the lexicographers, are merely versed in the theories of, or who merely advocate and promote, education, but very few educators, who may not have made education their exclusive profession by which they earn their living, but who do educate and are therefore true teachers. Modern emphasis has of course produced another type of educational experts, who are not called pedagogues but are really homologous in function to the Greek slaves known by that name. This situation in the sphere of education suggests a similar situation in the field of politics. Modern emphasis on political science both as to its theoretical and practical aspects seems to have had no hand in the production of any statesman, but have materially contributed to the ranks of political scientists and demagogues. Whereas both the statesman and the educator are perhaps not born, they are certainly not made.

The late Mr. Yuan Hsi-tao, whose death occurred over 2 months ago and whose burial is scheduled to take place in the coming week, will always be remembered neither so much for the wealth of educational knowledge, both ancient and modern, that he had imbibed, nor for the numerous educational enterprises that he had had a hand in creating, as for the spirit with which he initiated, fostered, and kept alive against all odds the modern educational movement, as well as for the personal

---

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. III, No. 47, November 20, 1930, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_20

influence that he had been able to exert upon hundreds of thousands of the younger generation for the past 30 years. Mr. Yuan must indeed be counted as one of the very few educators that modern China has been able, not to make, but to discover and to allow a qualified chance for development and service.

The present writer has no intention to give a full account of the variegated life of Mr. Yuan. A very good one in Chinese has been prepared by some of his friends of his own generation who are acquainted with his career and work from the very beginning. But a few biographical notes will not be out of place here. The Yuan family, like most Chinese families of long standing, has a very wide distribution in China. The branch to which Mr. Yuan belonged was originally native to the province of Honan, but it subsequently removed to Ningpo as a result of the Nuchen invasion early in the twelfth century. From Ningpo as a new center, the family spread in many directions; one of the lines reached this part of the country—Woosung to be specific—in the middle of the Ming dynasty. For 10 generations the family prospered, not any too brilliantly, but each generation is characterized by a love of knowledge, by industry, and by integrity of character. Mr. Yuan's father, for instance, served as a minor official in the Chekiang province for many years, and it was said that upon his retirement, the people under his jurisdiction came out by 1,000 to see him off.

Mr. Yuan was born in Hangchow in 1866. He began to receive formal education of the old type at 5, and passed the district examination when he was 20. Shortly afterwards he joined the Lung Men Institute, well known for the semimodern type of education it offered as well as for the number of early leaders in education that it was able to produce. It will be remembered that those were the eventful years which ushered in the period of cultural transition, and during which the old examination system was about to go but the modern educational system modeled after the West had not as yet come into existence; and that higher institutions of learning like the Lung Men filled the peculiar need of a classical educational requisite for examination coupled with a modicum of knowledge of the natural and social sciences as was then obtainable. Mr. Yuan was there and then able to acquire a truly liberal education, acquainting himself as he did with many of the best cultural elements that the East and the West could offer. In 1897, he successfully passed the provincial examination and became a provincial graduate.

Shortly before and for 6 years after he participated in the provincial examination, we find Mr. Yuan serving in some professional capacity in two different places, one in Anhwei. But his educational career cannot be said to have begun until 1903, when, together with a group of intimate friends, he started to organize a number of grammar and grade schools in his native district, Paoshan, of which Woosung constituted a small town. His efforts at introducing the western educational system are now remembered as among the earliest of their kind, antedating the final abolition of the competitive examination system for 2 or 3 years. It will be recalled that China had then just passed through the agony brought about by the Boxer Uprising, and many were there who had come to realize that for the amelioration of the national situation nothing was more fundamental than a general enlightenment of the masses through such a system of education as was provided by the European

countries and Japan, which latter, though had only lately come to adopt western methods, was then already making big strides in improving her national status. But with the exception of men like Mr. Yuan, few in China then had the courage to break the cake of custom and to inaugurate something new.

The year 1905 witnessed another forward step in China's effort at modernizing her educational system. The year was of course marked by the abolition of the age-old examination system by an imperial decree. But it will also be remembered as the starting point of normal schools in China, with the work of which Mr. Yuan was again very closely associated. In fact, he was one of the originators of the fruitful idea of transforming the shou yuans of which the Lung Men Institute was a perfect example, into normal schools. So nothing is more logical for us to find, in the autumn of that year, Mr. Yuan and three or four friends who are now equally well known for their pioneer work in education, touring through Japan, to profit by her experience, particularly in the line of normal school education. Upon their return, the Lung Men Institute was at once reorganized to form one of the first, if not the first, institutions in China for the training of teachers by modern methods. During the 5 or 6 years that followed, Mr. Yuan had also occasion to turn his attention to secondary and higher education and was one of the organizers of a number of institutions for that purpose, one of which, now a full-fledged university, celebrated its 25th anniversary only a short while ago.

During the same period Mr. Yuan's parents died. Heretofore, family considerations had prevented him from staying away from home for any considerable length of time. But his renown as an educator had by this time spread far beyond the provincial precinct, and so shortly after his parents' death, Mr. Yuan was invited to serve on the provincial broad of education in Chihli, now Hopei. For 3 years he travelled extensively north of the Yellow River, reviewing the educational life of many a district, preparatory to the improvements that were to be introduced. While the breaking out of the Revolution in Wuchang in 1911 put a stop to his work, much had already been accomplished at that time to serve to mark the beginning of the career of a man who was destined to play even greater roles after the Revolution.

In 1912, when the republican form of government was first being organized, we find Mr. Yuan in Peking, invited by Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei to head by far the most work-laden bureau under the Ministry of Education. Among numerous contributions that he made during the period, the most significant was doubtless the standardization of normal school education through national control of all high normal schools in the country. The formation of the high normal schools at Peking, Nanking, Wuchang, which were really the bases of the three national universities now respectively found in these three places, owed incalculably to Mr. Yuan's organizing genius—a fact which, like his many other contributions, is now quite generally forgotten and is soon destined to be interred with his bones.

Mr. Yuan continued to serve in the Ministry of Education for quite a number of years, first as heads of different bureaux, once as National Inspector of Education, in which capacity he again had occasion for extensive travels, as Vice-Minister, and finally as Acting Minister. In the last capacity, he was obliged to serve for three different times, until finally the political situation became so intolerable and

obstructive to all constructive efforts that he tended his final resignation, never to appear in official life again.

Mr. Yuan's much extended experience with official educational work was highly indicative of his character as a true educator. In the first place, he was nonpartisan. Political vicissitudes in the capital engulfed many an individual holding responsible offices; ministers and vice-ministers came and went by dozens and scores, but Mr. Yuan was always entreated to remain, to carry on whatever was possible under the circumstances. In the second place, as an exception that proves the rule, Mr. Yuan's official life was not one for wealth, his was not even one for livelihood. The Ministry of Education was during that period notoriously poorly financed; yet, he remained. All friends know that when he finally had to retire from official life, the luggage that he brought home with him was a package of old clothes and a few books. To the day of his death, his financial condition was no better than that of the average grammar school teacher, which is too well known to need any description. His poverty was partly caused by his willingness to give, and unwillingness to accept anything which was even suspectedly not his due. Last year, many friends offered to build a small house for him in Woosung, but he declined to have it. In the third place, it needs hardly be said that his perseverance and capacity for hard work was unexcelled. Correlative to this and to his being nonpartisan was that he was no man of theories and visionary ideals. In short, Mr. Yuan must be counted among those rare mortals, who, "knowing that they are working against all odds, and that whatever they may accomplish will soon be reduced to nought, nevertheless persist in working." Only such rare mortals knew what "the struggle of life" really means.

Mr. Yuan was also a profound student of geography and history. In his early years, he also delved deep into astronomy. During his office on the Chihli provincial board of education, he was instrumental in bringing about the organization of the National Geographical Society, which antedated the organization of other learned societies for many years and which will always be remembered for the long series of scientific journals that it published before and after the Revolution. We have already seen that Mr. Yuan was a great traveler, and had a number of occasions to see the country. Shortly after the World War, he made a tour of the world, noting the advances made in education in various countries, the journals of his trip amounting to several volumes. Connected with his love for geography was his early work in promoting railway building in Kiangsu, and in initiating scientific land-surveying in his native district, Paoshan, which is not only the earliest of its kind ever attempted in this country but also is admitted by present-day statisticians as the most satisfactory under the circumstances then obtaining in China.

For the last 5 or 6 years, Mr. Yuan headed one of the private research institutions in Shanghai, which has as its main object the compilation of the various aspects of Chinese history since the Revolution of 1911. Much was already under way when he died.

But to return to him as an educator, we must not forget to mention two more pieces of constructive educational work, with which Mr. Yuan was intimately connected. He was one of the organizers of the Provincial Educational Association of Kiangsu, and served for a number of years as its president after his retirement from

official life. During the many years of its existence, the Association had exerted great influence upon the educational and cultural status of the province in particular and that of the country in general. In the last few years, Mr. Yuan was painstakingly engaged in the promotion of rural education in those parts of the country, particularly in southern Kiangsu, where a semblance of peace and order had been enough kept up to allow a certain measure of constructive endeavor. He was indeed the originator and organizer of the so-called Free Education Movement of which rural education constitutes only a part. Both in the earlier work of the provincial educational association and in that of free rural education which was occupying his mind even a few days before his death, we see Mr. Yuan's unwavering desire and determination to achieve through purely local and social cooperative efforts what he could not accomplish through governmental channels—a fate that has befallen many an educator in China's historical past!

Many attempts are being made to keep Mr. Yuan's memory fresh among the countrymen, particularly among the people of Kiangsu. He was honored by his friends and admirers by a posthumous name embodying the two characters meaning "magnanimous" and "fortitudinous" (袁弘毅先生). We believe he is fully entitled to it.

Chapter 21
Whither China's Womanhood?

In two recent issues of *The China Critic* (Vol. IV, Nos. 4 and 8), there appeared two articles on "the Chinese Madonna", the first written by a gentleman complaining that such a being does not yet exist and that many social forces contribute to prevent her from coming into existence, the second by a lady vindicating that such is not the case.[1] She was almost indignant at what the first writer had to say as to what exactly constitutes the Chinese Madonna, or any Madonna for that matter. The first writer of course expressed quite a portion of the masculine point of view, and the second does the same with the feminine or, I may be mistaken here, rather the feministic approach. Now, who is to be the judge? "The father-in-law has his reasons, and the mother-in-law is right too," as the Chinese saying goes. In the absence of any true intersex or gynandromorph in our species which is called sapient, a really good judge has to be engaged from the planet of Mars.

But the case is after all not so hopeless. As it rests upon a difference of points of view or, rather, on a difference in the emphasis put upon them, the case may find a solution when the points of view are properly compared and weighed and each given its due. The first writer based his opinion on the assumption that *woman is woman*. Being *woman*, she has duties and responsibilities of her own, some of which exclusively so and must never be neglected, such as motherhood. The second based hers on a totally different assumption, that *woman is homo*. Being *homo*, she is entitled to all rights and privileges as accrue to all who come under that generic name, such as the knowledge and practice of politics. Now of course woman is *both*, and for her and for society to live at peace she simply had to live and let live as *both*. That is the problem in a nutshell.

---

[1] Editor's note: Refer to the following two articles: Sun Chih Hsiang: "The Chinese Madonna in the Making" and V. T. Bang-Chou (周彭望荃): "What is the Chinese Madonna?"

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. IV, No. 1, February 26, 1931, by the name of: Cohen Tien〔田坎侯〕)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_21

It does no longer need to be pointed out that throughout human history woman has never been able to live as both *woman* and *homo*, at least not as a class. Prior to the nineteenth century, the iron rule was that woman must live exclusively as woman. But since then, with the development of feministic ideas, womanly duties have come to be regarded as quite secondary; the extremists in the so-called emancipation movement have indeed gone so far as to advise against marriage and motherhood, and as a matter of fact, it is becoming increasingly fashionable for a woman nowadays to forsake wifehood and maternity for the sake of a career, that is, for a life which will vindicate her status as a homo. Needless to say, both kinds of experience are one-sided. But who is to blame? Historians and social students have been busy with fixing that responsibility. Some ascribe it to human frailty. Feministic leaders like Wollstonecraft and Mill argue that the willfulness of man has reduced womankind to subjection. On the other hand, opponents of feminism, at least the more militant forms of it, accuse that willful women are leading astray many members of their sex who would have gone on marrying and bearing and rearing children had they not come under the sinister influence of their agitation and propaganda. Others attribute the one-sidedness of the development of circumstances social and biological. They maintain in the first place that life in nature as well as in society has during the course of evolution naturally led to a division of labor based upon sex distinction, and that reproduction, including the gestative, parturitive, and lactative processes, and taking up the best portion of a woman's life, is itself a very one-sided function. In the second place, any woman committed to the task of raising a new generation will simply have to forego many other functions of which she is equally capable, to be henceforth taken up almost exclusively by her menfolk. Thus, what was at the beginning a one-sidedness in a biological function later developed into a one-sidedness in many social functions.

On the other hand, the sudden rise of a class of women who view marriage and motherhood with aversion may also be explained on biological and social grounds. Such women, they say, are under-sexed and deficient in that internal urge which is often called maternal instinct. The presence of such women in any large numbers not only necessitates the carving out of new pursuits other than wifehood and motherhood but also creates a general atmosphere which is inimical to the two historical functions of womankind.

But we have brought ourselves to another impasse. Theoretically woman should live and be allowed to live both as *woman* and as *homo*, but practically, circumstances, biological and others, are such that certain amount of one-sidedness is and will forever be inevitable; however, much the feminists may agitate against it. To reconcile the two propositions, three suggestions are now available—suggestions that were quite inconceivable before and even during the early years of the feminist movement. In the first place, not all women are alike. For the sake of discussion, let us simply assume that any woman is endowed with two sets of qualities, one fitting her to wifehood and motherhood, and the other predisposing her to a life of independence and intellectual work, in short, to a career. Now, the very simple fact of organic variation will tell us a priori that women are not equally equipped with these two sets of qualities, some better in one, others in other. And it follows that it is just as

unnatural to force the more maternal type of woman to a career, which many feminists are consciously or unconsciously doing, as to subject the more intellectual type to domesticity and motherhood, which civilized society has been doing all along. Both the conservative and the feminist err, but evidently in opposite directions. In a more rationally and scientifically ordered society, these two types of women will have opportunity and freedom to discover their own proclivities and find their proper places in the social complex. With the breaking down of many traditional bounds, we are now already witnessing the emergence from obscurity of the more intellectual type, but on the other hand, feminist agitation and propaganda are leading astray increasingly large numbers of the more maternally inclined. Many such women beguile themselves into believing that they are now free. Yes. But they freed themselves only to fall victims to feminist propaganda and to that mysterious influence euphemistically called the spirit of the times.

The second suggestion has come from social thinkers like Mr. and Mrs. Bertrand Russell and has much to commend itself. Like the first suggestion we have been discussing, it has the merit of being differential. The best part of a woman's life is undoubtedly those reproductive years between 20 and 45. Even though all these years are given over to the home and children, at least she is free in her more mature years to devote herself to pursuits to which her intellectual interests are best adapted. The universalization of adequate birth control methods, making maternity voluntary and properly spaced, promises to reduce the reproductive period to a shorter span so that the period for social and intellectual work may be made proportionately longer. A woman of intellectual interests may henceforth marry early, start to have children early, and, after the desired number is reached, may sally forth from the home, say, at 40 or even 35. Such an arrangement will doubtless be particularly satisfactory to that type of women whose endowment both as to intellectual interests and maternal yearnings is about equally divided, and who we believe constitute the majority of womankind.

The third consideration is purely psychological, and we believe time and education are sufficient to inculcate it in the minds of most people. As we have already said, anything rooted in sex distinction cannot but be one-sided. This is another way of saying that the sexes are not equal. They are not equal, and it cannot be helped, since nature has so ordained. But inequality here does not mean necessarily injustice. It is true that in ruling that all women must marry and beget children, past tradition has been unjust and inconsiderate to some women, but not to all. But so has been the feminist movement, in ruling the other way. In a sound system of sex education, the very first working principle to be enjoined is "Harp no more on the theme of sex equality." Outside of the home and activities connected with it, women can never aspire to be equals of men; not because they are incapable, but because their chances of fully utilizing their capacity is limited by circumstances which are not with human power to remove or correct. Even when the suggestions made by thinkers like the Russells are fully acted upon, women who are mothers still will find it impossible to keep pace with their husbands, simply because their attention is divided while their husbands' is not. The universalization of public nurseries, if it could be done, will have some equalizing influence. But then how about the period

of gestation and the few months after parturition during which rest is absolutely necessary? To obviate this, appeal indeed must be had to Professor Haldane's "ectogenesis" as prescribed in his Daedalus!

But when the matter is viewed no longer from the standpoint of equality, but, instead, from that of equitable and complementary division of labor, or, to follow Havelock Ellis, that of equivalence of function, the necessity for all this fuss disappears. Women may rightly envy the relative freedom enjoyed by men, but men may with equal reason envy that blessed state of bondage called maternity and motherhood, of the experience of which they cannot even have the slightest idea except perchance through the next metempsychosis.

It will be seen that the present writer's views differ quite materially from those expressed in the two articles on the Chinese Madonna referred to in the beginning of this piece of discussion. Such views are applicable not to the Chinese Madonna alone, but to the Madonna of any clime and creed. The only point that may be added is that while feministic ideas have lost much of their relish in the West, they, like other imported things, are still quite novel in this country and, if they are not viewed critically and accepted with qualification, may be productive of much social waste and unrest. It will be of course grossly unjust to lay everything at the door of feminism, which is itself an expression of the spirit of the times generated by a thousand and one forces, but in relying much upon propaganda and agitation, feminism has doubtless constituted one important factor in the destruction of the Madonna ideal and the disintegration of the home. Mr. Sun, the writer of the first article, may have been a bit too sweeping in his condemnation of present trends, but Mrs. Chou certainly evinces an undue amount of optimism when she declares that "the United States with all her divorce cases is still a world power" and that "England with her Lady Astor never finds her international prestige impaired because of political equality women have attained." This is of course all true, but true national greatness is something more social and cultural than political and is to be measured in duration by centuries and not by decades. Perhaps Mrs. Chou is not aware that many serious students in England and America do see, with Mr. Sun, in the disintegration of the family and all that it implies germs of ultimate downfall of their respective cultures. Dr. F.C.S. Schiller may be named at the head of this class of thinkers in England, and in America, dozens have been writing in recent years on social questions from the standpoint of family and racial conservation.

"Whither China's womanhood" is too generalized a question to be answered off hand. But whither China's intelligent and educated womankind? For the majority of them, the index finger points definitely in the direction that leads to the home and to motherhood. Nature has them so equipped, and social and racial considerations demand that they lead themselves and be led in that direction.

Chapter 22
Japan's Rape on Civilization

22.1 Introduction

Modern China has two main cultural and educational centers, Peiping and Shanghai. Peiping represents more of the traditional type, while Shanghai represents more of the progressive. The progressiveness of Shanghai is, of course, to be traced primarily to its propitious geographical situation. But latest events have proved that what has made this progressiveness in culture possible in half a century has now undone it in less than half a month. What has been a blessing proves now to be a curse.

Shanghai has been not only the home of the largest printing house in the whole of the Orient but has also fostered the growth of numerous institutions of higher learning, many dating back in history to more than three or four decades. The tourist passing through Shanghai must have been impressed with the number and variety of well-built school buildings that dot the periphery of this great metropolis. As the steamer plies up the Whangpoo, the very first thing that attracts his attention is the tall bright-red bell-tower of the China National University, the *alma mater* of Dr. Hu Shih, while in the foreground are to be found the less conspicuous Mercantile Navigation College and Sea Products College. Less than a mile up the river, the pinkish main structure of the Medical College of the National Central University overhangs from behind the shop buildings of the Woosung bund. At the head of this college is Dr. F.C. Yen, the brother of Dr. W.W. Yen, China's chief delegate to the League of Nations at Geneva. About a mile further to the West is located the National Tung Chi University, famous for its engineering and medical courses and for its German tradition and personnel. The tourist aboard is not expected to include this in his field of view but what he fails to see is perhaps made up by what he has already heard about the institution. In the last few years, two more schools of higher

(Originally published in *Symposium on Japan's Undeclared War in Shanghai*, The Chinese Chamber of Commerce, second impression, March 20, 1932, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_22

learning have been added in the Woosung area, the Agricultural and Engineering Colleges of the National Labor University.

More than half way up the river before the steamer reaches Shanghai bund, the tourist sees in full array the buildings of the University of Shanghai, formerly known as the Shanghai Baptist College and more intimately known as "Brown in China." It is situated just on the west bank of the river. About a mile further west and located well in what is now the new civic center of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai is the Fuh Tan University. The College of Social Sciences of the Labor University is still further to the west, beyond the International Race Course and touching the town of Kiangwan. In this general area, also known as Kiangwan, and flanking the Shanghai–Woosung branch of the Shanghai–Nanking Railway are to be found three more schools of collegiate standing: Chih Tze University, the School of Commerce of the National Central University and the Shanghai College of Law, the last being nearest to Shanghai and in close proximity to the Hongkew Park.

Turning in a westerly direction, the tourist, now perhaps aboard a train *en route* to Hangchow, is struck with another cluster of universities. As the train winds its way first westward and then southward from the North Station, the first group of buildings that impresses him as formidable constitute the Great China University, a young but full -fledged one within a short period of 5 or 6 years. Within a minute or two the tourist is brought to review, on the other side of the railroad tracks and beyond the Soochow Creek, another set of structures which represent one of the oldest institutions of its kind in this land and also one with the richest missionary background, St. John's University. The train may have by this time stopped at a station called Jessfield which leads almost directly to the University; and in the lingo of the Chinese residents nearby, both the station and the university have come to acquire a common name, Fan Wang Tu, originally the name of an old ferry across the Soochow Creek at this point. The next stop at Siccawei brings the tourist in sight of the observatory and the library of the Jesuits, and more to our present interest, the Chiao Tung University, formerly the Nanyang College, for decades the strong rival in athletics of St. John's. It is the *alma mater* of numerous engineers who are now reconstructing China. But midway between these two stations, there is yet another newly developed school, the Kwang Hua University. Turning from this group of schools to the south of the Settlements and coming near the old Chinese city of Shanghai, the tourist, if he had started his Hangchow excursion from the South Station, would have come within echoing distance of yet another university, the Utopia University.

The survey so far does not exhaust the list of colleges and universities. The Chi Nan University, reputed to be the highest center of learning for overseas Chinese youths, is located in Chen-ju, four miles from the International Settlement. It has a very beautiful campus by which a tourist en route to or from Nanking cannot fail to be attracted.

Within the International Settlement, there are two schools which are interesting for our present purpose. The Comparative Law School of Soochow University, which is to Chinese lawyers as what the Chiao Tung University is to Chinese engineers,

is located in the Hongkew district. The newly erected College of Commerce and Journalism of the University of Shanghai is found further south across the Soochow Creek. In the French Concession, there are two or three schools of note, of which the best known is Aurora University.

Now, in what has already been said it was assumed that the tourist must have made his tour before January 28, 1932. Had he come later than that date, even if he had followed our itinerary to the letter, his experience would not have tallied with the account above given. The reason for this is obvious to all who have watched the unprecedented rush of events in Shanghai since that date. Japan has not only made undeclared war on Shanghai but also has so made it as to have her writ large in Chinese history as having perpetrated a type of vandalism with a precision and efficiency which is only capable in this gracious age of power and science. Of the total number of institutions detailed above, the seven in Woosung have been either entirely demolished by shell and bomb fire or so damaged as to become incapacitated for further function. Of the six in the Kiangwan region, at least three are known to have been totally destroyed as their sites are right within the line of conflict, and one to have suffered partial damage. The fate of the other two is yet to be revealed; close as they are to the water front, they very early come under Japan's "protection." Among the five institutions in the west, at least two have received special visits by bombing planes which carried out their missions with appreciable measures of success. The rest seem to have been benefited by being in close neighborhood of extraconcessional roads. But with the Chinese troops retreating toward Nanziang and with the Japanese following close upon their heels, the final fate of these schools is yet to be seen. Of those listed as within the Settlements, the one in the Hongkew District was the very first victim to considerable rummage and damage. It paid the penalty for being too close to Japanese civilization in Shanghai.

Thus in a total of about 20 institutions, at least 14 are known (up to the time of the present writing) to have suffered from varying degrees of destruction. More detailed facts follow in the next section.

22.2 The Facts

The exact extent of damage done by Japan's undeclared war upon Shanghai and its vicinity cannot be known at the present stage of Sino-Japanese conflict. To all intents and purposes the "war" is still on, even though the Chinese troops have strategically retreated. The part of the loss borne by the institutions of learning is of course even harder to know. Its exact extent will never be known. Institutions of learning represent accumulated cultural experience which, as everybody knows, does not lend to quantitative measurement. But let us review the facts as far as they are ascertainable through the press and reports from responsible persons connected with these ill-fated institutions.

Before separate accounts are given of the damaged institutions, the following chronological record may be of interest:

January 29	The Commercial Press
January 30	The Comparative Law School
February 1	The Oriental Library of the Commercial Press
February 1	Chi Nan University
February 1	The Great China University
February 3	Preparatory School of Chih Tze University
February 3–4	Shanghai College of Law
February 6	The Min Sen Middle School
February 6	The Presbyterian Press
February 7	The Sea Products College
February 7	Mercantile Navigation College
February 7 (?)	National Tung Chi University
February 7	China National University
February 8	Medical College, National Central University
February 8 (?)	College of Agriculture, National Labor University
February 8 (?)	College of Engineering, National Labor University
February 9–10	Chih Tze University
February 11	Yueh Tsing Middle School
February 11	Fuh Tan University
February 25	Hsueh Yi Society

This record is more inclusive than the list of collegiate institutions given in our first section. There are two or three middle schools which we are not going to consider in any detail. Nor are we to relate the tragic experience undergone by The Commercial Press and its famous library; it finds expression in a separate and exclusive paper. The Presbyterian Press will not be dealt with either. The Hsueh Yi Society which concludes the list is a research institution of long standing organized by Japanese returned students. A short account will be allotted to it accordingly.

A very significant point is to be noticed in this record. With the exception of the Hsueh Yi Society, all the havoc was wrought between January 30 and February 11, a short period of 13 days, confirming for the superstitious that after all 13 is an unlucky number.

The Comparative Law School, Soochow University—The following account of destruction of the school was found in the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, the American paper in the city, on January 30:

> The Comparative Law School of China, a branch of Soochow University, situated at 11 Quinsan Road, was badly damaged by a group of men, reported to have been Japanese *ronins* at 1 o'clock this morning.

> Believed to have been searching for anti-Japanese literature, the group entered the law school building, smashed windows, destroyed furniture, cut the upholstery and broke the panels in many of the doors in the structure.
>
> Following this, the group departed and crossed the street to the Soochow University middle school where they contented themselves with smashing a solitary window.
>
> The law school, a branch of Soochow University, is an American institution operated by the American Methodist Episcopal Mission, South.
>
> Servants in the law school building, reported to have been roughly handled by the invaders, made their way after the alleged *ronins* had departed to the residence of Dr. J. C. Hawks, presiding elder of the district for the American Methodist Mission, South.
>
> They told Dr. Hawks that they saw a Japanese bluejacket at the head of the group. The others, it was pointed out, were armed with clubs, guns and blackjacks.
>
> Dr. Hawks is in possession of two white arm bands and one red arm band similar to those used by the Japanese *ronins* stationed in the Hongkew District yesterday and last night.
>
> Dr. Hawks is making a complete report of the affair to the local United States consular authorities.

Dr. A. G. U. Pozzy de Besta, a well-known Swiss legalist and Professor of Swiss Civil Law at the school, wrote in *The China Press* on February 8:

> Among all the blunders committed by Japan since her first assault on Shanghai on January 28, the partial destruction of the Comparative Law School of China, a branch of the Soochow University, and its sealing up by Japanese naval forces was not the least one, for it was the first deliberate violation of foreign property on Settlement ground. Strong protests have been lodged with the Japanese authorities and it is to be expected that the damages suffered by the Comparative Law School of China, owned by an American institution, will fully be made good by Japan. These damages include not only the destroyed furniture but also the loss of time and money sustained by students and teachers who are still prevented from continuing their studies. The Comparative Law School of China, located within the boundaries of the International Settlement, has been ransacked without any necessity by regular Japanese armed forces. Japan's liability is therefore clearly established.
>
> A state is liable for any offence committed by its organs against the provisions of international law, and it is an acknowledged principle that it doesn't matter whether the offending organs acted upon instruction or without any knowledge of their superior authorities. As to the present case, the fourth Convention at The Hague of 1907 provides in its Article 3, explicitly, that among the organs that imply the liability of a state are included not only those who are in charge and control of the international relations but also the armed forces (members of the regular army and navy). As the Comparative Law School of China has been damaged, and still is damaged, by Japanese soldiers and *ronins*, Japan has committed an offence against international law and is, therefore, responsible not only for the restoration of the former condition of the Comparative Law School of China (*restitutio in integrum*) but also for the damages inflicted upon students and teachers on account of the interruption of their studies (tort moral).

While *The Post* speaks as an American paper and Dr. Pozzy as a student of international law, we are primarily interested in the Law School as a cultural and educational institution. The school is among the oldest of its kind in this country. Since its establishment about 20 years ago it, has always maintained a high standard and has been considered on a par with similar institutions in the USA, to which its graduates have been freely admitted for post-graduate studies, in particular the Michigan Law School. At present, the greatest apprehension is being felt over the large collection

of books and bound volumes of old periodicals invaluable to the pursuit of legal studies. Students of the school whom the present writer has met have received information that they are among the damages wrought by Japanese *ronins. Restitutio in integrum* will never be achieved with regard to such things.

National Chi Nan University—No detailed report has appeared in the press regarding this school for overseas Chinese youths. But situated as it is in close neighborhood of the Nineteenth Route Army Headquarters before the latter's general retreat of March 1, it very early became a target of Japanese bombing planes and fell an easy victim to their ravages. On the fifth day after hostilities began, some of the bombs succeeded in blowing off a part of the science building containing many valuable specimens and instruments of precision. For fear of further destruction, the librarian Mr. K.C. Hsu succeeded a few days later in moving out about nine-tenths of the books, representing one of the best collections in possession of collegiate institutions in and around Shanghai.

The Great China University—As far as is known this school has suffered least. On the same day when the science building of Chi Nan was attacked, one or two bombs fell on the campus of this university but according to a reference in the daily paper, they failed to register any hit except a tree. No other aerial attacks have been reported after this. It seems that proximity to some of the extraconcessional roads and particularly to the sector which has been allotted to the British regulars for protection has spared the school much worry and anxiety.

The story of the two last mentioned schools cannot be taken as concluded at the present time. With the retreat of the Chinese army westward and with the whole environs of the Settlement falling under the "protection" of the Japanese, how far will these schools remain intact is yet to be determined.

The Shanghai College of Law—It appears that law schools are more strongly attracted to Japanese neighbors. The authorities of these schools might have thought that their profession was sufficient to inspire restraint to any form of lawlessness that might take place in the neighborhood. But they have been wrong and have paid dearly for it. We have already given the experience of the Comparative Law School in the Hongkew district, which is bitter enough. But an even worse fate entailing greater and more irreparable losses befell upon the Shanghai College of Law on February 3 and 4. This school is close to the boundary between Shanghai and Kiangwan and is less than a quarter mile away from the Hongkew Park which very early became one of the Japanese headquarters. Its destruction, therefore, had long been taken as fore-ordained. Owing to inaccessibility, the report of the destruction, however, did not find its way to the papers until about 20 days later, when one of the servants in the school succeeded in sneaking away from the ruins. The following account is found in *The China Press* of February 26 (italics in all quoted passages to follow are supplied by the present writer):

> The god of fire, who has visited educational institutions in Woosung and Kiangwan lately, has not neglected the Shanghai College of Law, Kiangwan Road, buildings of which have been *completely burned down* during the recent heavy firing in its vicinity.
>
> The estimated loss is placed somewhere around $435,000, and more than 1,300 students have been driven from school as the result.

A report on the fate of the school has been submitted to the Ministry of Education by school authorities with the hope that the Ministry will file a protest against the Japanese destruction of cultural centers in China.

Fire gutted classrooms first, on February 3. The assembly hall and students' dormitory were not destroyed until the next morning, according to one of the school servants who has just made escape from danger.

In 1925, plans were begun to found the law school in Shanghai by Mr. Shen Chun-lu, former chief secretary of the political council of the Chekiang provincial government, and Mr. Chu Fu-cheng, prominent local educationalist. Their plans matured in the following year.

The college was opened in 1926 with a college enrollment of not more than 50 students and a faculty of 10. Classes were conducted in small rooms.

Classrooms with a capacity for more than 1,600 students and student dormitories able to accommodate more than 1,000 were constructed in the following year. The assembly hall was completed in 1930.

Sea Products College—That the denizens of the sea, after years of preservation in formaldehyde, should be finally cremated by fire from tri-nitro-toluene is the strangest fate to be found in the world of living creatures. Strange as it may seem, it does happen once in a long while. When Japan's warships and fighting planes found it expedient to clear the environs of the Woosung Forts of all buildings and inhabitants, they made no exception of the provincial college for the collection and study of sea products. Almost 10 days after the disaster, we read in *The China Press* (February 16):

The compound of Sea Products College (Shui Chai School) has been completely *reduced to an open space with remains of sea products, broken glass and charcoal* since the first flash of the Japanese bombardment at the Woosung Fort had taken place. It has been a close neighbor to the Navigation College, and the students of this school have been trained to obtain sea products by the most efficient means and produce chemical imitations of them.

At about the same time the faculty and staff of the school conveyed to the provincial authorities the actual extent of demolition to be forwarded to the national government as basis for filing a protest and, later on, for seeking indemnity.

Authorities of the educational department of the Kiangsu Provincial Government, Chinkiang, are requested to report the Japanese bombardment of the Shui Chai College (Sea Products College), Woosung, to the national government in order to file a protest against the Japanese aggression in China. The request was cabled yesterday to the department by the faculty and officers of this college.

Japanese are charged with the *destruction of the school building, specimens of sea products rarely found* in China, and *various sets of apparatus* for the measurement of astronomical bodies and navigation. The cable petitions for full compensation from Japan through proper Chinese authorities.

At the same time, the department is requested to give financial assistance for the establishment of a similar institution at an unaffected area for the group of refugee students of the school, and authorities of other schools are asked to render substantial help to this proposed institution.

According to the school authorities, this college was established twenty years ago by the Chinese government. It has been *the only institution in China which has cultivated specialists in sea products and the manufacturing of imitations. The destruction of sea products and apparatus alone entails a loss of about* $1,000,000.

The College was bombed during an attack of Japanese troops on Woosung Forts.

The Mercantile Navigation College—A next door neighbor to the Sea Products College, the Navigation College had its fate sealed on the same day, in all probability

February 7. Organized in the last years of the Manchu regime by Admiral Sah Cheng-ping, the school has had a long and checkered history and has remained the only institution of its kind in this country. Its destruction would inevitably mean for many years the further retardation for the development of the art and science of navigation. *The China Press* reported on February 16:

> Chinese Navigation College, formerly under the Ministry of Navy, now reorganized by the Ministry of Communication for the purpose of training expert navigators with special emphasis upon piloting and repairing steamers and measurements of bodies of water of various sizes, has suffered along with other schools in the vicinity. Buildings of this school have been bombed, and most of the 350 students have not reported their whereabouts to any of the local relief bodies or refugee camps.

National Tung Chi University—Japan's aerial attack upon this school, as can be gathered from different reports, must have started on February 7 or even a bit earlier. While Chinese newspapers had nothing to report until February 11, Berliners who had been extremely anxious over the safety of their compatriots teaching in this university had the following to communicate to Shanghai through the Transocean on February 9:

> Apprehension at the fate of the German teaching staff at the Tung-chi University at Woosung was dispelled today by dispatches from Shanghai reporting the arrival there of the remaining 13 teachers and their families. Thanks to the courtesy of the Chinese military authorities, the women and children had made the journey *via* Chenju in a Red Cross truck, while the men had walked. All carried with them only the bare necessities of life, leaving behind them, apart from all their possessions, *some valuable libraries and collections*. Professor Othmer, the head of the Tung-chi Middle School and one of the foremost German sinologues, fears the loss of his *famous library containing many rare volumes*. Professor Stueber of the university's medical faculty, whose house was situated right below the Woosung forts, also has *abandoned all hope for his valuable collections, the results of a life time of scientific work*.
>
> All the newspapers publish long eyewitness stories from the fugitives who passed the night from Sunday to Monday in dug-outs prepared by themselves and who were unwilling to part from the university compound and their property until at last the Japanese bombs compelled them to seek a refuge in Shanghai. The electric laboratory of the university has been hit and destroyed by two Japanese aerial bombs, while the other buildings, though there had been no direct hit until Monday (Feb. 8) morning, were severely damaged by machine gun and rifle fire. All accounts emphasize the valor of the Chinese troops in resisting the Japanese landing forces as well as the courteous behavior of the commanding officers toward the small colony.

While bombardment had started on February 7 or thereabout the task of destruction was not completed until February 11. In the Chinese evening papers of that day and as well as in *The China Press* on the 16th, we read:

> School buildings including electricity room, science hall, laboratory, middle school dormitories and classrooms have been *completely wrecked* at Tung Chi University. While one-third of the 620 students of this school have reported their cases to the registration office of the dormitory at 22 Burkill Road, nothing has been heard from the remaining group. . . . Telegrams reporting the ill fate of the school have been despatched to the German government by Professor Birt, dean of the medical faculty, Professor G. Slotnarin, dean of the engineering faculty and Dr. W. Othmer, dean of the middle school of this university, and authorities of the German government have been requested to file a letter of protest to the Japan government.

The China National University (Chung Kuo Kung Hsueh)—It will be recalled that this is the first school that is conspicuous to the tourist sailing from the Yangtse into the Whangpoo. Along with the other schools skirting the Woosung Forts, this university was in the van to receive the blunt of attack by shells and bombs:

> Instituted by local educationalists, including Dr. Hu Shih, the China National University has had a student body of more than 2,000. *Six-tenths of the school constructions have been destroyed*, and the whereabouts of one-third of the students have been unknown following the bombardment of this school.
>
> This institution has been one of the best schools in Shanghai established by Chinese with special emphasis on plain Chinese language and mandarin.

The above is also quoted from *The China Press* of February 16. This school is well known partly because of its relationship with Dr. Hu Shih, who was not only a student there but served as its president and on the board of directors for a number of years. Its prestige among local institutions, however, recently suffered a great blow when its management came under Party influence and became a bone of contention between factions of the Kuomintang.

Medical College, National Central University—This is the school that has been most responsible in Red Cross work since the commencement of Sino-Japanese hostilities, as its president, Dr. Yen, is concurrently the head of the Chinese Red Cross Hospital. But in spite of its charitable mission, it was allotted the regular quota of bombs and shells between the morning of February 8 and 11. No reports have appeared in the papers except the following meager lines from the evening extra of *Shih Pao* of February 8:

> Early in the morning, about 4 a.m., Japanese aerial bombs directed at the Medical College succeeded in blowing off a part of the third floor of the main building which housed the Physiological Laboratory of the school.

A reference to the school in the same paper on 11th indicated that greater and more widespread damages were done during the intervening days.

Colleges of Agriculture and Engineering, Labour University—The following amounts to all what the writer has been able to glean from the press (*The China Press*, Feb. 16) with regard to the damages sustained by these two schools:

> Half of the school building of the Agricultural College of the Labor University has been bombed, but most of the class rooms have not been damaged. It is located 10 miles from the Woosung Fort in the Paoshan district.
>
> The Engineering College of Labor University, being located in the midst of the war zone, has been totally demolished. School authorities are anxious to learn the whereabouts of half of the students who have left school following the outbreak of the Sine-Japanese conflict in Woosung.

The National Labour University has a third school, the College of Social Sciences. It is located on the outskirts of the town of Kiangwan. The concentrated attacks of Japanese troops after February 20 in this region, which reduced the whole town to ashes must have included this school in the devastation.[1]

[1] About ten days after this was written, Mr. Malcolm Posholt had the following to say with regard to this their school of the Labor University and its immediate environs:

Chih Tze University—About the demolition of this school by Japanese soldiery we are in possession of more detailed information through a letter addressed to *The China Press* on February 21 by its Alumni Association, and also a project and appeal for reconstruction by members of its faculty published in *The China Weekly Review* of February 27. In the former document, we are informed both as to the history and the recent wreckage of the school:

> The most heinous of all the Japanese military atrocities is the wanton and unnecessary destruction of the institutions of culture. Our Alma Mater, Chih Tze University and the middle school affiliated, was set afire on February 3 and 10 by the Japanese marines. Not to say the heavy losses which have been sustained, the efforts which have been put in from the opening of the institution are far from being estimable.
>
> Chih Tze University was founded by Dr. Ho Shih-chen and his two brothers, Mr. Ho Shih-mo and Dr. Ho Shih-mai in accordance with the wish of their grandfather, the late Mr. Ho Ru-chih. The support of the university depended entirely upon the private funds of the Ho family. . . . From its birthday, December 2, 1924, up to the present, the enrollment of the students has grown from 100 to 1,500, with 600 already graduated.
>
> In the summer of 1931, the premises on Kiangwan Road were found inadequate, and hence plans were soon formulated to locate a new campus on Stein Road, Chapei, for the accommodation of the university while the middle school remained on the old site. The main buildings of the new campus are estimated on silver dollars around 300,000, with all modern equipments and fittings, such as the power house, water tower and steam heat system. The library had a huge accumulation of Chinese and foreign books, ancient and new. Among the ancient books was the *Royal Edition of Literary Works, a rare or probably the only edition to be found anywhere*. The library alone cost more than $40,000. The casualties resulted from the Japanese actions have totally demolished that illustrious institution of learning.

In the project and appeal for reconstruction issued by the professors, an even more detailed account is given of how the Japanese soldiers deliberately set about to burn and kill until the premises were reduced to ashes:

> Chih Tze University was founded by the Ho brothers. The premises of its middle school or department of college preparatory were located in the vicinity of Recreation Road and that of its college proper near Shui Tien Road. The latter contained new buildings with a spacious auditorium, dining halls, recitation rooms, a library and dormitory for the accommodation of one thousand students. In the stacks of the library were placed many volumes of Chinese and foreign books of great value and a collection of rare relics from Chinese literature and philosophy. Ever since the fighting in Shanghai, the Japanese soldiers have deliberately bent their energy and mind upon annihilating the centers of civilization of the Chinese citizenry. Unfortunately, therefore, Chih Tze University had become one of their victims.
>
> In the afternoon of February 3rd, 1932, the Japanese soldiers rushed into the premises of its middle school through the Hongkew Park, attacking it with machine guns. Later on, they bound the hands of the gate-keeper and man and maid servants behind their backs,

---

Almost any place one goes in the Kiangwan district is desolate, unspeakable destruction. Homes, schools, and factories have shared alike in the amount of destruction suffered. It seems that schools and factories have been the special objects of demolition, because hardly one in that area came through without experiencing heavy damages. Labor University is riddled with bullet and shells holes from one end to the other. The statue of the man with his hands in his pockets also came in for its share of punishment. Although the man still has his hands in his pockets, his face has been shot away leaving the skull supported on two small rods. The entrance to the compound is deformed, topographically speaking, with a hole in the ground that is 15 feet across and six or seven feet deep.

intending to shoot them; but their commanding officer ordered them to force their captives to walk into the fire specially kindled for the burning of the school by the soldiers, instead of shooting them. Whereupon the gate-keeper and a man servant started to run away for their lives, being followed by the rest of their fellow-servants. The Japanese soldiers opened fire upon them, discharging more than thirty bullets and killing one man servant and another maid servant. The gate-keeper and the man servant had, however, succeeded in narrowly escaping from instantaneous death.

In the afternoon of February 9th, 1932, at five o'clock, the Japanese soldiers made a rush into the premises of its college proper by way of Chu Chia Chiao bridge, attacking it with machine guns. Later on, they tried to search the servants, whom they thought would be found hiding in and around there. Fortunately, the gate-keeper and other servants had gone into the homes of neighboring peasants, so that the Japanese soldiers could do nothing and were obliged to return to their headquarters quite reluctantly.

In the afternoon of February 10th, 1932, at five o'clock, they came again with the intention of burning all the buildings in and around the campus; but since they were built under the structure of reinforced concrete, it was not so easy to burn them down, they had, therefore, to go back to their headquarters again without doing anything successfully.

Early in the morning of February 11th, 1932, at five o'clock, once more they came to start the burning of the buildings, and in the afternoon four aeroplanes came on the spot, dropping about forty or fifty bombs, thereby helping the soldiers to complete their deeds of destruction with the result that all of the new buildings of the campus were reduced to ashes in a few hours.

Chih Tze University has already weathered the storms of eight solid years, since its inception, and its record has been very excellent both administratively and scholastically. Many of its graduates, have gone to America, England and France and completed their studies for the Masters' and Doctors' degrees with high credits, and have come back to serve their nation in various professions for which they have received good training in the way of preparation. There is no question that there are practically very few universities in China of a private nature—private in the sense that they are run independently by their founders, so far as the question of finance is concerned.

Fuh Tan University—Little has so far appeared in the foreign press about this school except that after February 20, its campus was used for a number of days as the headquarters of the Japanese General Uyeda. But as early as February 11, the Chinese press (*The China Times*, evening extra) reported that the Japanese soldiers fired upon the premises with their machine guns. The extent of damages at that time, however, was not indicated. On February 25, we were informed by the same paper that:

Ever since the university was appropriated by the Japanese as their headquarters a few days ago, many damages have been done to furniture and equipment. The buildings have also suffered from bombs and shells. This has already meant inestimable loss to the school. But according to the report of a Chinese officer who came back yesterday (February 24) from the front after having engaged in battle with the Japanese in the neighborhood of the University, apparently the library has been ransacked and destroyed, for all along Zing Ying Road from the gate of the University to the Dairy and Nursery Company, he found numerous broken and soiled volumes on the roadside. He believed they originally formed a part of the library.

The desire and ability of the Japanese to trample under foot the culture of another country are truly inordinate.[2]

[2] According to latest reports as appeared in *The China Press* of March 15, the School was found unharmed.

Hsueh Yi Society—One more institution and we shall be through. The building of the Hsueh Yi Society was razed to the ground on February 25, and the news to the effect was found both in *The China Press* and *The China Times* one or two days later:

> The Hsueh Yi Society, North Szechuen Road, was destroyed yesterday morning by fire, following Sino-Japanese hostilities in that area.
>
> Chinese students who have returned from Japan compose the membership of the society. While part of the society hall was the assembly room, the other space contained *foreign and Chinese books on special subjects and written sociological data* collected by Mr. Ma Tsoong-hsuang, secretary.
>
> Total loss as result of the fire is estimated at $400,000.
>
> Members of this society, following the Japanese occupation of Manchuria on September 18, have made special efforts to collect literary pieces with regard to Sino-Japanese relations, possible outcome of the strained condition and means for the national salvation.
>
> The Society was compelled to close on January 29 after a thorough search in the house by the Japanese troops.

This concludes the list of learned institutions that have suffered in different degrees from Japanese bombardment, ranging from the sprinkling of a few shells to wholesale devastation. As has already been touched upon, the total loss can never be ascertained and expressed in arithmetic figures. One conservative estimate of the material damages sustained by the seven schools in Woosung alone was $12,000,000.

22.3 An Interpretation

What has Japan done? *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, an American paper, called it "vicious vandalism" (February 1). The 105 British and American missionaries thought it constituted "an attack against civilization." While the latter was meant to be a rather general characterization of what Japan has done to Shanghai, it is more particularly and literally applicable to her deliberate and wanton destruction of learned and educational institutions with which the present paper deals. "An attack or rape on civilization" is apt and correct.

China has apparently lost heavily; but compared with Japan, has she really? Any material loss, however stupendous, and even though it represents an agency of culture, is after all immaterial. In the course of time and with renewed effort on the side of the injured party, it is replaceable. But what about the mental attitude which has led the aggressive party to deliberately inflict such losses upon the enemy? If it has taken mankind tens of centuries to evolve the desire and ability to hold in esteem culture and tools for the advancement of culture, then it would seem that Japan, by laying waste the cultural institutions on the outskirts of Shanghai, has experienced a tremendous setback in her progressive march with the world. Compared with the loss she has meted out to China by dint of her greater military prowess, such a loss on her own part is inestimably greater and more irreparable.

Japan is apparently a first-class civilized nation, even though she has only recently emerged from feudalism. But how are we to reconcile civilization with all

the outrages that she has perpetrated against culture and humanity in the very midst of one of the most civilized centers of the world? The defenders of Japanese interests and the Japanese point of view, of course, have not been reticent. The aged and erudite Dr. Inazo Nitobe, for instance, in an attempt to absolve what his fighting compatriots have been doing in Shanghai, told us through a recent number of the *Osaka Mainichi* and *Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, of which he is advisory editor, that "it is not seldom that fearless soldiers march on, and kill and burn more than is sanctioned by the laws of war and humanity."

What a revelation! But to the editor of *The China Critic* who appears to be a fairly good psychologist, the revelation serves no better purpose than a rationalization brought about by an acute nationalist bias:

> The epithet fearless was of course designed to atone for atrocities. But the fact is that *excesses are more often than not committed by those dominated by phobias which Japan, traditionally by her feudalism and more recently by her skilful propaganda, have successfully implanted in her soldiery and common people*. Aside from the feebly inhibited who have a hereditary basis, a modern psychologist will tell Dr. Nitobe, *it is only the thwarted and fear-ridden personality who is really capable of excesses whenever the conscious restraint is allowed to lift itself such as normally occurs to participants in organized warfare*. The learned doctor has certainly allowed a war-time and nationalist psychology to usurp the psychology that is scientifically expounded.

If this analysis by the editor of *The China Critic* is to stand, it would seem that while politically and economically Japan has been following doggedly the steps of the West, the nation is still largely dominated by many social and psychological survivals of feudalism. A feudalist culture has its distinctive merits, but the constant domination of the more lowly situated by semiconscious fears as a result of invisible class barriers and antagonisms must be counted as one of the greatest demerits, which is directly responsible for the excesses for which Japan is now being critically watched by the world. Insofar as such fears on the part of the mass would lead to excesses on occasions when conscious restraint is let off, and insofar as the excesses thus committed are still ingeniously defended by the more learned elements in the country, Japan must be considered, in reality, as not having yet arrived at the cultural stage which China has long ago reached. Between the almost religious reverence that is accorded to the "written character" by the Chinese and the deliberate wreckage of learned institutions by the Japanese in their present invasion, there is indeed a wide gap the bridging of which may yet take centuries.

Chapter 23
Since Darwin's Death

Charles Robert Darwin was born on February 12, 1809 and died on April 19, 1882. The fiftieth anniversary of his death occurred this year, just about a week ago. Little seems to have been done in this country by way of commemoration except a leading article in Shun Pao on the anniversary day. Amid these days of national crisis, even such a meager tribute must be considered surprisingly satisfying to those whose mind is not fettered down to the vicissitudes of daily life.

To most English readers, the life of this great emancipator of human mind from the shackles of mediaevalism is well known. It was singularly uneventful. His school days in Cambridge and Edinburgh were spent much as those of an average college student nowadays are spent, except that he had developed a rather inordinate liking of shooting birds which he in later years corrected. The brilliancy of his mind and his ability for hard mental work were not recognized even by himself until he joined the cruise of the *Beagle* as a naturalist toward the end of the year 1831, now just about a century ago. Upon his return from this voyage, he was found a quite different man by his rather austere father who exclaimed in the presence of him and his sisters, "Why, the shape of his head is quite altered." It indeed was, paving way for the proclamation of a theory to the world which was to shook the very foundation of human thought and life, the repercussions of which are uneasily felt to this day.

Darwin was no "mixer," but in his early years, he enjoyed quite a bit of social life, particularly in the company of many senior scientists and men of letters like Lyell, Hooker, Sedgwick, Humboldt, Macaulay, and Carlyle. He married in 1839, which will be remembered also as the year in which the doctrine of evolution by natural selection was first formulated, waiting to be elaborated, and then to be abstracted, and finally to appear in print 20 years later. He and his family moved to

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. V, No. 17, April 28, 1932, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_23

a newly bought residence at Down in 1842. His health had always been delicate, but from this time onward it became so much worse as to force him to lead almost a secluded life, which he did until his death in 1882. It was during this period of 40 years that all his major works were produced, beginning with the *Journal of Researches* in 1839, and ending with *The Formation of Vegetable Mould* in 1881, with almost a score of other work intervening, the more important *Origin of Species* toward the end of 1859 and *Descent of Man* early in 1871. "I have nothing to record during the rest of my life," wrote Darwin about the beginning of his residence at Down, "except the publication of my several books."

Fifty years have now elapsed since Darwin's death, and more than 60 and 70 years respectively since the first appearance of *Descent of Man* and *Origin of Species*. Has human life and thought changed much during this period? Believers in progress have claimed a great deal. But really? In the realm of thought, evolution and Darwinism seems to have greatly prevailed, first on the Continent, then in England itself, and finally the rest of the world. But the conquest is yet far from complete. To it is still opposed Christian Catholicism and Fundamentalism which latter not long ago went so far as to stage a trial of a middle school teacher in the State of Tennessee who had the audacity of teaching evolution to pollute the mind of developing youths. In the realm of practical social life, the influence of evolution and Darwinism as a conscious principle may be said not to have been even sensibly felt. Demagogues are still talking glibly about natural right, liberty, and equality which, as Thomas Huxley long ago pointed out, are diametrically opposed to the facts of variation and heredity which are the very foundation stones of the doctrine of evolution. With the slow advocacy of eugenics and race hygiene initiated by Francis Galton, a first cousin of Darwin, we are only beginning to apply evolutionary principles to human affairs. Eugenics has been not inaptly defined as conscious direction of human evolution.

What is true in other countries is also true in this country, if not more so. The first introduction of evolutionary thought into China took place in 1896 when Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* was translated into Chinese by Yen Foh. The translation was very widely circulated, and soon the evolutionary concepts of "struggle for existence," "natural selection," and "survival of the fittest" were constantly on the lips of those who considered themselves progressive and advanced. Soon the politicians were found to be talking as glibly about these concepts or factors of evolution as those revolutionary and metaphysical concepts of natural right, liberty, and equality. The incongruity between these two sets of concepts is to this day hardly recognized by them. Both sets have become current platitudinous slogans. What wonder is there if the teaching of evolution has effected but little change upon the life and thought of modern China?

As I see it, the failure of all this lies in an inability to distinguish between the facts of evolution such as variation and heredity from the factors of evolution. The leaders of thought may have a good acquaintance with the factors of evolution assumed by Darwin to exist, but they have failed to acquire a sufficient knowledge of the facts of evolution from which the assumed factors were derived. In the absence of a factual background in the minds of those who presume to know much

about evolution, their constant reference to the factors of "struggle," "selection," and "survival" cannot but become empty and shallow slogans.

The fiftieth anniversary of Darwin's death is as auspicious a point of time as any for us to undertake the study of Darwinism once more, not so much the doctrine itself as the many and multifarious facts in the organic world upon which the doctrine was based.

Chapter 24
Japan's Southward Policy

In a period when everybody is riveting his attention upon Manchuria as the actual "cockpit of Asia" as a recent author has not ineptly called it, there is great likelihood that we forget the other potential cockpits on the continent in which Japan is destined to play a role no less characteristic than what she is already playing in Manchuria. One such potential cockpit is certainly Nanyang. For many years Japan has adopted two policies of political expansion, one northward into Korea, Manchuria, and Russian Siberia, and the other southward into British Malaya, Dutch West Indies, and other insular and peninsular regions which the Chinese have for centuries conveniently termed "Nanyang." The northward policy is now being worked out in great detail, with much pomposity and no less verbosity.

Japan's southward policy, while still waiting to be transmuted into glaring action, is almost equally unmistakable. There are signs enough pointing to the slow but sure advent of the storm. A few such signs may be mentioned. We do not mean to forecast but at least the world must be prepared, lest it will be taken unawares, as it had been lately when Manchuria was suddenly invaded.

In the first place, Japan has for a number of years established a research center in Formosa from which have issued numerous investigators who are literally combing the whole of Nanyang for facts and possibilities. They have at the same time made searching observation of the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese as migrants and colonists.

In the second place, Japan has adopted a different view toward intermarriage in Nanyang from the one she holds in other places, for instance, in Hawaii. The latter place is noted for the melting-pot nature of its population, yet the Japanese there are known to be the most clannish, in marriage as in other matters. But the situation in Nanyang is totally different, Japanese ladies of fortune that went to Nanyang in

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. V, No. 18, May 5, 1932, by the name of: Q. P.)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_24

the van and ahead of traders and merchants entertain no repugnance against association or marriage with natives and migrants of other countries. This change of attitude has been interpreted by acute observers of Nanyang affairs as deliberate and calculated.

In the third place, public opinion in Japan has for some years been educated to understand that the Japanese people originally had their home in Nanyang, that their present occupation of Japan was a result of migration, and that the only logical thing for present-day Japan to do to relieve her of her surplus population is to resettle Nanyang. Whatever truth there is in this sort of ethnological juggling, it tells concretely that Japan's intention in Nanyang is more than economic and commercial.

It is high time that the overseas Chinese in Nanyang should become well acquainted with such facts. They should have no objection to the influx of Japanese as fellow immigrants to lands over which neither have political control. But they should be better equipped for the severe struggle that is bound to ensue.

Chapter 25
Bankruptcy of Higher Education

The financial situation of China's higher education has always been bad, but recent developments initiated by the government are making it worse. Lack of funds is a pretty general characteristic of all institutions of learning and research, but what has been a general trait will soon become a universal one when all the research institutes in Peiping, Shanghai, Nanking, and Canton and Tsing Hua University will be deprived of the support derived totally or partially from the indemnity refund from America. The Finance Ministry has recently announced the suspension for a year of the payment of monthly allowance from the refund to the aforesaid institutions, beginning from March. The public is of course not notified why the move has been necessary. But it may be surmised that the government is again in financial straits, and that to meet the exorbitant demands of military and other expenses, all available sources simply have to be tapped. A realist will of course be always silent on such occasions. But falling short of such a realist, we venture to point out that the indemnity refund is not really available, and even available, it is best spared for the sake of saving what is left of China's enterprise in modern university education and scientific research. It may be urged, and indeed is urged, that all the institutions affected have savings to draw upon and can easily tide over the year during which the monthly allowances are to be suspended. But all the savings has been deposited in the form of sinking fund, which, in the case of Tsing Hua, is not available for use until after 1940 when the refund will have been exhausted. If the new measure is insisted upon, there are only two possible ways out for the institutions, particularly for Tsing Hua, that is, either to suspend activities, including the despatch of monthly allowances to students now studying in America, or to draw upon the sinking fund, either of which is quite unthinkable to one who is at all law-abiding and has the educational and cultural advancement of the country at heart. Negotiation is now

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. V, No. 19, May 12, 1932, unsigned)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_25

on between the authorities of the institutions and the finance minister to see if a compromise can be worked out such that at least the institutions will be benefited by a part, say a third, of the monthly remittances to meet the absolutely indispensable expenses. But as we see it, a compromise on such occasions is almost as fatal as a total concession, for "a third" may soon come to mean "one-thirtieth" or "one-three-hundredth" and a year's suspension may invite privation for many years. We lament this action of the government, and hope that it will under no circumstances be repeated in the future.

Chapter 26
From Lausanne To Lousan

While delegates of the world's most important powers are deliberating over the question of debts and reparations at Lausanne, momentous conferences are being held during the past week at Lousan, popularly known as Kuling, of China's foremost civil and military leaders, to discuss such urgent matters as China's forthcoming foreign policy, especially as relating to Manchuria, the immediate program of the suppression of bandits and communists, whose scourge is felt all over Central China, and the condition of the nation's finances.

Turning our eyes from Lausanne to Lousan, and again from Lousan to Lausanne, we find these conferences to have much in common in spite of the difference in scope and in the subject matter under consideration. Both conferences, it may be noted, are attempting to solve problems which are well-nigh insoluble, and yet for which a solution, somehow, *must* be found. Both conferences are politico-economic in nature: economic complexities causing political difficulties, and political impasse again giving rise to further economic complexes. On both conferences hinges the future, the one holding Europe, and the other China, in the balance. And the failure of either spells disaster.

The Lausanne Conference is one of the several attempts, made in rapid succession, toward alleviating the ailments of the world in general, and Europe in particular. The immediate manifestations of the ailments are the severe economic crisis, the impending and threatening default of debts and indemnities of certain European states, and political restiveness, all of which are the natural heritage of the Great War and the peace treaties.

Europe was in a state of prostration after the Great War. Sentiments were high and bitter against Germany among the Allied countries, who were the dictators of the terms of peace. The Versailles Treaty fixed a sum of some 15 billion gold dollars for Germany to pay. Aside from the transfer of properties of individual Germans abroad to the creditor nations, which could make up only a small part of the

---

(*The China Critic*, Vol. V, No. 25, June 23, 1932, unsigned)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_26

indemnity, Germany could only pay the enormous reparations by the exportation of goods. Even at the outset, Germany found its obligations hard to meet, which resulted in the French occupation of the Ruhr. During the last few years, however, the situation was further aggravated by two unforeseen factors, which renders the German position incomparably more difficult, if not actually hopeless. The growing nationalism which spread over the world after the Great War manifested itself, among other things, in protective tariffism. Customs barriers of unprecedented heights were erected all over the world. Germany, therefore, has found it harder and harder to export its products. The rapidly falling price level, again, delivers a hard blow upon the debtor nations. If formerly the export of a certain quantity of goods was sufficient to meet the annual payments, at present twice, or even thrice the quantity is necessary, in order to make up the same amount in money. Hence, the strong outcry in Germany of "No more reparations."

Aside from Germany, financial difficulties of not very different character are also being faced by the small Central European states. The Danubian or "Succession" states are especially hard hit. The peace treaty, it seems, has brought certain states into being, without, however, devising ways and means to provide for them. Petty political jealousies are easy to develop, and mutual discrimination is rapidly bringing them to the verge of wholesale ruin. They, too, are threatening debts default; and they mean it.

These, in brief, are the outstanding issues before the Lausanne Conference, aside from the ticklish question of limitation of armaments. In spite of early optimistic press reports, it seems that, so far, the Conference has accomplished but little. The declaration of a moratorium to be extended for the duration of the Conference is a step in the right direction; but the German Chancellor's retort, to the effect that the time for giving breathing spells and postponements is past and that other means must be found to cure Europe's ills, seems to be not only pointed but also pertinent. The signed note to America, for the extension of Europe's war debts to the USA, is reported to be awaited by a cold reception, and observers agree that little can Lausanne expect as far as America is concerned. All these cannot but remind us of Mr. T.V. Soong's apt phrase of an irresistible force encountering an immovable body. Lausanne, therefore, remains a paradox.

Turning to the situation nearer home, we find that the conditions are decidedly more encouraging. Unlike Lausanne, the Lousan Conference did not prove to be a long drawn-out affair. In fact, it was briefer than what we might expect. The session lasted only 1 or 2 days, during which, it is said, a satisfactory solution was arrived at in regard to questions diplomatic, military, and financial. While the details of the conference results have not been divulged, subsequent events, especially the hurried airplane trip north of such important personages as Wang Ching-Wei, T.V. Soong, V.K. Wellington Koo, and Lo Wen-Kan, cannot fail to indicate that some important decisions have been reached. No time is being wasted for their execution.

In our opinion, the most significant development of the Lousan Conference is embodied in the laconic phrase given out by Mr. Wang Ching-Wei at Peiping. Mr. Wang said that the result of the conference could be summarized in three words: "Rely upon Thyself." It is tragic when we realize that such a simple truth is only

learned after such bitter experience; but experience, as the saying goes, is always expensive. Not the League of Nations, nor the Soviet Union, nor the USA, but upon ourselves we must rely. Perhaps herein we discover the essential difference between Lausanne and Lousan. While Lausanne looks for help from other quarters, the USA for example, Lousan knows that outside assistance, in such cases, can never do. China has at last ceased to beat around the bush. Now, on to business.

Chapter 27
Some Vital Statistics from Kuala Lumpur

The 1931 report of the Lying-In Hospital for Chinese in Kuala Lumpur contains the following figures as regards annual births and maternal mortality taking place within the precincts of the hospital since the year 1914:

Year	Births	Maternal deaths
1914	70	2
1915	118	2
1916	128	4
1917	191	4
1918	335	4
1919	355	2
1920	473	2
1921	579	2
1922	679	4
1923	696	2
1924	1,200	4
1925	1,415	7
1926	1,633	3
1927	2,168	7
1928	2,801	6
1929	3,018	6
1930	3,282	8
1931	3,292	8

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. V, No. 26, June 30, 1932, by the name of: Q. P.)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_27

If these figures have been recorded with good care and are therefore reliable, they are extremely interesting in that they tend to reflect very favorably as to the health of overseas Chinese in their new habitat, as far as Kuala Lumpur and its vicinity are concerned. A simple calculation of the annual rates of maternal deaths based upon these figures will bear out that this is probably the case:

Year	Maternal death per 1,000 live births	The same in five year period
1914	28	
1915	17	
1916	31	
1917	21	
1918	12	19.0
1919	5.7	
1920	4.3	
1921	3.5	
1922	5.9	
1923	3.0	4.4
1924	2.5	
1925	4.8	
1926	1.2	
1927	3.2	
1928	2.1	2.9
1929	2.0	
1930	2.4	
1931	2.0	2.3

The rates for the years since 1924 appear incredibly low. We say “incredibly,” because they indicate a health record that surpasses almost all known ones. In the years 1901–1910 in Sweden, Italy, and Norway, the maternal deaths for each 1,000 children born alive are a trifle less than three; in Prussia and Hungary somewhat less than four; in England and Japan just over four; in France, Scotland, and Australia slightly over five; and in Switzerland, Spain, and Belgium a little less than six. Of all civilized countries, the USA leads in this matter and has in 1910 a rate of 6.5 per 1,000 live births. All these countries have progressed little, if at all, since these rates were put on record. “As a matter of fact,” wrote Professor East in 1924, “these death rates have shown little tendency to fall in the majority of countries during the last few years. In England and Wales, Ireland, Japan, and possibly New Zealand and Switzerland, the rate diminished somewhat in that part of the twentieth century before the war; but in the remaining countries it is either stationary or rising.” It would seem, therefore, that the overseas Chinese in Kuala Lumpur have been for the last decade almost three times as healthy as the Americans before and after the war, as far as maternal health is concerned.

The report also contains other interesting figures. The numbers of boys and girls born in 1931 were 1742 and 1577, respectively, giving a ratio of 115 boys to 100 girls, which is higher than the usual one of 103–106 to 100. In 1931, 25 cases of twin births were reported, one case in every 130, which is greater than the ordinary ratio of 1 in every 80.

Chapter 28
Manchuria as China's "Life Line"

Although many arguments have been advanced why China cannot afford to give up Manchuria, there is one very important reason which has not yet been brought up before. People are right in maintaining that the Northeastern Provinces are China's granary, that they are China's most valuable mining districts, that they serve as an excellent outlet for our surplus population. The point is however neglected that Manchuria is at the same time the only existing breeding ground of some of the qualitatively better elements in the population of China. This last point is the one that I propose to deal with in this chapter.

Japan is fond of telling the world that the progress of South Manchuria for the last 30 years has been due to her efforts alone. Such open boast has also been made by the Russians regarding the development of North Manchuria. People who notice only the externals and have not inquired into the fundamental reasons of the racial development in Manchuria are apt to be misled by the Russian and Japanese propagandists into thinking that had it not been for the two countries, Manchuria would still have been today a wild and uncultivated expanse of land. Among those who have thus been deceived are not only foreigners but also Chinese—which, needless to say, is a pity indeed! What the Russians and the Japanese have told us is only partly true, the other part of the truth being that the development of Manchuria is also largely due to the strivings of the people who are indigenous to the land. Manchuria is comparatively one of the newly opened regions in China; its wealth is almost inestimable, while its population consists mostly of colonists who have emigrated there from China. These emigrants are as a rule adventurous and courageous in character, and it is due to them that Manchuria has become what it is today. In fact, even had there been no help from outside, it would still have not been unimaginable that these people would have done their best to make Manchuria an "earthly paradise."

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. V, No. 32, August 11, 1932, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_28

It is not unusual for countries having surplus population to adopt the policy of emigration or colonization on a large scale; and it is interesting to note that the people who are willing to leave their home countries to become either emigrants or colonists are always those who are, biologically speaking, superior in their mental and physical makeup. They are usually the people who can take the initiative and are adventurous in spirit and capable of withstanding hardships. Furthermore, they are usually the people who are highly adaptable to changing environments and are resourceful enough to deal with new problems and situations. Such were the stock of men who were the original settlers of New England. Such again were the first colonizers of New Zealand and Australia. And such, in no less a measure, were the Chinese who had found a new home in the Northeastern Provinces.

It is a mistake to think that the colonizing movement of Manchuria is of only recent origin. To be sure, the construction of the two railways, namely the S.M.R. and the Chinese Eastern Railway, has contributed to the increase of the number of Chinese colonists in Manchuria, but that it by no means has anything to do with the Chinese colonization movement which has a historical continuity is abundantly clear. In fact, we know definitely that the Chinese started systematically moving into Manchuria as early as 1370, when officials were installed in the Northeast looking after the welfare of the colonists. In the period of 50 or 60 years that immediately followed the date which we have mentioned in the above, as many as 30 Chinese villages were established along the banks of the Liao River. Take 5,600 as a rough guess of the number of families in each village and five or six as the number of persons in each family, then the grand total of the Chinese population in Manchuria in the early years of the Ming dynasty would be in the neighborhood of a million or more. From what we have been able to gather from the records, the districts directly under the control of the Tussu of Nurgan (奴儿干都司) alone boasted of 100,000 militia-men (屯田兵). These then were the ancestors of Manchurian Chinese. With the rise of the Manchus, many of these Chinese, it is true, were either killed or forced to evacuate into China proper, but still the number of them that adopted Manchu nationality and became the "Chinese Bannermen" (汉军) must have also been very great. In spite of the fact that in the early days of the Tsing dynasty, Chinese were not allowed to emigrate to Manchuria, still during the period which began with the promulgation of this regulation and ended with its revocation during the reign of Emperor Kuang Hsu (光绪), millions of Chinese must have found means to smuggle themselves through Shanhaikuan and seven or eight other passes to the Northeast. These people who had managed to escape the sieve, so to speak, must have also been on the whole physically robust and mentally alert, for else, it would have been difficult for them to stand the strain of the journey and to circumvent the officials who kept a watchful eye on those who would defy the imperial order regarding Chinese emigration to the Northeast. Since then and up to the present Sino-Japanese conflict; however, the situation had greatly changed; with easy means of communication and without laws to hold them back, everybody could now go to Manchuria, if he wished. The result is therefore that the Chinese emigrants of the latter age had no need of such strong physique and high intelligence as had hitherto obtained in order to push through and to overcome the

obstacles which those who had gone before them invariably had to face. For this reason, the building of the railways has only served to retard, instead of enhancing, the qualitative progress of the colonizing movement.

It is regrettable that very few Chinese realize the excellence of the stock of people who have been the pioneers in Manchuria. That many scholars in the West are, on the contrary, well aware of this is borne out by the following quotation from Professor Huntington's *Character of Races*:

> "In Mukden there is more activity and life than in any other Chinese city that I have visited. Activity and progressiveness are said to be still more evident in Harbin, and most of all in the far north, where the town of Aigun on the Amur River, opposite Blagoveschensk, is reported to be inhabited by Chinese who seem quite unlike their countrymen in their modern spirit of progress and in their bustling activity. It is sometimes affirmed that this is because the Chinese have become Russianized by contact with the relatively large Russian population. In a certain way this is true. But why has not contact with the British at Hongkong done still more to give a British quality to the Chinese there? Nothing of the kind has happened, although Hongkong had a considerable British population for a generation or two before the Russians had much contact with the Chinese in Manchuria. The answer seems to be a recent and drastic selection in Manchuria, and only a mild selection in Hongkong.
>
> "Manchuria is inhabited almost entirely by Chinese who have recently come from the conservative provinces of Shantung and Chihli. In general the merchant classes and city people are from Chihli, and the farmers from Shantung. Here is what happens. Owing to the constant economic pressure, people from those two provinces migrate more or less at all times, but especially when there are famines. They go to Manchuria not only because that province is near and is under Chinese rule, but because until the nineteenth century it was only sparsely populated. The regular proceeding is for the Chinese men to go first without their families. A man newly come from Chihli works for a while for some one in Manchuria. Then if he is successful he starts a little business for himself. Once in three years, as a rule, he goes back home, usually staying five or six months. From time to time he brings with him other men from his village. For a while they live together as a single big family. But at last the merchant who succeeds, decides to have his family with him rather than several hundred miles away. He can afford to set up a house, and he does so. Because he is competent and successful—because he is the best man out of twenty, or fifty, or a hundred—his family comes to Manchuria and his children become permanent parts of the population. Of course he still calls Chihli his home, but the Englishman who settles in Australia calls England home. In due time the merchant's sons grow up. The more adventurous among them go farther north, just as their father did before them. When they succeed they likewise bring their families to the north, and still another stage in the selection of competent types is accomplished.
>
> "The same thing happens among the Shantung farmers. Each year toward the end of winter they come by the hundred thousand to Manchuria, some by rail, but many tramping hundreds of miles on foot. Spreading out into the country they are ready to work for the farmers as soon as spring breaks. In the autumn they go back to their families, only to swarm north once more at the end of the winter. But some are not content to be merely hired laborers. The more ambitious and energetic get hold of small pieces of ground. At first they cultivate these and at the same time work for others. But in a year or two they get enough land to support a family. Then a shack is built. Next year at the time of the northward migration there is a wheelbarrow on the road. On it sits the grandmother surrounded by a promiscuous heap of bedding, boxes, bags of rice, cooking-pots, and all the simple paraphernalia of a Chinese household. The proud owner of the Manchurian shack sways between the shafts of the wheelbarrow, his oldest son bends low in front, tugging at a rope over his shoulder to help his father with the heavy barrow. The wife walks behind bearing

> on her shoulder a bamboo pole with a basket on each end and a baby in each basket. And with her trudge one or two other children. Thus they toil along the snowy path to their new home, unconscious that they have been selected by their innate ability to people a new land. If the father is competent and ambitious his work soon makes his land increase in value. Then he sells out, moves north once more, this time in a cart drawn perhaps by two horses and a mule. Once more he succeeds, and then sometimes moves on a third time. Thus northern Manchuria is being peopled by the most competent of the inhabitants of Chihli and Shantung."

Truth to tell, we do not really have to wait for Huntington to tell us of the above. History goes everywhere to prove that the Chinese in Manchuria represent a superior stock.

First, let us look at the achievements of some of the "Chinese Bannermen" (汉军) at the beginning of the Tsing dynasty. The "Chinese Bannermen" at the beginning of the Tsing dynasty were as a rule most venturesome and adaptable. To name a case alone, one of their number, Fan Wencheng (范文程), was responsible for many of the important enterprises of the Tsing court during its first 30 years. He was the twentieth descendant of Fan Chung-yen, (范文正公) the famous Prime Minister of the Sung dynasty. Fan Wencheng himself was Prime Minister to Emperor Shun Chih (顺治) for almost 10 years, and it is no exaggeration to say that the Manchu dynasty was in a sense actually founded by Fan. His elder son was later the Viceroy of Fukien, whereas his younger son served for a time after his father's death as the Minister of War. All in all then, he has a distinguishable family indeed. Kao Tien-chiu (高天爵) and his sons constituted yet another family which contributed greatly to the early years of the Manchu regime.

Second, our contention is abundantly proved by the number of talents among the Manchurian Chinese during the reigns of Tao Kuang (道光) and Tung Chi (同治). This chapter in the history of the Chinese colonization movement has yet to be written, but perhaps an example in this connection will suffice:

> "Those who talk about the history of Kirin will always come upon Han Pien-wai or Han the Frontier man, of Chiapikou (夹皮沟). Han had been a Shantungese and was of great ability. He came to Kirin in the sixties of the last century, for the purpose of extracting gold from the rivers. With him were a large group of famine refugees from Chihli and Shantung who had recognized him as their natural leader. They soon settled themselves in Chiapikou. Han made laws and devised measures of protection for the new community which grew rapidly. It was about this time that Wu Ta-chen (吴大澂) visited Kirin, commissioned to check up the boundary line between Kirin and Korea. He met Han, was captivated by his personality and ability, and proposed to change his name into Hsiao-chung (效忠), which he accepted.
>
> "Now a word as to the extensity of Han's influence. Going south from the provincial capital for about 180 *li*, one comes to Tayingkou (大鹰沟); another 30 *li* in the same direction, takes one to Huashilin (桦树林); 25 *li* more brings one to Muchiho (木奇河); Chiapikou is located farther to the southeast for about 190 *li*. All this used to be a thickly forested region, and it was entirely due to the effort of Han and his followers that it was opened up and made fit for human habitation. The general region south of the provincial capital and west of the Sungari, for more than 800 *li*, was under his undisputed rule. He organized six centers of military drill, which in all supplied a regular fighting force of not many more than 300. There were 1,800 households, containing a whole population of about 10,000. These were made to distribute more or less regularly over the whole region, making up 150 miles, so that in case of attack from outside, organized and concerted protection was

> easily available. Thus peace and harmony reigned for many years, and it was well-known to the outside that personal effects lost on the roads were always recoverable. Before Hua-tien (桦甸) and Pan-shih (磐石) were regularly organized into hsien districts. Han was the virtual administrative head, to whom all people went for protection, charity, and justice. Han was a generous man, besides acceding to the wishes of his fellow colonists, he made friends of all officials and tourists who came in his way. Han has now been dead for many years, but his grandson is also an able man, and has no difficulty in maintaining the influence built up by his grandfather in the southern part of Kirin" (translated from Wei, "The Life of Han Pien-wai", in *The Geographical Magazine*, No. 134).

Such a man as Han is of course rare, yet people who have been to the Northeast not infrequently would meet rich and prosperous owners of farms, factories, and stores, who all started life penniless when they came to Manchuria 30 or 40 years ago. Are not these therefore worthy of the same respect and memory as we have been paying to Han Pien-wai (韩边外)?

Third, nearly all the young men and women who come from Manchuria are healthy and strong, both physically and mentally. A traveler in the Northeast for instance has this to say:

> "It has been the custom of Mukden that no Chinese woman there ever binds her feet. All girl students (those of the provincial Girls Normal School, for instance) are tall, well-built, and are not morbidly reserved and shy. This I have not been able to witness in all other provinces and I must consider as highly gratifying" (translated from: Yin Hua, "A Short Account of My Travels beyond Shanhaikuan").

Then we have corroborative testimony of Dr. Chang Po-ling, the President of Nankai University, in a speech before the International House, New York, March 15th, 1929. About one-tenth of the enrollment in Nankai is supplied by Manchuria; and these students from Manchuria, says Dr. Chang, are "always physically stronger and stouter than the others, and noticeably more energetic and active than students from interior."

Fourth, the progress in athletics in the Northeast is again a very eloquent evidence of the superiority of the Chinese in Manchuria. Regarding this point, I have elsewhere written, shortly after the National Athletic Meet which took place in April, 1930.[1]

> "The recent national athletic meet held in Hangchow has demonstrated beyond the peradventure of doubt some of the benign aspects of the effect of natural selection among the Chinese. The result of the meet showed that practically all championships went to athletes coming from marginal areas of the country. The leading position taken by the Cantonese has long been an established fact and the success they achieved this time is no cause for surprise. But in addition to the southerners, we had during the recent meet delegates from Mukden and Harbin whose extremely high attainment was entirely unexpected. The men athletes from the Liaoning province easily took the lead in the field and tract meets; and so did the women athletes from Harbin; and the single fastest running man and woman were found in these two groups respectively. The two fastest long distance runners were again members of the Mukden delegation. Could these be mere happy coincidences? Of course not. One common explanation is that as northerners they are longer-legged, which is evidently true. But not all or even most long-limbed people are swift. Another explanation is

[1] Editor's note: Refers to "Selection and Athletic Prowess".

> that they have undergone more practice, which is not true. For in this matter of physical education as in other things, Mukden and Harbin, both being newly developed centres, cannot be expected to have as much experience as in most large centers inside of Shanhaikwan; and, besides, no amount of practice will make the lame walk. The true explanation is to be found in selection. The Three Eastern Provinces have been for the last few hundred years, at least, the receiving station of active colonization chiefly from the provinces of Shantung and Hopei, where war, pestilence, famine, and the general pressure of population have all along compelled the more energetic, the more far-sighted and the more enduring to move out. The descendants of these emigrants or colonists constitute now over 90 per cent of the population of Manchuria, and it is from these that the athletes represented in the recent meet were picked. When it is remembered that thousands of Shantung colonists reached Harbin or other centres in the extreme north *on foot*, formerly following the river courses, but now alongside of the railway tracks, and when it is further remembered that they had been for this habit of long-distance hiking invariably nick named *pao-tuei* (跑腿) or 'running legs', is it any wonder that both the fastest and the most enduring runners should be now found among their progeny?"

Fifth and final, Manchuria has furnished China with many brave soldiers. This especially has always been true of Heilunkiang Province (Cf. *A Brief History of Heilungkiang* [《黑龙江述略》] *passim*). To mention a more recent instance, General Han Kuang-ti who was killed in action during the recent Sino-Russian conflict of 1929 will always be remembered by us for his patriotism and bravery. Again, Ma Chan-shan, Tin Chao, Li Tu, and a host of others, who are now winning Manchuria back from foreign aggressors, are heroes too familiar to need any introduction. During the fight at the Nonni River, an important figure in Heilungkiang was reported to have written to Mr. Chu Chin-lan as follows: "All the non-commissioned officers and soldiers have made up their minds to sacrifice themselves for China. None of them are afraid of death, which explains why there are so many casualties among the enemies." All these go to prove not only the excellence of the Chinese in Manchuria as fighters, but also their willingness to give up their lives as an expression of their loyalty to the nation.

The above five points are sufficient to show that so long as Manchuria exists as an integral part of China, the superior elements in our racial stock would still have a chance to flourish, but should Manchuria fall into the hands of the Japanese, the comparatively adventuresome and intelligent elements in China proper would have to be submerged in the sea of mediocrities and would have no room for the development of their talents.

After all, the qualitative aspect of a race is more important than its quantitative aspect. To look at Manchuria as an outlet of our surplus population is to emphasize only the superficial side of the question, while to look at Manchuria as the breeding ground of the best in our race is nearer to the truth of the problem. And it is for this reason that Manchuria can truly be called the "life line" of the Chinese people and should by all means be conserved as such.

Chapter 29
Havelock Ellis as a Humanist

Mr. Havelock Ellis is not generally known as a humanist. He is hardly any —ist in the sense of a doctrinaire. Mr. Mencken is right in calling him the most civilized living Englishman, for to be really civilized is to be no doctrinaire of any sort.

Yet most people will take Mr. Ellis for a naturalist. This is again only natural. His appreciation of modern science, his own training in medicine, his researches in the psychology of sex, and his great admiration for Shelley and Whitman, who are naturalists in the romantic sense, are certainly good pieces of evidence to that effect. But to say that he "stands for a full-blooded naturalism" as does one of his biographers, Mr. Houston Peterson is really far more than the case would warrant.

Our contention is that if Mr. Ellis is to be called an —ist at all, he is a humanist, humanist of a wider sense than the present-day Americans, the champions of humanism par excellence, would be willing to understand. There are at least two types of humanists. One is the narrow type. Those who think that man is the supreme entity in this world and that man alone is capable of working out his own destiny are no doubt narrow humanists. The form of humanism that has lately developed out of Unitarianism in America is of this type. Others who are less arrogant but maintain, by a philosophy of dualism, that man must necessarily be at loggerheads with his physical surroundings and with his own impulses, are at least narrow in intellectual outlook, though not in emotional attitude. Mr. Ellis belongs to neither of these, but to the broad type.

Man is not the supreme entity in this universe, whatever that supreme entity may be; but he is a most central factor from our human standpoint. He is a part and parcel of nature; he has arisen out of nature. Although in the long course of evolution and history, he has achieved, or thinks he has, a sort of semi-independence, he is not to be set against nature. His relationship to nature is neither one of passive resignation

---

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. VI, No. 36, September 7, 1933, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_29

as the romantic naturalist would have us assume, nor one of belligerent conquest as the scientific naturalist has long led, or rather misled, us to believe, nor even one of adaptation which is only a degree better than passive resignation but rather one of active cooperation, one of harmony to be worked out with effort on the part of the man. This is the type of humanism that Ellis represents and one that he has been propounding more or less unconsciously for the last half a century.

Thus to a humanist of the caliber of Mr. Ellis, harmony is the object of existence and to achieve it is the most important human task. Harmony is first to be achieved between man and the nature that surrounds him, the external environment. This may be called the harmony of the first order. It is also to be achieved between him and the nature that is within him, the internal environment. This is the second order. The two of course are one in the last analysis, without internal harmony external harmony will be out of question; a man suffering from chronic dyspepsia will have a sour outlook upon life.

To the understanding of both orders of harmony, Ellis has made many lasting contributions. The story of his own conversion is interesting in showing how he himself achieved the first order of harmony at Sparkes Creek in Australia, while a youth of 19. "One day," he writes in *Impressions and Comments II*, "by no conscious effort of my own, by some inspiration from without, by some expiration from within, I saw that empty and ugly Universe as Beauty, and was joined to it in an embrace of the spirit. The joy of that Beauty has been with me ever since and will remain with me till I die. All my life has been the successive quiet realizations in the small things of the world of that primary realization in the greatest thing of the world. . . ." Mr. Ellis' own explanation of this experience, his own theory of conversion, is to be found in *The Dance of Life*, by far the most popular of all his books, "A conversion," he writes, "is not a turning towards a belief. More strictly, it is a turning round, a revolution. . . . To put the matter more precisely, the change is fundamentally a readjustment of psychic elements to each other, enabling the whole machine to work harmoniously. . . . The psychic organism—which in conventional religion is called the'soul'—had not been in harmony with itself; now it is revolving truly on its own axis, and in doing so it simultaneously finds its true orbit in the cosmic system." In yet another book, *The New Spirit*, Mr. Ellis urges that the opportunity of such experience should be extended to everyone in his youth. "Everyone," he insists, "for some brief period in early life, should be thrown on his own resources in the solitudes of Nature, to enter into harmonious relation with himself, and to realize the full scope of self-reliance. For the man or woman to whom this experience has never been given, the world must hold many needless mysteries and not a few needless miseries."

Mr. Ellis' emphasis of harmony is further to be found in his attitude toward religion and mysticism. He defines religion in *The Dance of Life* as "the art of finding our emotional relationship to the world conceived as a whole." He considers mysticism the essence of religion, and in one of his early reviews of books, he goes so far as to declare that there is a mystic impulse, which "we are compelled to regard—after the sexual passion which is the very life of the race itself—as man's strongest and most persistent instinct. So long as it is saved from fanaticism by a strenuous

devotion to science, by a perpetual reference to the moral structure of society, it will always remain an integral portion of the whole man in his finest development."

If the necessity for the first order of harmony, or external harmony, has its basis in the mystic impulse, that of the necessity of the second, the internal harmony, is to be found in the sexual impulse and other related instinctive tendencies. Here, we find Mr. Ellis a good follower of the doctrine of mean as all good humanists are. Mr. Peterson has a pretty detailed account of his personal habits in the chapter "Physician and Surgeon" in *Havelock Ellis, Philosopher of Love*. "It was not a great hardship," says Mr. Peterson, "for Ellis to maintain that decision (as to some of his habits), as moderation came easily to him, an inheritance as well as a conviction." As a profound student in sex psychology, people may think that he must necessarily tend to be romantic and to run to excesses in his personal habits. Quite on the contrary, Mr. Peterson writes of him: "In terms of Aristotle, who taught that virtue is a beautiful mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency, Ellis has tended toward the vices of 'too little' rather than 'too much'. He has been closer to St. Frances than to Casanova."

In line with this spirit of moderation and restraint, Mr. Ellis himself affirms in *Affirmations*. "It may seem that I speak of out-worn things, and that the problem of saintliness has little relation to the moral problems of our time. It is far otherwise. You have never seen the world if you have not realised that an element of asceticism lies at the foundation of life. You may expel it with the fork of reason or of self-enjoyment, but being part of Nature herself it must ever return. All the art of living lies in letting go and holding in. The man who makes the one or the other his exclusive aim in life will die before he has ever begun to live. The man who has carried one part of the process to excess before turning to the other will indeed learn what life is, and may leave behind him the memory of a pattern saint. But he alone is the wiser master of living who from first to last had held the double ideal in true honour. . . ."

In his habits of observation and judgment, the same general humanist ideal holds true. Early in youth he was attracted by the sermons of F.W. Robertson, a well-known preacher and lecturer of the early nineteenth century, who formulated a kind of law that the reconciliation of two apparently opposing principles is not to be found in some compromise halfway between them, but a higher truth embracing both. Mr. Peterson writes of him with insight, "This notion of reconciling opposites became a passion with Ellis and one of the most outstanding characteristics of his work. He has been . . . almost incapable of taking sides in capital issues. . . . He has had supreme delight in breaking down dilemmas, in collecting specimens of the either-or fallacy. Consequently he has written most successfully on such subjects as sex, morals, mysticism and science, socialism and individualism, Casanova, Zola, Nietzsche and Rousseau, for it is precisely such subjects that force most minds to extreme positions."

It is of course in the field of sex research that his humanist position is most manifest. Mr. Ellis' decision to devote his life to an extensive as well intensive exploration of this field was formed as early as 1875, when a lad of 16 leading a solitary life in the wilderness of Australia. By 1909, the work that he was born to

do was done, in the form of the *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, in six big volumes. In 1928, a seventh volume came out which contains the more important of his research papers that had appeared since 1909. Before him sex in the Christian West was either a prohibited subject or only studied in its aberrant and pathological aspects. Sex as a normal phenomenon suitable for observation and analysis was practically unknown until Mr. Ellis came upon the scene. Throughout his studies, Mr. Ellis maintained an attitude of sympathy, a desire to understand wherever deviations from the normal occur, and where treatment is suggested, he was particularly careful in the avoidance of extremes. His conception of purity is precisely what we like to expect from the humanist standpoint. Reacting to the still current Christian attitude toward sex in many parts of the world, he was once led to decry that "the filthy rags of our righteousness have alike robbed desire of its purity and restraint of its beauty." More positively, he asserts in his *Little Essays of Love and Virtue* that "purity cannot be the abolition or even the indefinite suspension of sexual manifestations; it must be the wise and beautiful control of them."

His attitude of sympathy and desire to understand is best illustrated in the way he deals with aberrations of sex tendencies. Take, for instance, erotic symbolism which represents tendencies to replace the normal object of love with some other object forming a part of the former or entirely foreign to it. Mr. Ellis writes of it in a specific volume: "The phenomena of sexual symbolism can scarcely fail to be profoundly impressive to the patient and impartial student of the human soul. They often seem absurd, sometimes disgusting, occasionally criminal; they are always, when carried to an extreme, abnormal. But of all the manifestations of sexual psychology, normal and abnormal, they are the most specifically human. More than any other they involve the potently plastic forces of the imagination. They bring before us the individual man, not only apart from his fellows, but in opposition, himself creating his own paradise. They constitute the supreme triumph of human idealism."

To one not well acquainted with the life and works of Mr. Ellis, such remarks may seem merely theoretical. But Mr. Ellis is not theorist. While he is not psychiatrist and lays no claim to any ability or method of treatment, he has helped many a wayward individual to recover his or her normal attitude toward, and interest in, sex, through interviews and correspondence, particularly the latter. No example is perhaps better than the case of "Florrie," a robust literary woman addicted to flagellation as a way to sexual outlet, Mr. Ellis successfully helped her through numerous letters and not a few interviews within a period of 3 years at the end of which he was notified that "Florrie" was dead. The whole account and the letters, about 60 in number, are now to be found in the chapter on the mechanism of sexual deviation in the seventh volume of the Studies.

Mr. Ellis is not philosopher, yet he is a profound thinker, one of the profoundest whom the passing generation has yet witnessed. He is not scientist, yet the method and the spirit with which he approaches the forbidden precincts of sex will put to shame the efforts of many who styled themselves scientists. He is not physician; he has never practiced in spite of his strenuous medical training and his certificate; yet, he has been a curer of many souls of the maladies which an ordinary physician

does not even have the courage to talk about. He is not moralist, yet by his sane attitude toward sex, his wholesome conception of purity, his discountenance both of "vulgar prudence" and "categorical imperatives," he, as Mr. Peterson declares rightly, becomes one of the most important moral teachers of his time. He is indeed none of these types of savants, but had it not been for his humanist outlook and convictions, Mr. Ellis would not have contributed as much as he actually has.

Chapter 30
Construction for Rehabilitation

Two types of material construction are always possible. One is decorative and superficial, and the other fundamental and meant for real rehabilitation in the case of a country which has been virtually torn to shreds by natural catastrophes, famine, war, pestilence, and the like. It is perhaps pertinent now for us to ask which of the two types China as a nation has been engaged in ever since its movement for national reconstruction started some years ago.

The answer is not far to seek. It is the superficial and decorative type that has figured most in the agitation and whatever accomplishment the country has so far made. Shortly after the Nationalist forces unified the country, a big construction program began. While never completed, it resulted in beautifying some of the big cities like Nanking, Hangchow, and the Greater Shanghai. One big piece of construction is of course the Chung-san Mausoleum and the road that leads to it. Less local and even of nationwide importance have been the planning and building of wireless stations and motor roads. It goes without saying that the latest fad is aviation and the purchase of as many aeroplanes as possible.

Now the big question is: What has all this to do with national rehabilitation? By national rehabilitation, it is usually agreed to mean the general improvement of the economic status of the country as a whole. China being a principally agricultural country, it is further admitted that the process of rehabilitation, to be effective, must start from the farm. Now what has the radio to do with the farm? The dozens of aeroplanes? Or even the motor-roads? Farmers living near the Shanghai–Hangchow motor highway complain that the reform has done the countryside one good but two wrongs. The good is that it makes it possible for them to see what a "toad" car is. Their curiosity in that respect can now be satisfied without the cost of a trip to Shanghai or Hangchow. The wrongs are that their children and poultry are

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. VI, No. 43, October 26, 1933, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_30

constantly exposed to being run down and that they themselves and their property are now at the mercy of armed bandits coming from the cities in "toad" cars without tooting.

Construction of the more fundamental type is of course not entirely lacking. The irrigation schemes carried out in Suiyuan and Shensi, the respective Ming-sen and Chin-huei Canals and the Yangtse dykes are of course good examples. But when the vastness of our need and the depth that we have allowed ourselves to sink into the slough pond in recent years are remembered, it will be seen that even these are either insufficient or merely palliative. The irrigation schemes reclaim at best the land of half a dozen or dozen hsien, whereas the dykes on the Yangtse are admittedly merely protective and alleviatory. Only a few days ago we were informed by the newspapers that in order to solve more permanently the flood problem along the Yangtse, General Chiang Kai-shek was of the opinion that the Tung-ting Lake should first be drained of its silt.

The general situation in China at present is not unlike an old noble house that has undergone rapid decline but with its descendants still bent on preserving its prestige and dignity by keeping up appearances. The old mansion is badly in need of repair; the windows are broken; the roof is leaking; the whole house has indeed been for many long years at the mercy of the elements. Yet, it seems that the owners are quite unaware of these; they must have their automobiles, radio-sets, and all the other things that will keep them modern and respectable in the eyes of the neighbors. For these they are willing to spend the last cent and even go so far as to go into further debt. Meanwhile, the old house stands tottering to fall when the next wind storm comes. Such a combination of things would not seem at first sight possible, but when it is remembered that the mansion is the only part of the ancestral heritage that has not and could not very well have been partitioned among the descendants, the reason for the neglect becomes obvious.

But let us not digress too far. The object of the present chapter is to remind ourselves of the need of the type of material construction that will really go to rehabilitating the country and to suggest a few schemes that are practicable under the present circumstances and will be productive of more immediate results on the way to rehabilitation. China suffers from chronic poverty. The principal cause of poverty is doubtless famine, due either to too much water or too little. When Mr. Mallory, Secretary of China International Famine Relief Commission, wrote his book on the subject in 1926, no better title could have been chosen than "China: Land of Famine." Famine is of course to be found in all countries and at all times, but in China, it has become one of the national characteristics, and the Chinese people has become one that is famine conditioned.

So it would seem that if the process of rehabilitation is one that is intelligently mapped out and centrally controlled, and if its chief objective is the recovery and stabilization of a sound rural economy, the first as well as the most fundamental step to be taken is the prevention of famine. In this work of prevention, authorities are agreed that the first things to be done are flood control through drainage and well-constructed dykes, and drought control through irrigation projects. Mr. Mallory, in concluding his extremely significant book, asserts that the lines of work that will

yield results more quickly than others, in order of importance, are: "(1) Flood control, irrigation, land reclamation, (2) Economic improvement, rural credits, colonization, home and village industry, (3) Improved agriculture and forestation, (4) Development of transportation, and (5) Education." All these are sooner or later to be done, but our policy and efforts in the past seem to have quite reversed the order. We have tried to multiply schools in poverty-stricken rural districts, and the result has been, instead of improving conditions, to make rural people more susceptible to radical propaganda. At present, we are absorbed in the development of various forms of transportation, and communication, particularly those aerial and ethereal forms, whereas according to Mr. Mallory, it should have come in as the fourth in the order of importance.

One excuse for not attempting the type of construction that will go far to ameliorate the conditions of the countryside has been the lack of sufficient fund. Take the projects with regard to the Hwai River for instance. The cheapest one, proposed by the American hydraulic engineer, Mr. Freeman, would cost $12,000,000, whereas the Chinese plan, which aims at improving the Grand Canal and the old channel of the Yellow River at the same time, would require the stupendous sum of $213,000,000. Not to say the even bigger projects having to do with the Yellow River as a whole, or the Yangtse River. But it has also been shown by experts that such projects, when carried out, will produce benefits which will more than repay the expenditure put in at the beginning. If the Hwai River, for instance, is properly improved according to the Chinese plan, it will annually yield a benefit valued at $1,105,000,000, which is five times the capital that has to be invested. So it seems with the work on the Yellow River. Experts are of the opinion that if the work of constricting and straightening up the stream is done by sections, the proceeds from the sale of the reclaimed land bordering on the first section will be sufficient to cover the expenses incurred in the work on the second, and so the whole scheme, which means, once started, it would be almost self-supporting. Take the Kiang-nan dykes along the coast for another instance, while the total cost for rebuilding them may run beyond $30,000,000, the failure to rebuild them in the near future may prove to cost an annual yield of crops valued at $120,000,000, again four times what has to be put in as construction materials and labor.

A further argument is of course still possible with those who are reluctant to put up works of construction which are less dazzling and ornamental but more to the permanent benefit of the peasants, the bulwark of Chinese population. They will say that we have not got the money to start with. Granted that such works of construction will eventually repay itself and have even a great deal more to spare, or will be self-supporting once started as in the case of the Yellow River, they ask where is the initial money which may run up to tens of millions.

Such an argument would be hard to meet in ordinary times, although it may be pointed out that our total expenditure for the ornamental types of construction in the past few years must have been many times tens of millions. But in any case, it is no longer a good argument at the present moment. Have we not recently borrowed quite a staggering sum from the USA? Has it not been the demand on the part of the people as well as the promise on the part of the authorities that the money shall be

exclusively used for constructive purposes, particularly those that have to do with the rehabilitation of the countryside and the salvation of the farming population from utter ruin? That being the case, we for one hereby propose that the money shall be exclusively devoted to projects of flood and drought control. It has been for months a puzzle to us and to the public at large that while our authorities agree to the principle of construction for rehabilitation, they have been unusually slow in arriving at any definite decision as to the specific forms of rehabilitation work to which the money will be allotted. Like one who becomes suddenly rich through the winning of the first lottery prize or the receipt of an unexpected legacy from a distant relative, and is in a state of bewilderment and surprise, our authorities seem to have quite forgotten what are the obvious and self-evident things to do.

Of these obvious and self-evident things that should be done, we ask to propose three in particular. The first is the control of the Yellow River. Not to say the havoc that the river has wrought in the past centuries, its recent upheaval demonstrates sufficiently how big an economic loss it may entail. Yet when it is shown by experts like Mr. Freeman that the river is after all "no such fierce and ungovernable tyrant as it has been painted," and that "means for confining the channel in a straight and narrow way and forcing it to dig its bed deeper are within economic reach," and that the many outbreaks recorded in history are the result of "human carelessness and official negligence" more than anything else, we do not see any reason why some form of permanently constructive work should not be started upon it at once. Indeed, the Yellow River Conservancy Bureau has recently been organized and has already started to work. But it is short of money. The authorities of the Bureau calculate that preliminary work in preparing the way for more permanent construction will cost $8,000,000, and that the work to follow will cost many times more. Now since the Cotton and Wheat loan from the USA has increased the national treasury by some $200,000,000 in Chinese currency, we see no reason why this Bureau should not be allowed a share sufficient to start the ball rolling, say a sum of $30,000,000 or 40,000,000. After paying the expenses for transportation, the loan may net much less than $200,000,000. Some say it will amount to only $120,000,000 or 130,000,000. In any case, it is only a fraction of this loan which is now asked for a piece of work which will be sure to prove the revival of prosperity for almost a half of the country.

Our second proposal is the rebuilding of the Kiang-nan dykes. The relation that these dykes bear to what is traditionally known as the South-east is similar to that obtaining between the Yellow River and the Northern provinces. They form a protecting shield against inundation from the sea for an agricultural area sufficient to produce an annual crop valued at $120,000,000—a sum almost as big as what we are to realize from the Cotton and Wheat Loan. Unlike the Yellow River, however, these dykes have been very much neglected in recent decades, and as a result, in spite of the fact that they were strongly built and had been in constant repair in earlier years, they now show signs of rapid deterioration. The type of work that has been given to them in recent years is entirely palliative in character and was not intended to last more than a year or two. But if the present situation, experts declare, is allowed to stand any longer, the day of reckoning will soon come when the whole

region East of Soochow may find itself under a deluge, and if cities like Shanghai will rise again, they will be anti-diluvian, not to say the general economic and cultural loss that such a state of affairs will involve. This being the case, we do not see any reason why another portion of the American loan should not be given over to the work of rebuilding these dykes. Experts on the problem calculate that a total sum of $30,000,000 will be sufficient to reconstruct those sections of the dykes protecting the coast of Kiang-su from Chang-su (常熟) to Ching-san (金山). The sections lining the length of Chekiang coast down to the mouth of Chien Tang River are in much better condition and are in no need of being built all over.

Our third proposal is that a portion of the rest of the American loan be allotted to the construction of irrigation schemes in the Northwest, particularly in provinces like Kansu and Shensi. These provinces have in the past lived upon irrigation schemes. In order to offset the influence of the process of desiccation that has been going on for thousands of years in that general region, irrigation schemes such as canals and reservoirs have been in the past put up in great numbers and kept in constant repair. But like many other things, human carelessness and official negligence have in recent decades decreased their usefulness or even reduced them to ruin, and the result, at least in part, had been the many and frequent famines that are fast reducing a province like Shensi into an extension of the desert that lies not far to the Northwest. After the loss of the four northeastern provinces, our optimistic authorities have been constantly harping on the theme of restoring the prosperity that originally belonged to the Northwest. They are even thinking of putting up a subsidiary capital at Si-an. But it is to be wondered how all this will ever be possible in the absence of sufficient water. It is only obvious that the construction of reservoirs and canals such as the Chin-huei Canal to the north of Si-an is far more important than restoring the splendor of the former Chang-an. Such splendor is naturally born of a prosperous countryside replete with water and vegetation, and not made.

Other lines of construction may yet be cited. The conservancy work of the Hwai River, after long years of planning and preparation, seems to have been long at a standstill. The Grand Canal is also in need of serious attention. So do the rivers in the province of Hopei. The Yangtse may yet prove to be a source of serious trouble, it almost did in this past summer. Something more fundamental should be done to all these, if the work of economic rehabilitation is expected to assume a nationwide significance. The rest of the American loan will have no chance to lay idle, when it is properly meted out to some of these measures.

Chapter 31
Ma Chun-wu (马君武)

According to the different versions of Who's Who in China, Chinese leaders are to be had by 1,000. But of this number we are certain that none is more interesting than Dr. Ma Chun-wu—interesting in the sense that in him we find not only a coordinated development of many talents but also a harmonious combination of Eastern and Western ideals of a true gentleman.

To know Dr. Ma as a man of achievements in the ordinary sense of the word, the reader is referred to any one of the biographical sketches that are found in the various versions of Who's Who in China, English, Chinese, or Japanese. But the following high points may be noted. A native of Kweiling, Kwangsi, he was born in 1881 of poor parents. His father appeared to have died early, and as an orphan of nine, we already found him roving around in Canton and other southern cities, working out a future by and for himself. At times we were told that he had only one or two bananas for meals. But his thirst for knowledge even at this tender age proved even more irresistible than his hunger for food, and soon opportunities were opened to him where he could both study and work. Leaving the details for biographers to work out later, we are for the present satisfied to know that he finally found his way to Japan, the Mecca at that time for those who were after new knowledge and revolutionary ideals. After graduating from the Kyoto Imperial University in 1906, winning honor and a degree in agriculture he went to Germany and joined the Technische Hochschule in Berlin where he won the degree of "Doktor Ingenieur" in 1915. Facts like these are certainly uninteresting in these days when college diplomas are to be had by car-loads, but it will yet go down in history that Dr. Ma is the very first Chinese to earn degrees in agriculture and engineering, which, by the way, in comparison with other kinds of degrees, are to this day quite rare.

Dr. Ma has been precocious in many ways, and in political life, he has been no exception. Prior to the completion of his engineering course, he was already body

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. VII, No. 2, January 11, 1934, by the name of: C. T.)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_31

and soul in it. He has been a follower and friend of Dr. Sun Yat-sen since his teens, and his early sojourn in Japan had some close connection with this happy relationship. His association with this great leader finally led him in 1911 to be elected representative of his province to Nanking to draft the provisional constitution. We remember having seen the enlarged picture this group of worthies at Dr. Ma's home in Yanghang, a few miles from Woosung, in which Dr. Ma stood out as the very youngest. Like the provisional constitution which the worthies in the picture had helped to frame, the picture itself, we were once told by Dr. Ma, has been relegated to the realm of history since January 28, 1931. From 1911 onward and up to 1926, Dr. Ma led a very active political life, served the country in a variety of capacities, with official titles which all of us would like to possess if it were possible. Since 1926 when he first took up the presidency of the Kwangsi Government University, he seems to have evinced but little interest in politics. While still no less a follower of Dr. Sun, he has more than once denounced the party and party principles which Dr. Sun founded and formulated, and in no gentle terms.

But Dr. Ma is primarily a scholar. It appears that it was only youthful idealism that led him into politics in those early years. Soon after he had returned from Germany, he began to write and translate scientific works for Chinese students. He also rendered a number of Western classics into Chinese. For him there is no hurried work, for he soon acquired the habit of translating a 1,000 characters each day, whenever he is not travelling. As a result of this habit to which he still sticks today, he has succeeded in putting forth a great number of volumes the total weight and bulk of which would easily make the ox perspire and more than fill the attic, as the Chinese saying has it (汗牛充栋). A few examples may suffice. Among the translated works, we find Darwin's *Origin of Species* and *Descent of Man*, J. S. Mill's *On Liberty*, Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*, Haeckel's *Die Welträtsel*, Rousseau's *Du Contrat Social*, and a number of important works in mathematics, chemistry, mechanics, mineralogy, and other technical subjects. He also wrote textbooks on zoology and botany, and compiled a German-Chinese dictionary. He is a lover of literature; among his voluminous writings, there is a collection of his Chinese poems. We recall to have seen a translated version of Wilhelm Tell, also done by his hand. He is a well-known calligrapher; wherever he goes, people flock to him with ink and scrolls, and he complies with ease and pleasure.

While his scholarly and educational achievements appear weighty and formidable, his personal appearance is hardly impressive, certainly not in the sense that we would have inferred from his variegated and fruitful career. Always clad in native cloth, he looks almost rustic. He has a very straightforward temperament and has no patience with those whom he dislikes. His rusticity on the one hand and frankness on the other once conspired to produce the material of a very interesting anecdote. While serving as president of the Great China University, he had the pleasure of sitting together with two other Chinese passengers who conversed in English. He soon grew impatient and interrupted their conversation by asking what was the necessity for two Chinese to tete-a-tete in English, while the native tongue would serve equally well, if not better. What followed may be easily surmised by the reader. The dignity and amour propre of one who was able and modern enough to

converse in English would not of course stand for such uncalled advice. A quarrel ensued and was on the point of leading to a fight when other passengers intervened and brought about peace, and it soon transpired that the offending party were really two English instructors in the University, whom Dr. Ma did not know, nor they recognized him as the president, being new in the office at that time.

Dr. Ma is a good dancer and knows the latest styles. He plays mahjong with a rapid hand, always taking up the new card without consulting the one to be discarded, true to the type of temperament we have just discussed. If he happens to be a loser, he would willingly stay up for the night, even though it is plain that in the end nobody really pays. He lives a very simple life. A lover of nature, in his house in Yanghang he used to be surrounded by all sorts of pets and cultivated plants. Amid a great number of hives he could look up and pick out the queen bee for you. He even cultivated strawberries. When he gave you a feast, he would let you know that all what you were given to eat were the product of the labor that himself and his much devoted wife had spent.

Chapter 32
Educational Facilities at Home

More than a million overseas Chinese are reported to have come back to China since the effect of the world-wide economic depression began to be felt in those regions to which they or their direct forbears had emigrated from China in recent decades. More are perhaps yet to come back in the future, when the disastrous effect will be appreciated by those who are at present still well-to-do. The economic rehabilitation of those who are already back is of course a serious problem, and we trust that the government with its specially established bureau is already looking into the matter. But no less serious is the question of education. While we have no statistics as to the demographic nature of the million that have returned, we have reasons to believe that the majority are young and able-bodied, for whom either productive employment or secondary or even higher education will have to be provided, unless the public is willing to see them drift their way and to stand the consequences that usually attend upon a laissez faire policy.

For secondary and college education, people will easily point their finger to the Chi-nan University at Chen-ju, about five miles from the port of Shanghai. Chi-nan is said to be the school for overseas Chinese. It was indeed established for their exclusive benefit. Even the name of the school is indicative; it means no other than "reaching to the south." Authorities of the school have constantly capitalized the theme of "overseas Chinese education," as if it were a new branch of education calling for special technique and method, over and above what the genius of Americans has created in this great field. Yet to all observers, it is apparent that the school has in recent years undergone a number of degenerative changes owing to many causes, the chief of which is mismanagement. Recently, there has been a change of hands in the control of the school. The Ministry of Education has now a more direct supervision over it. But whether the new administration is able to make good and to reinstall it

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. VII, No. 10, March 8, 1934, by the name of: C. T.)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_32

as the "highest institution of learning for the overseas Chinese" worthy of its name, is yet to be seen.

Since education for the overseas Chinese constitutes no special brand of education, we see no reason why overseas Chinese youths should not join other institutions of similar standing. In spite of all criticisms and even strictures against missionary education, we are of the opinion that colleges and universities with a missionary background are on the whole still the best managed throughout the land. We believe they deserve to be patronized at least as much as others which have a greater local color. To the overseas Chinese youths, accustomed as they have been to the English language from their childhood, such schools will prove particularly congenial. They form a good transition stage between their former oversea environment and the environment to which it is necessary to adapt themselves from now on. It must be added here of course that in purely Chinese studies, these schools have made up much of their former neglect in recent years, notably in Yenching, which now boasts of a special school for Chinese studies.

Of the government universities, Tsing Hua probably still leads in financial resource and equipment. The campus, the library, and the general atmosphere for quiet and steady pursuit of knowledge are perhaps unsurpassed. But in point of the rapidity of development both as to equipment and as to management, Wu-han must be ranked first, with the Central University following as a close second. Chiao-tung has become unusually solid in recent years, and as a school for technical studies, it deserves the first attention of all aspirants aiming to serve the homeland along material lines. Among the so-called private universities, Nan-kai easily leads in the van. The Universitato Utopia is also well managed, but it is a bit too conservative. The Great China has expanded somewhat too rapidly, but it has a very well-unified administration. Kwang Hua has an unusually fine middle school, but the university proper is still beset with difficulties.

Chapter 33
Birth Control and Oversea Chinese

In the *Sin Po* (《新报》), a daily paper published by the Chinese in Batavia, Java, we recently have the pleasure of reading a special article prepared by a well-known local physician. It was a long paper and had to appear in different installments between February 21 and March 5. The thesis, which the writer was intent upon proving, was the importance and necessity of birth control among the oversea Chinese. He started with a general survey of the adverse economic conditions of the Chinese in Batavia and elsewhere, particularly since the time when the effect of world depression began to tell on them. It was shown very suggestively, if not conclusively, that since 1930, not only unemployment has multiplied, but also those who still enjoy employment in some form now receive much smaller wages than they used to. Some statistical material was given, showing how within the period of a single year, from June 1, 1930 to June 1, 1931 the change from being well-to-do to poverty in some and from poverty to destitution in others was already well on its way. Yet, this reduction in economic well-being does not seem to have told upon the birth rate of the Chinese population, at least not among the poorer classes. The second part of the essay, therefore, gives a number of sample families, the two chief characteristics of which are utter poverty and unusual fecundity. One such sample may here be reproduced:

> Mr. O. P. L., aged 43, native of Fukien; wife, aged 33, of Hakka extraction. Peddler in preserved sweets, daily income less than 30 cents (仙), all going to the support of a family of seven. Whole family huddling in a bamboo-plaited house of one room, paying a monthly rental of 4 guilders (盾). Room without floor, not even paved with bricks. No kitchen, cooking done in the open at the rear of the house. No bath. Water bucketed from a near-by well. Kerosene lamps. Rental 5 months in arrears. Wife pregnant nine times since marriage: 1. a miscarriage after three months; 2. a girl, lived six months; 3. another girl, now aged 13; 4. a boy, died the seventh day after birth; 5. a third girl, lived 11 months; 6. a fourth girl, now seven years old; 7. a second boy, now in fifth year; 8.a fifth girl, now aged three; and the ninth child, a third boy, was born not quite a year ago with the help of free service from the Lying-in Hospital in the city.

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. VII, No. 16, April 19, 1934, by the name of: Q. P.)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_33

The last part of the paper is of course a plea for the dissemination of the knowledge of birth-control methods. With this plea we are in full accord. Under the present circumstances, the limitation of population is perhaps the only fundamental way of mitigating the suffering most people are in. This is a general truth which is now being reached by most far-seeing people. It is particularly pertinent with us Chinese. With those of us who have found sojourn overseas, the problem was formerly less acute, but as time goes on, the day of reckoning is bound to come with or without the depression. The depression has done nothing aside from hastening it. With those who are in Java, the seriousness of the situation is something entirely within expectation. Java is one of the most densely populated spots in the world, and easily the most congested region in the torrid zone, having as it does in a relatively small area a total population of over 300 millions. If birth control is not resorted to, we really do not see how the additional numbers are to be adequately absorbed in the future. Expansion and spread to neighboring regions are quite out of question. Emigration, like tariff, is nowadays confronted with high walls in all countries. China, the mother country, is in no position to take up any large numbers of home-coming migrants. The million or so that have come back as a result of depression are finding themselves quite maladjusted, with meager hopes of employment and settling down.

Perhaps there is no real difficulty in making people realize the importance and necessity of birth control under the circumstances we have been describing. The question is rather who is to attend to the formulation of a policy and to do the actual work of making contraceptive methods available to the poverty-stricken oversea Chinese. The special bureau that the government has specially organized for helping them does not seem to be very busily engaged, at least the bureau authorities are yet far from looking at the problem in the light that the essay we have just reviewed sheds. There are also a number of local organizations which are serving the less fortunate oversea Chinese in various capacities. But thus far it seems that their work does not go beyond economic relief or forms of assistance that would lead eventually to such relief. It is undoubtedly high time that the leaders who are at the back of these organizations should understand more fundamentally the nature of the problem they are faced with and attempt to formulate relief measures which are no less fundamental.

Chapter 34
Eugenics and Birth Regulation

I have here preferred to designate birth regulation what is commonly called birth control or limitation of parenthood. My reason is this. This term limitation of parenthood is entirely negative. It postulates that curtailment of births is almost necessary under all circumstances. But for the sake of racial welfare, which is essentially what eugenics is, we are well aware that there are situations and cases in which limitation is not only unnecessary, but also altogether uncalled for. The same sort of difficulty is found with the term birth control. In itself not negative, it has often been taken in a negative sense. At least the enthusiasts in the birth control movement have seldom, if at all, realized that control implies adjustment, that it may mean limitation as well as augmentation, restraint as well as release. That this is no incrimination is evidenced by the fact that they have often used birth control and contraception interchangeably. The term birth regulation is not open to such misinterpretation. It unmistakably implies adjustment. Indeed I could very well have made use of the term adaptive fertility first introduced by Professor Ross, but it is a bit unusual and perhaps unnecessarily academic.

I think it is high time that we should reorientate the birth control movement into one of birth regulation. In the new movement, the principal instrument will still of course be contraception, but it will be applied far more discriminately and wisely, with due and proportionate recognition of personal health, social economy, and racial welfare. Any instrument is open to abuse and misuse. Some people have likened contraceptive methods to a sword with two blades; in cutting things it may draw blood out of one's own hand. But why double blades, any ordinary sword is sufficiently dangerous in unthinking and ill-inhabited hands. An old Chinese saying runs, "For a child to wield a sword, great must be the havoc done." Or even take water, a same saying, exact to the letter, is found both in the English and Chinese

(Originally published in *The China Critic*, Vol. IX, No. 3, April 18, 1935, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_34

languages that while it floats a boat it also engulfs one (水所以载舟亦所以覆舟). So it is with contraceptive methods.

It must be admitted that up to the present day, the results achieved by the contraceptive movement in the west has not been entirely happy. Many factors have contributed to this, of which two are particularly potent, the philosophy of individualism on the part of those who are personally using the methods, and the mania for social service on the part of others who have been beguiled into thinking that a real panacea has been found to purge mankind of all its social ills. Had these two factors operated separately, the results might have been less unhappy, for then it would have turned out that the decline in birth rate would be something more general and irrespective of social classes and grades of biological quality. But apparently fate has decreed otherwise. The second factor has unwittingly played into the hands of the first. Instead of a common boon that is available to all people, the contraceptive methods have become the special prerogative of a relatively few who are in a position to acquire a knowledge of their use and to realize the immediate conveniences that such use confers. Social panacea or no social panacea, the immediate personal advantages are too real to give up, and the result is that the birth rate of the educated classes steadily declines until the trend becomes decidedly dysgenic. Such is the predicament that is now found in most western countries, particularly in those where the government has been stupid enough to declare the whole movement illegal and unconstitutional and attempt to stop the free and open dissemination of all contraceptive information. The undesirability of this state of affairs is now recognized by leaders who are by no means special students in eugenics, for example, Professor Ross in America and Lord Russell in England.

The situation in the West is already difficult to correct. The best that could be done under the circumstances is to make contraceptive knowledge simple and effective enough and the mechanical or chemical contrivances cheap enough to be easily available to all classes of people. If counterselective influences through the elimination of superior elements cannot be thwarted for the present, at least it could be counterbalanced to a certain extent by selective influences through the reduction of inferior elements. In other words, a general reduction without selection is preferable to mere counterselection. This is indeed what some of the more intelligent leaders of the birth control movement aim to achieve. The agitation led by Mrs. Sanger in America for the repeal of federal laws against the spread of contraceptive information has at least in part this object in view.

In China, the situation is perhaps more amenable to intelligent direction. The movement has had a much shorter history, indeed it may be questioned whether the sum total of scattered clamorings for birth control could be taken as a movement. While a considerable portion of the educated classes must have already acquired a working knowledge of contraception, particularly those who have had a foreign education, the degree of prevalence certainly cannot be compared with that obtaining in the West. In the West again, the development of the birth control movement antedated that of eugenics or race hygiene at least for more than three or four decades, but with us, there is no reason why the two things cannot be introduced together and be allowed to develop in conjunction.

We may yet begin at the right beginning, and shape the movement according to principles dictated by personal health, social economy, and racial welfare. Perhaps two different stages in the development may be recognized. The first I choose to call selective ministration, the second, general dissemination. The directing principle for the first stage is to be personal health, and for the second, that of social economy, and in both stages, the principle of racial well-being will be given due consideration.

In a country like China, the desirability of a general dissemination of contraceptive information is most obvious. Authorities may differ as to the total number of our population and the ability of our land and natural resources to support us, the need for some general reduction of our teeming millions is not only desirable but necessary from the standpoint of social economy. But necessary though it is, it cannot be done at present. It presupposes a number of conditions at least equally general, such as elementary education, a measure of public health and medical attention, without which the knowledge will fall upon stony ground.

So for the present the feasible thing to do will be selective ministration. Families in which the mothers are found to be of delicate health either due to sickness or to too frequent pregnancies will be individually ministered to. Family income is of course another factor to be taken into account, but in real importance, at least in this stage of selective ministration, I should rank it second to maternal health. In all cases, the hereditary qualities of the parents are of course fundamental and should be first attended to.

In those clinics that have been set up in the last 2 or 3 years in Peiping and Shanghai, we can already see a fair beginning of the first stage we have been discussing. The procedure that is followed in these clinics appears quite adequate. The importance of maternal health is sufficiently stressed. Only those families receive attention which have been investigated and ascertained to be really in need. It is to be expected that the example set by Peiping and Shanghai will soon be followed by other big cities throughout the country.

While we have faith in the serviceableness of such clinics, we cannot but feel anxious over that small class of people who, by virtue of their better social and economic position and greater educational advantages, are making free use of contraceptive knowledge and are unduly limiting the size of their families. Individually they may be achieving great fame and success for themselves, or socially may be doing a great deal of good, but racially, they must realize that they are nothing short of deserters.

Chapter 35
The Chinese as Believers

The first thing that any new comer from a western country notices about Chinese religious beliefs is their great variety. As is true of all peoples, innumerable beliefs and religious practices have their origin in animism. Animism really means the worship of all natural objects, including heaven and earth, the sun, moon and stars, great mountains and rivers, manifestations of natural forces such as lightening, thunder, wind, and rain, quite a proportion of animals and plants, particularly those which are noted for age, real or alleged, such as big trees and tortoises, for weird and unusual appearances, such as snakes and hedgehogs, for great utility and benefit to human life, such as at one time of Chinese history cats, horses, cattle, and even tigers, for mythical and legendary values, such as the dragon, the phoenix, and the unicorn, approaching in appearance to the mythical animals bearing the same names in the West since the time of the Egyptians. The worship of ancestors and illustrious men is really of the same category. While most of these beliefs are nationwide, some are quite local; the religious awe expressed in confronting a hedgehog, for instance, is perhaps only found in parts of north China. Again, in point of time, some of the beliefs have long outlived their usefulness, such as the respect paid to the cats and cattle largely out of a sense of gratitude. A complete inventory of animistic beliefs obviously cannot be made, but examples like these will suffice.

Next in historical sequence comes perhaps Taoism, said to be founded by Laotze, an older contemporary of Confucius, about 2,500 years ago. A fairly clear differentiation of two aspects of Taoism should be made. In the first place, it is an attempt at organization and rationalization of all the animistic beliefs mentioned in the previous paragraph. The attempt was more or less successful, even to the extent of establishing a monotheistic and trinitarian deity governing a hierarchy of lesser gods.

(Originally published in *Kunming*, [American] Red Cross Town Club (ed.), July, 1945, by the name of: Quentin Pan)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd
and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

G. Pan, *Socio-biological Implications of Confucianism*,
China Academic Library, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-44575-4_35

It also succeeded in evolving a sort of church with an ecclesiastic body and a hereditary papacy having its Vatican in the province of Kiangsi and this hereditary papacy was biological, as the Taoists, with the exception of a single sect since the time of the Mongols, have no scruples against marriage. The Taoist papacy lasted for almost 2,000 years and came to an end only about 20 years ago. The second aspect of Taoism is actually only a body of naturalistic and primitivistic philosophy; while it has been prevalent and deep-rooted to this day in the mentality of the Chinese people, I will not go into it, as it belongs to a category other than religious beliefs and practices.

Confucianism, dating back to the birth of Confucius, has also enjoyed a history of two millennia and a half. Like the second aspect of Taoism, it is far more a system of philosophy, which is best described as humanism, than of religion. Confucianism is quite clearly agnostic; while it is skeptical about all religions, it tolerates them all, as long as they do not develop to the point of dogmatism and fanaticism. In fact, it welcomes them all as instrumentalities of life, contributing to life color and richness, and with regard to certain portions of them, it actually takes over and sponsors as parts of its own system, such as the worship of ancestors and historical personalities who, by force of moral character, by political and economic accomplishments, or by learning and scholarship, have contributed much to Chinese culture. In comparison to other systems of philosophies, either independent or embodied in the different religions, Confucianism has had the most pervading influence on the warp and woof of Chinese social and cultural fabric.

A word should be said about the philosophy of Micius who came upon the scene shortly after Confucius. The system expounded by Micius, though short lived, had had a tremendous quasi-religious influence during the couple of 100 years it flourished. It was said, at one time, that half of China was teeming with the followers of Micius. In exalting the will of Heaven and the necessity of universal brotherhood among men, Micius anticipated in a considerable measure of what Jesus had to teach a few centuries later in the land of Canaan.

Buddhism was the first foreign religion to come into China, dating back as far as the first century of the Christian era, and it has flourished ever since, partly as a system of philosophy and metaphysics among the more intellectual elements of the population and partly as a body of idolatrous worship in the rank and file, some of its beliefs and practices later on coming to be quite indistinguishable from those of animism and Taoism.

Mohammedanism came to China during the sixth century and has found its believers largely in north-west China, in the provinces of Sinkiang and Kansu. Yunnan has had a considerable population of Mohammedans since the time of Mongols. The third religion to come from outside was Christianity, first in the form of the unitarian Nestorianism in the seventh century which next as Franciscan Catholicism during the Mongol dynasty very soon went out of existence, still later as Jesuit Catholicism toward the end of the sixteenth century, and finally as Protestantism about a century ago. Mention should also be made of a couple of 1,000 Jews, known to the Chinese as “blue-capped Mohammedans” who came into China during the tenth or eleventh century and who have been gradually absorbed

into the Chinese population, both biologically and culturally, and now only a very small remnant is found in the province of Honan.

To friends from the west, such an array of religions and bodies of superstitions, existing together and fairly amicably associating one with another in the same community, would seem quite strange and inexplicable. But the Chinese take it as a matter of course, knowing as they do practically nothing about religious persecution which has blackened much of Western history, and to those who do know, such persecution would in turn appear strange and inexplicable. If reasons are to be sought for this great difference in feelings, I venture to suggest the following.

1. Except perhaps in the earliest historical period and before the introduction of Christianity and Mohammedanism, the Chinese had no knowledge of any so-called revealed religion. To the ordinary Chinese with a modicum of Confucian education, religion is man-made, on a par with the arts and philosophies and other cultural instrumentalities designed to further man's adaptability to nature and to social life. Religion may be taken as instrumentality in itself; it enlivens the human spirit, either individually or collectively; it gives to life color and richness, just as music or literature would do. It may also be taken as a means to help along some other instrumentality. An old woman, for instance, may be in the habit of kowtowing more than two score of times before the Buddhistic Madonna in her family shrine every morning; she does that of course as an expression of piety, but at the same time she is thereby also improving her health by regular physical exercise, which, be it consciously or unconsciously done, after all does her more real good than the mere expression of piety. So long as saying prayers is mentally helpful and regular kowtowing physically therapeutic, why must other people bother about one's doing them in the Taoistic, Buddhistic, or some other ways.
2. Again under the permeating influence of Confucian humanism, the ordinary Chinese has learned to be tolerant toward all kinds of human differences, religious, or otherwise. Thus, all over the country, one finds Buddhist as well as Taoist temples stand side by side. Of the three major temples in the western hills overlooking the Kunming Lake, two are Buddhist and one, near the precipice made by landslide, is Taoist. In many temples particularly in south-west China, one finds Confucius, Laotze, and Gautama Buddha sitting in the same shrine. Again, in funeral procession or in a memorial service, one finds groups of Taoist priests, Buddhist monks, and occasionally Buddhist nuns as well, walking in close succession, playing music, or chanting respective sutras in regular shifts. Situations like these reminds one of a symposium of essays or an anthology of poems contributed by authors belonging to different literary schools; if a critic should raise on outcry on the ground that not all contributors are classicists or romanticists, nothing is gained aside from betraying his own narrow-mindedness and bigotry.

In this spirit of tolerance, credit must also be given to Buddhism and Taoism themselves, for neither of them, unlike Christianity and Mohammedanism, is known to have exhibited any high degree of dogmatism and exclusiveness. A simple instance will make this clear. The Y.M.C.A. in China has been for decades in the habit of holding summer conferences and retreat meetings in the Buddhist or Taoist

temples in the surrounding hills of large cities, and, as far as I know, has never met any rebuff on religious grounds. The other way round would be utterly inconceivable!

3. It is also noteworthy that the devotees of various religions have themselves learned to be moderate in their beliefs, expressions, and practices, again largely through Confucian influences. Both Taoism and Buddhism have never been truly proselytizing, still less militantly so. Crusaders, revival meetings, and other forms of collective fanaticism are either totally absent or extremely seldom in Chinese history. While new sects have sprung up from time to time, sectariane strifes are quite unheard of. Mention has already been made that the Taoists have no scruples against normal married life. It is true that Buddhist monks and nuns embrace celibacy, they at the same time inculcate family virtues upon their patrons and devotees, and when the latter decide to launch upon the other-worldly course and forsake family and social life, they would advise postponement until their parents are safely dead or the children properly brought up.

In conclusion, I would like to refer to a remark with regard to the Christian religion made by Francis Galton, the well-known English author and scientist. When he said, “The Church has brutalized the breed of our forefathers”, he was perhaps making too strong a condemnation of Christianity, for which I personally hold great admiration and which would undoubtedly enrich the life of the Chinese people if we have more of it. But I am equally convinced that a verdict like this, in any sense applicable to the Christian religion, is altogether inapplicable to religious beliefs in China, no matter whether they are indigenous growths or transplants that have become acclimatized.